
https://www.bbc.com/news/live/uk-politics-64945036?page=2
Introduction
The AUKUS pa
rtne
rship between Aust
ralia, the United Kingdom, and the United States is one of the most audacious
defense indust
rial effo
rts to meet the challenge of China’s
rising milita
ry powe
r.
1 While most attention has focused on what is called ‘Pilla
r 1’ to const
ruct a fleet of nuclea
r-powe
red, conventionally a
rmed subma
rines, the th
ree AUKUS count
ries a
re also pu
rsuing ‘Pilla
r 2’ coope
ration to develop cutting-edge milita
ry technologies that complement the subma
rine ente
rp
rise. Th
ree yea
rs since it was announced, the potential expansion of Pilla
r 2 membe
rship to include othe
r U.S. allies and pa
rtne
rs ma
rks a new phase in minilate
ral secu
rity coope
ration in the Indo-Pacific.
2 But should the
Republic of Ko
rea join AUKUS Pilla
r 2?
This
Asan Issue Brief explains what AUKUS Pilla
r 2 is and conside
rs the costs and benefits of
ROK collabo
ration with the AUKUS ente
rp
rise. The Issue B
rief p
roceeds as follows. Fi
rst, it
reviews how the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship has p
rog
ressed ove
r the past th
ree yea
rs ac
ross both the Pilla
r 1 nuclea
r subma
rine ente
rp
rise as well as the Pilla
r 2 advanced milita
ry capabilities st
reams. Second, it compa
res the
respective cases fo
r expanding AUKUS to include eithe
r Ko
rea o
r Japan based on thei
r relationships with the AUKUS count
ries. Thi
rd, it add
resses how
defense t
rade cont
rols unde
r AUKUS might affect
ROK conside
rations about membe
rship. Finally, it offe
rs five options that
ROK policymake
rs, but also othe
r potential membe
rs, should conside
r in how to app
roach potential collabo
ration on Pilla
r 2, including ‘go ha
rd and go ea
rly,’ ‘wait and see,’ 'plug and play,’ ‘p
roposing Pilla
r 3,’ and ‘opting out.’ The Issue B
rief concludes with some obse
rvations about how the
re-election of P
resident Donald T
rump in the United States could c
reate oppo
rtunities fo
r naval shipbuilding coope
ration in at least some pa
rts of the AUKUS ente
rp
rise.
1. Understanding AUKUS Pillars 1 and 2
In 2021, du
ring the COVID-19 pandemic and Aust
ralia’s diplomatic and economic stand-off with China, Aust
ralian P
rime Ministe
r Scott Mo
rrison and his closest adviso
rs and ministe
rs sec
retly negotiated with B
ritish P
rime Ministe
r Bo
ris Johnson and U.S. P
resident Joe Biden’s National Secu
rity Council on a t
rilate
ral pa
rtne
rship to help Aust
ralia acqui
re a fleet of nuclea
r-powe
red subma
rines. Announced to the wo
rld in Septembe
r 2021, the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship ma
rked the fi
rst time that the United States would t
ransfe
r naval nuclea
r p
ropulsion technology used to powe
r the U.S. Navy’s attack subma
rines with anothe
r count
ry since helping the United Kingdom in the late 1950s.
The announcement was followed by an 18-month consultation pe
riod between the th
ree gove
rnments to dete
rmine the ‘optimal pathway’ fo
r acqui
ring conventionally a
rmed, nuclea
r-powe
red subma
rines (SSN), du
ring which time two of the o
riginal th
ree political a
rchitects we
re
replaced as leade
rs. The optimal pathway concluded that Pilla
r 1 would p
roceed in seve
ral phases to build up Aust
ralia’s nuclea
r stewa
rdship to
receive and ope
rate nuclea
r-powe
red subma
rines. The fi
rst phase would be known as Subma
rine
Rotational Fo
rce-West (S
RF-West) to b
ring fou
r U.S. Vi
rginia-class SSNs and one UK Astute-class SSN on
rotational deployments to Aust
ralia beginning in 2027. The second phase would see the United States t
ransfe
r to Aust
ralia at least th
ree Vi
rginia-class subma
rines beginning in 2032-33 at th
ree-yea
r inte
rvals. The final phase would see Aust
ralia and the United Kingdom each build thei
r own fleets of ‘SSN-AUKUS’-class subma
rines with the fi
rst delive
ry fo
r Aust
ralia in the ea
rly 2040s.
Alongside this so-called Pilla
r 1, the th
ree count
ries also ag
reed to coope
rate on cutting-edge milita
ry technologies with
relevance to unde
rsea wa
rfa
re and the objectives of nuclea
r-powe
red subma
rines to p
rovide long-
range dete
rrence and st
rike capabilities. These Pilla
r 2 capabilities would, ove
r time, come to include six specific technology st
reams including unde
rsea capabilities, quantum technologies, a
rtificial intelligence and autonomy, advanced cybe
r, hype
rsonic and counte
r-hype
rsonic capabilities, elect
ronic wa
rfa
re, as well as coope
ration on the innovation and info
rmation-sha
ring
regimes necessa
ry fo
r thei
r implementation ac
ross th
ree distinct
defense science and technology systems.
3 Th
roughout 2022-23, the AUKUS count
ries conducted multiple pilot p
rojects, including a joint exe
rcise of unde
rsea d
rones, cont
racts fo
r quantum clocks fo
r navigation and timing, AI-enabled swa
rm d
rones, a P-8 Poseidon ai
rc
raft ma
ritime sonobuoy IS
R test, and launched the AUKUS
Defense Investo
r Netwo
rk including 300 companies wo
rth $265 billion.
Pilla
rs 1 and 2 of the AUKUS ente
rp
rise ultimately seek to inc
rease the collective milita
ry powe
r of the th
ree count
ries in the Indo-Pacific ma
ritime theate
r to dete
r China’s
rapidly g
rowing naval capabilities. Unlike othe
r minilate
ral pa
rtne
rships such as the Quad which t
ry to avoid ove
rt milita
ry connotations, AUKUS is, by design, a
defense indust
rial effo
rt to build specific milita
ry capabilities. This is demonst
rated by the leading
role of the Aust
ralian Depa
rtment of Defence in publishing the guiding policy documents that info
rm the st
rategy and implementation of both pilla
rs of the AUKUS ente
rp
rise, including the 2023
Defense St
rategic
Review, 2023
Defense Indust
ry Development St
rategy, 2024 National
Defense St
rategy and Integ
rated Investment Plan, and 2024
Defense Innovation, Science and Technology St
rategy. The U.S. and UK counte
rpa
rts have simila
rly a
rticulated the policy p
rocess fo
r achieving the AUKUS ente
rp
rise.
Table 1. AUKUS Pillars 1 and 2

2. Expanding AUKUS Pillar 2
Th
roughout late 2023 and ea
rly 2024, the AUKUS count
ries began to note thei
r desi
re to b
roaden coope
ration on Pilla
r 2 capabilities with key allies and pa
rtne
rs. At the AUKUS
Defense Ministe
rs’ Joint Statement in Ap
ril 2024, the ministe
rs outlined five c
rite
ria fo
r conside
ration: technological innovation, financing, indust
rial st
rengths, ability to adequately p
rotect sensitive data and info
rmation, and impact on p
romoting peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific
region.
4 On the thi
rd annive
rsa
ry of AUKUS in Septembe
r 2024, the AUKUS leade
rs fu
rthe
r added, “
Recognizing these count
ries' close bilate
ral
defense pa
rtne
rships with each membe
r of AUKUS, we a
re consulting with Canada, New Zealand, and the
Republic of Ko
rea to identify possibilities fo
r collabo
ration on advanced capabilities unde
r AUKUS Pilla
r 2.”
5
ROK commenta
ry has been
rife with misinfo
rmation about what AUKUS is. Some have f
ramed it as a pu
rely civilian science and technology pa
rtne
rship, a
defense indust
ry expo
rt oppo
rtunity, o
r even a tool to dete
r No
rth Ko
rean milita
ry th
reats.
6 ROK inte
rest in collabo
rating with the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship, not to mention othe
r minilate
ral pa
rtne
rships, is subject to changing th
reat pe
rceptions of China. Meanwhile, the Chinese Minist
ry of Fo
reign Affai
rs has condemned any expansion of AUKUS as “stoking bloc conf
rontation.”
7 While the p
rog
ressive-leaning Democ
ratic Pa
rty has not given a position
rega
rding collabo
ration with the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship, it will likely be mo
re cautious and sensitive to this imp
ression. Meanwhile, the Yoon administ
ration’s inte
rest in Pilla
r 2 is pa
rt of a wide
r effo
rt to
re-engage nascent minilate
ral pa
rtne
rships.
8
The AUKUS debate thus pa
rallels simila
r discussions in the
ROK about the me
rits of pa
rticipating in othe
r U.S.-led minilate
rals, such as the Five Eyes intelligence sha
ring pa
rtne
rship, the Quad
rilate
ral Secu
rity Dialogue, and the Camp David
ROK-U.S.-Japan secu
rity pa
rtne
rship. Fo
rme
r Ministe
r of
Defense Shin Won-sik stated du
ring the
ROK-Aust
ralia 2+2 Fo
reign and
Defense Ministe
rs’ Meeting on May 2024, “The Ko
rean gove
rnment, to enhance the
regional peace, we suppo
rt the AUKUS Pilla
r 2 activities,” adding that “Ko
rea's
defense science and technology capabilities will cont
ribute to the peace and stability of the development of AUKUS Pilla
r 2 and the
regional peace.”
9
3. KAUKUS vs. JAUKUS: Unpacking Relations
This section compa
res the
relative me
rits of the
ROK and Japan’s potential to join an expanded AUKUS Pilla
r 2 pa
rtne
rship. It focuses on the th
ree bilate
ral
relationships that will unde
rpin any collective coope
ration, with Aust
ralia, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Fi
rst, Japan is widely conside
red the f
ront
runne
r candidate fo
r any expansion of AUKUS.
10 The White House
released a joint statement stating that “AUKUS pa
rtne
rs and Japan a
re explo
ring oppo
rtunities to imp
rove inte
rope
rability of thei
r ma
ritime autonomous systems as an initial a
rea of coope
ration.”
11 U.S.-Japan
defense indust
ry coope
ration is being upg
raded since the signing of a
Recip
rocal
Defense P
rocu
rement ag
reement (
RDP) in 2016 and Japan is now able to facilitate co-development and co-p
roduction of advanced missiles, missile
defense, and U.S. naval maintenance,
repai
r, and ove
rhaul (M
RO) suppo
rt.
Japan is also a st
rategic pa
rtne
r of Aust
ralia th
rough the Aust
ralia-Japan Joint Decla
ration on Secu
rity Coope
ration of 2007 and the Special St
rategic Pa
rtne
rship (SSP) established in 2014.
12 Also, the Aust
ralia-Japan
Recip
rocal Access Ag
reement (
RAA) was signed in Janua
ry 2022 to fu
rthe
r p
romote bilate
ral secu
rity and
defense coope
ration. This ag
reement was Japan’s fi
rst such t
reaty aside f
rom with the United States.
13 Japan and the United Kingdom a
re also close pa
rtne
rs, most
recently signing the Hi
roshima Acco
rd in 2023, defined by both count
ries as “an enhanced UK-Japan global st
rategic pa
rtne
rship.”
14 The two count
ries also signed an
RAA in 2023.
15 Aust
ralia, the United States, and Japan sta
rted the T
rilate
ral St
rategic Dialogue (TSD) in 2002, which fi
rst began at the level of senio
r officials, but is now elevated to the level of fo
reign ministe
rs.
On the othe
r hand, the
ROK’s
relationship with the AUKUS count
ries has been mo
re uneven compa
red to Japan. Building on the momentum of the 2023 Washington Decla
ration and Camp David Summit, the
ROK-U.S.
Defense Vision outlined a way fo
rwa
rd fo
r the secu
rity and
defense of the two count
ries and they affi
rmed to play a mo
re active
role in cont
ributing to
regional secu
rity.
16 Yet despite significant effo
rt by the Yoon administ
ration to upg
rade
defense indust
ry coope
ration with the United States, including signing a Secu
rity of Supply A
rrangement (SOSA) in late 2023, the two count
ries have not yet signed an
RDP due to U.S. Cong
ressional pushback.
17 At the 2024
ROK-U.S. Secu
rity Consultative Meeting (SCM) in Octobe
r 2024, the two count
ries ag
reed to establish a vice-ministe
r level
defense science and technology executive committee to “explo
re the application of cutting-edge science and technology in the
defense secto
r, as well as coope
ration on AUKUS Pilla
r 2.”
18Meanwhile,
ROK-Aust
ralia
relations have inc
reased significantly since the 2021 Comp
rehensive St
rategic Pa
rtne
rship (CSP) was announced.
19 Bilate
ral
defense indust
ry coope
ration has also begun with acquisitions fo
r self-p
ropelled howitze
rs and infant
ry fighting vehicles.
Relations between the
ROK and the United Kingdom we
re st
rengthened th
rough signing the Downing St
reet Acco
rd in 2023, becoming a ‘global st
rategic pa
rtne
rship’ and ag
reed to launch a 2+2 ministe
rial meeting on fo
reign affai
rs and
defense.
20
The compa
rison between South Ko
rea and Japan’s
relations with the AUKUS count
ries is outlined in Table 2. What it demonst
rates is that the scope of South Ko
rea’s secu
rity coope
ration with Aust
ralia and the United Kingdom continues to lag behind that of Japan. This pa
rtly explains why the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship as a collective has been keene
r to conside
r Japan as an initial pa
rtne
r. Howeve
r, it also shows that the
re a
re oppo
rtunities fo
r ROK officials to upg
rade and fill in the gaps, something that the Yoon administ
ration has made a clea
r p
rio
rity.
Table 2. ROK and Japan Relations with AUKUS Countries

4. Defense Trade Control Considerations
A
rguably the most impo
rtant outcome of AUKUS ove
r the past th
ree yea
rs has not been in p
roducing a milita
ry capability to dete
r China, but
rathe
r the t
ransfo
rmation of the
defense expo
rt cont
rol
regime among the th
ree count
ries. The
re has been eno
rmous p
rog
ress in the AUKUS ente
rp
rise st
reamlining the th
ree count
ries’
defense t
rade cont
rols and expo
rt cont
rol
regimes. Despite thei
r longstanding milita
ry coope
ration as pa
rt of the Five Eyes intelligence sha
ring pa
rtne
rship and membe
rship in the U.S. National Technology and Indust
rial Base (NTIB), many Aust
ralian expe
rts and officials had long been f
rust
rated by the one
rous
rest
rictions on close
r defense indust
rial coope
ration and integ
ration.
In the months following the AUKUS announcements, legislatu
res in all th
ree count
ries moved to
refo
rm expo
rt cont
rol policies. The 2024 U.S. Cong
ress National
Defense Autho
rization Act (NDAA) legalized Aust
ralian M
RO of U.S. SSNs, Aust
ralian wo
rkfo
rce t
raining in the United States, and wide-
ranging
refo
rms to
defense t
rade cont
rols. Togethe
r, these initiatives a
re expected to
result in license-f
ree t
rade fo
r 70 pe
rcent of
defense expo
rts f
rom the United States to Aust
ralia, and ove
r 80 pe
rcent f
rom Aust
ralia to the United States.
24 Also, the U.S. Depa
rtment of State published an inte
rim final
rule to amend the Inte
rnational T
raffic in A
rms
Regulations (ITA
R) and implemented an expo
rt licensing exemption fo
r Aust
ralia and the United Kingdom, which became effective f
rom Septembe
r 1, 2024.
25
In the coming yea
rs, Pilla
r 2 coope
ration will p
roduce common milita
ry technologies only sha
red among the AUKUS count
ries. The
re will be one
rous data and info
rmation secu
rity p
rotections and st
rict cont
rols ove
r any p
rolife
ration o
r expo
rt, let alone comme
rcial sale, of such capabilities. Any decision by Ko
rea to join AUKUS must the
refo
re ca
refully conside
r how it might affect its own
defense indust
rial expo
rt ambitions. At the same time, if the
ROK’s ultimate goal is close
r integ
ration in the eme
rging common
defense indust
rial ecosystem led by the United States, then AUKUS
refo
rms offe
r a valuable lea
rning model. Many
ROK
defense fi
rms have long sought to b
reak into the la
rge U.S. and so-called Five Eyes
defense ma
rket given thei
r own longstanding sha
ring of technologies and integ
rated supply chains.
26 The
ROK-U.S. alliance itself is
responding to these cues. Fo
r example, the 23
rd ROK-U.S. Integ
rated
Defense Dialogue emphasized “st
rengthening the connection between U.S. and
ROK
defense indust
rial bases to enhance inte
rope
rability and inte
rchangeability within the Alliance
defense a
rchitectu
re.”
27
5. Five Options for ROK Consideration
Whethe
r o
r not South Ko
rea is ultimately invited to join the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship is a matte
r fo
r the gove
rnments of Aust
ralia, the United States, and the United Kingdom.
Rathe
r, this Issue B
rief has outlined the t
rajecto
ry of this t
rilate
ral pa
rtne
rship to enable
ROK officials to bette
r weigh the potential benefits and costs of membe
rship. Should such an invitation be extended to Seoul, the
ROK can then conside
r how it might
respond. This Issue B
rief concludes by examining five options, including ‘go ha
rd and go ea
rly,’ ‘wait and see,’ the 'plug and play' app
roach, building a ‘Pilla
r 3’ line of effo
rt, and staying out. These options also apply to the othe
r p
rospective membe
r count
ries of Japan, Canada, New Zealand, and potentially othe
rs in the nea
r futu
re.
Option 1 is to ‘go ha
rd and go ea
rly.’ Being a latecome
r to minilate
ral pa
rtne
rships has been a
recu
rring challenge fo
r ROK fo
reign policy.
28 The most obvious example of this has been
ROK engagement with the Quad, which Seoul declined to join out of fea
r of antagonizing China, only to late
r exp
ress inte
rest in joining the pa
rtne
rship afte
r it had developed a complex bu
reauc
ratic a
rchitectu
re.
29 In the case of AUKUS, the
ROK can be a fi
rst move
r to shape the agenda f
rom within and it could pa
rticipate in the still ea
rly stages of Pilla
r 2 coope
ration. The
risk of such a st
rategy would, howeve
r, be that the
ROK would need to be able to c
redibly offe
r something of value to the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship that is not al
ready possessed.
Option 2 would be to take a ‘wait and see’ app
roach that adopts st
rategic patience to join at the last possible moment when the
re has been significant p
rog
ress ac
ross some o
r all of the Pilla
r 2 capabilities of inte
rest to
ROK
defense scientists. The
risk of such a st
rategy would be that t
rying to join at such a late stage would
requi
re majo
r regulato
ry
refo
rms and legal changes that the AUKUS count
ries had spent many yea
rs implementing. As such, the ent
ry costs would g
row ove
r time.
Option 3 would be to take a ‘plug and play’ app
roach that sought to isolate coope
ration in specific Pilla
r 2 st
reams, such as joining info
rmation-sha
ring, quantum, and cybe
r while negotiating ‘K-
defense’ ca
rveouts fo
r hype
rsonics, unde
rsea d
rones, and AI and autonomy whe
re
ROK companies may have comme
rcial expo
rt ambitions. This would p
rese
rve the
defense indust
ry expo
rt angle while offe
ring coope
ration on a case-by-case basis. Fo
r example, the
ROK and AUKUS count
ries could t
rial sta
rt a test on P-8A Poseidon ai
rc
raft IS
R info
rmation-sha
ring
recently conducted since the
ROK Navy
recently acqui
red its fleet of six P-8A Poseidon ai
rc
raft. The
risk of such a st
rategy is that, given the p
receding discussion of
defense t
rade cont
rols, it
remains unclea
r if eme
rging Pilla
r 2 st
reams can be siloed fo
r legal pu
rposes.
Option 4 would be to pu
rsue what some expe
rts have called ‘Pilla
r 3’ coope
ration on existing milita
ry capabilities in sho
rt supply.
30 Fo
r example, the
ROK could wo
rk with AUKUS and non-AUKUS pa
rtne
rs to scale up co-p
roduction of munitions and weapons systems, which the United States is st
ruggling to
replace, such as 155 mm a
rtille
ry shells, Stinge
r anti-ai
rc
raft systems, Javelin anti-a
rmo
r systems, and multiple launch
rocket systems.
31 The
ROK’s
recent a
rms deals to ‘backfill’ Eu
ropean a
rsenals could be expanded into a wide
r initiative that combines comme
rcial and st
rategic pa
rtne
rships with the AUKUS count
ries.
32 This would allow the
ROK to coope
rate with the AUKUS count
ries while avoiding much of the complex legal and expo
rt cont
rol changes occu
rring in Pilla
rs 1 and 2.
Finally, option 5 would be ‘opt-out’ and decline any invitation fo
r defense indust
rial coope
ration. In doing so, the
ROK can p
rese
rve its ‘K-
defense’ expo
rt agenda, not antagonize China in te
rms of st
rategic signaling, avoid any pe
rceived competition with Japan, and potentially even develop its own Pilla
r 1 SSN pathway independently. It could also pu
rsue civilian, non-milita
ry science and technology coope
ration such as on d
rones and AI th
rough alte
rnative minilate
ral pa
rtne
rships. The
risk of such a st
rategy would be that the
ROK is eventually
relegated to a diffe
rent tie
r of alliance coope
ration.
Conclusion
This
Asan Issue Brief has examined the case fo
r whethe
r Ko
rea should join the AUKUS Pilla
r 2 pa
rtne
rship. Fo
r U.S. allies looking to join the AUKUS ente
rp
rise o
r build simila
r a
rrangements of thei
r own, the
re a
re impo
rtant lessons in te
rms of how to design the ‘optimal pathway’ to be suitably favo
rable to the United States and ea
rn its t
rust and suppo
rt. Yet, in many
respects, the Pilla
r 2 debate sidesteps the bigge
r question about why the United States has chosen to sha
re its naval nuclea
r p
ropulsion technology with Aust
ralia in a ‘one-off’ deal. It is wo
rth
recalling that when the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship was fi
rst announced in 2021, p
rominent Ko
rean expe
rts lamented that the United States had long
resisted any such a
rrangement with the
ROK.
33 In the yea
rs to come, as No
rth Ko
rea, China, and
Russia’s nuclea
r-powe
red and nuclea
r-a
rmed subma
rine capabilities inc
rease, the U.S. position may change, as al
ready hinted by senio
r U.S. milita
ry commande
rs.
34
In the meantime, the expansion of AUKUS Pilla
r 2
rep
resents an impo
rtant new phase in st
rengthening
defense indust
rial collabo
ration between the United States, Aust
ralia, the United Kingdom, and U.S. allies and pa
rtne
rs. Option 1 (‘go ha
rd and go ea
rly’) o
r Option 3 (‘plug and play’) should be the fo
remost conside
rations based on an assessment of
ROK
defense science and technology st
rengths and weaknesses ac
ross the Pilla
r 2 capabilities. Option 4 (‘Pilla
r 3’) should be actively pu
rsued
rega
rdless of whethe
r the
ROK ultimately joins the AUKUS pa
rtne
rship. Options 2 (‘wait and see’) and 5 (‘opt-out’) should be conside
red if the
re is no possibility of building and maintaining bipa
rtisan suppo
rt fo
r coope
ration and effo
rts should then be focused on pu
rely bilate
ral alliance
defense science and technology coope
ration with the United States exclusively to deal with No
rth Ko
rean milita
ry technologies.
The
re-election of P
resident T
rump to the White House adds a new va
riable to the AUKUS debate. The
re is a st
rong case to suggest that the AUKUS a
rrangement as envisioned ove
r the next fou
r yea
rs is sufficiently favo
rable to the T
rump administ
ration fo
r it to continue the pa
rtne
rship. Aust
ralia will t
ransfe
r $3 billion investment di
rectly to the United States ove
r the next th
ree yea
rs to suppo
rt the U.S. subma
rine indust
rial base. The United States will begin to fo
rwa
rd deploy its Vi
rginia-class attack subma
rines to Aust
ralia’s naval facilities in 2027, the thi
rd yea
r of his te
rm. And the c
rucial date fo
r the t
ransfe
r of the fi
rst Vi
rginia-class subma
rine will only take place afte
r he leaves office so he is unlikely to conce
rn him. It
remains to be seen whethe
r P
resident T
rump and his adviso
rs will judge the cu
rrent financial and indust
rial integ
ration a
rrangements as benefitting the United States, but the nea
r-te
rm outlook is good. P
resident T
rump has focused on g
reate
r ROK-U.S. t
roop cost-sha
ring and ta
riff policy
re-balancing but he has also exp
ressed a desi
re to coope
rate with the
ROK on shipbuilding. This suggests that the
re is scope fo
r close
r defense indust
rial coope
ration in at least some pa
rts of the AUKUS ente
rp
rise.
35
The views expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views of the Asan Institute for Policy Studies.
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