ASAN PLENUM 2012

L E A D E R S H I P

Proceedings

April 25-27, 2012

THE ASAN INSTITUTE for POLICY STUDIES

Save the Date

Asan Plenum 2013

"New World Disorder"

April 30 – May 2, 2013
Seoul, Korea

L E A D E R S H I P

THE ASAN INSTITUTE for POLICY STUDIES

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About the Asan Plenum

The *Asan Plenum* is a yearly gathering of the world's leading think tanks in Seoul, Korea to discuss the pressing challenges facing the world. The *Asan Plenum* is a multi-day, multi-session conference with each panel organized by an individual global think tank. This division of labor capitalizes on each think tank's different strengths and expertise and ensures a diversity of opinion and perspective, so as to bring together as wide and deep a knowledge base as possible. In addressing the most pressing challenges facing the world with experts from around the globe, the *Asan Plenum* aims to positively influence the policymaking process and enable the international community to better address those challenges.

Asan Plenum 2012: "Leadership"

From the uprisings across the Arab world to the seismic tremors in the European Union, and from the ravaged economy of the United States to the Fukushima disaster in Japan, the world is beset with crises, many of which resonate far beyond national borders. Such crises can unmake—or forge—political leaders. 2012 marks a particularly significant year for political leadership, with an unusually large number of elections and other political transitions taking place around the world.

The *Asan Plenum 2012* convened policymakers, analysts, scholars and members of the media in Seoul for three days of intensive discussion about the role of leadership in responding to a wide range of political and economic crises around the globe. How are leaders responding to crises? Where have they been

effective or ineffective and why? And how should new leaders prepare to face the challenges confronting them as they take office?

This year's *Asan Plenum* featured 23 regional panels and four additional panels covering a range of cross-regional issues. Four plenary sessions brought the heads of some of the world's leading think tanks together with renowned public intellectuals and journalists to discuss the crises and broad trends defining today's global political landscape.

Format

In terms of both timing and location, the *Asan Plenum* is designed to maximize its impact on the unfolding global conversation on leadership issues. The "conversational" format of the plenum allows for maximum interaction among the panelists and participants. Parallel break-out sessions and intimate group lunch sessions provide further opportunities for in-depth and focused discussions.

About the Asan Institute

The Asan Institute for Policy Studies is an independent think tank that provides innovative policy solutions and spearheads public discourse on many of the core issues that Korea, East Asia and the global community face.

In particular, the Institute's mandate is to contribute to peace, prosperity, and unification of the Korean Peninsula by engaging issues pertaining to national security, foreign affairs, and governance, both domestic and global.

The goal of the Institute is not only to offer policy solutions but also to train experts in public diplomacy and related fields in order to strengthen Korea's capacity to better tackle some of the most pressing problems affecting the country, the region and the world today.

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April 25, 2012

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Opening Ceremony

Date: April 25, 2012
Place: Grand Ballroom

Opening Remarks by Dr. Hahm Chaibong, President of the Asan Institute

Welcome. This year's theme is leadership. And I'm very happy to report that we have 22 think tanks and research institutions officially participating as partners. That is, 22 of your institutes have actually organized a panel, each on a specific theme. Then there are, of course, at least 150 of you, last count, from abroad. We also have a group of young scholars in their graduate programs, who are also participating, 33 of them, as official rapporteurs. None of this includes, of course, the audience of experts from within Korea. And also we have a very large participation from the diplomatic corps in Korea.

I would like to give a special thanks to all of you, but especially to Dr. Chung Mong Joon, our founder and Honorary Chairman, who is here and will be with us for most of the conference, and to Prime Minister Lee Hong-Koo, who will soon be giving us the keynote speech. But a special word of thanks to many of the National Assembly members. You know what season it is this time of year in Korea, and it means a lot to me that they made the time and effort to come and join us. Thank you very much.

Welcoming Remarks by Dr. Lee In-ho, Chairperson of the Asan Institute

Your Excellencies, Dr. Chung Mong Joon, and dear participants, it is a great honor for me to welcome you all to the *Asan Plenum 2012* and to introduce our keynote speaker.

This is only the second time the Asan Institute has hosted a conference of this scale. As most of you already know, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies is a privately funded think tank inspired by the ideal of overcoming poverty and securing lasting peace and prosperity not only for Korea but for the entire world community. This was the ideal to which our namesake "Asan," the late Mr. Chung Ju-Yung, the founder of the Hyundai Group, dedicated his life. His son, our founder, Chung Mong Joon, the seven-term elected national assemblyman, thought that he would continue his father's work. If the late Mr. Chung had tried to attain his ideal by producing better goods and services, the younger Mr. Chung thought that he would carry on his father's heritage by helping enhance the quality of public policy making and implementation. The Asan Institute strives to achieve this purpose first, by promoting research on public policy issues of foremost priority in the world, providing venues for exchange of ideas and opinion among experts from different walks of public life, including academic specialists, and lastly by serving as a training ground for future public policy makers.

The Plenum, as the word should indicate, is the most comprehensive of the many conferences and seminars organized by the institute every year. *The Asan Plenum 2011* was dedicated to the most critical issue of our nuclear future. It was partly in anticipation of the Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, which just took place last month with great success. This year, we chose the topic, which is no less critical, 'leadership.' In light of what happened in West Asia and Africa during the past year or two, and what might be expected to happen after this year's multiple elections are over, the critical importance of leadership is very much on everyone's minds. But, no one at this point is sure what leadership really means. After the ordeal everyone connected with Iraq had gone through, some people, not just cynics, began to wonder if even Saddam Hussein was the worst leader that Iraq could have had. What is leadership and how much can be expected of it in these days of democracy—bordering sometimes on mobocracy—and also Internet terrorism?

It is my happy duty to introduce or present to you someone who is far better equipped than I to explain to you why it is so important to raise the issue of leadership at this particular moment. Here is a true expert and leader—well seasoned both in theory and practice of political leadership—Dr. Lee Hong-Koo, the former prime minister of the Republic of Korea. It may seem like an affront even to try to introduce someone who already has such a high profile, but please let me just summarize briefly his lustrous vitae, thus reminding us of what sort of person we are with here.

Upon graduation from the elite Kyunggi High School in Korea, he went to the United States to study at

Emory University, and received a Ph.D. from Yale, specializing in political science. His dissertation was on the pivotal issue of social conservation, which is to remain his lifelong concern. Upon returning to Korea, Dr. Lee Hong-Koo taught political science at Seoul National University and became a leading opinion maker. In 1988, he was appointed the Minister of National Unification, and then became the prime minister. Dr. Lee Hong-Koo is the founding president and the current chairman of Seoul International Forum, and also a member of the Madrid Club, a gathering of former heads of state. Although officially retired from politics now, Dr. Lee is still the big hand behind the scenes who makes things work, both in domestic politics and in international relations. For instance, he still sits as the chairman of the Presidential Council on Unification. He co-chairs the National Commemorative Commission established on the 60th anniversary of the Korean War. He also is organizing the World Conservation Congress, which will take place on Jeju Island in the coming September.

Keynote Speech by Dr. Lee Hong-Koo, Former Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea and Chairman of the Seoul Forum for International Affairs

Thank you for the kind introduction, Dr. Lee. I have not had the chance to say hello to my old friends or greet the many new faces. I would like to welcome everyone to Korea. I think this Plenum should be a really good occasion to review not just simply "leadership," but "leadership in crisis," because it seems that the world, the regions, and the nations are all in deep crisis today.

When I look at the books on the shelves at the bookstore, most of the books on leadership these days are about corporate leadership—how to run a successful business. There has been an emphasis on business, economy, and economics. Looking back on history, we can see that this is something natural. With the global spread of Marxism during the last century, the primacy of economics or economy of everything else was emphasized and had a tremendous influence. The spread of capitalism and the emergence of global markets again may have contributed to the increasing emphasis on the economy over everything else. The famous saying of a former US president, "It's the economy, stupid!" made sense. But with the current global financial crisis, which we have been experiencing since 2008, the mood has somehow changed. Instead of saying, "It's the economy, stupid," now more and more people are saying, "It's the politics, stupid." Everybody seems to believe that having good politics and good political leadership is the only way that you can come out of this crisis. The people are depending on their leaders to make wise decisions and to be brave in selecting the right alternatives.

Speaking of the current crisis, it is not the fault of any individual. Everybody did his or her work diligently all around the world. Rather, the crisis happened because of the failure of systems. We have many American colleagues here now. Neither any individual American nor even the leadership at Lehman Brothers made a big mistake. It might be the limitations of the American system that brought about the crisis on Wall Street that spread all over the world. It is not just the United States anymore. Everybody else is finding out that their system has some problems and limitations.

When we look at systems, particularly political systems, we have a textbook taxonomy of systems and theories. But let me point out that there are still at least four different systems coexisting in the world today. First, I think there is still a totalitarian system but I will come to this later. There are also many authoritarian regimes and dictatorships.

Now, the Arab Spring in the Middle East is an effort to free the societies or countries from authoritarian dictatorships. Then, of course, there are many types of democracy and many of you here live in those countries with democratic governments. And then, there is a new category of governments, although I do not know if there is a good name for it. The governments of China and Vietnam fall under this category; these governments are one-party states characterized by a reasonable amount of openness and a market economy.

Now, one common characteristic in all these four systems is that unless you have a very able leadership, you cannot sustain the system. Hence, leadership becomes the very important item to discuss to resolve the current crisis and to find a path for development in the future. And that is why I believe that the Asan Institute has decided to focus on the question of leadership for this year's *Asan Plenum*. I do not have any great answers to this. But I would like to offer a few of my thoughts relevant to this topic in the next few minutes.

My thoughts on leadership, particularly leadership in democracies, have been influenced by one of my old teachers, Karl W. Deutsche. He taught me one thing. He said, when people talk about business, the corporation, or even the government, they always talk about the deficit, and how dangerous it is to run a country or a business with a big deficit. But somehow people do not pay much attention to the power deficit. If a government wants to do great things, it has to have a great deal of power, state power. But, unless you have already brought in power resources into the government, you soon find yourself struggling with a power deficit. This is a very dangerous thing. This is the great lesson that I have learned and taught for a while. I have some former students sitting around here, but ever since I returned home in 1968, many of them went into politics and some of them became very important officials in the government. But they always concentrated on using power but never making power, or the income side of power. They generally became experts in expending power or using power for certain policy purposes.

The power deficit problem has become a very serious threat. With democracy spreading all over the world, you have to adjust yourself to the popular sentiment and popular demand to get elected into posi tions of leadership. This creates the problem of populism. As a result, governments around the world have become vulnerable to the power deficit problem.

Europe is a perfect example. We talked about the crisis in Southern Europe, Greece, recently in Italy, and in a few other places. Obviously, in the public sector, the politicians and the government have concentrated so much on using state power to meet the popular demand, particularly the welfare demand. As a result, these countries not only suffer tremendous fiscal deficits, but also face power deficits. I was in Tokyo during the last few days, attending the Trilateral Commission meeting, where our European colleagues discussed the Italian situation. In fact, the European Chairman of the Trilateral Commission, Mario Monti, had taken over the government. In a matter of a few months, he had succeeded in restoring the confidence in the Italian government and the Italian economy; now it looks like Italy is starting to recover, at least from the bottom. Our Italian colleague brought the most recent poll in Italy, and interestingly about 54 percent of people approved of Mario Monti's government. How many people think they have confidence in Italian politics, Italian politicians, or the Parliament? It was 2 percent. Now, it is surprising it was not zero percent, but politicians have relatives and they may have constituted the 2 percent of the people who approved. As you can see, this is really a crisis of democracy; particularly of parliamentary democracy.

But it is not just in Italy; the situation in Japan is the same. Prime Minister Noda is trying hard to elimi-

nate the fiscal government deficit. He is trying to raise the sales tax by 10 percent, but he is having all kinds of trouble and it does not look like he will be able to accomplish it. This is the crisis of Japanese parliamentary politics, which speaks to the dilemma that politicians face: you must please voters in order to get elected into office. So you are forced to make all kinds of irresponsible promises because you do not know how else you can stay in power. So herein lies at least one problem of current leadership in democracies everywhere.

I'm afraid that Korea is no exception. We just had a general election, and trying to implement the promises made by both parties will bankrupt the country in a matter of weeks. But that is the reality; it is one of the leadership problems we have to deal with.

At the trilateral meeting, Dr. Fan Gang, the director of China's National Economic Research Institute, gave a very good presentation where he said that one of the most serious problems in China is the excessive welfare expenditure. I said that although China and Vietnam belong to different political systems, they do share this problem. They increasingly have to meet the popular demand and it's obvious that they will have to go over on the expenditure of the welfare side and they don't know how to resolve this problem. This is a problem that I would like for this Plenum to deal with—the Plenum should work to come up with a good solution. It is a very urgent problem in every country, including Korea. Although we have a presidential election coming up in December, no one seems to have an answer to this question so far.

While I'm on the topic of the trilateral meeting, everybody agrees that most of the problems we face, particularly on the question of leadership, are universal problems that are not limited to one nation. Henry Kissinger and others had rightly pointed out that one problem around the world today is that you can no longer find a political leadership that asks for sacrifice from its citizens. In the old days, sometimes you could find a great statesman making a moving speech in which he or she would ask the people to make sacrifices for the common good. Today, this has gone out of fashion; you don't find anybody asking for sacrifices. This is a big problem. The reason that this has become a universal problem is partially because the world has changed. Globalization has occurred, not only in the market, but also in politics. Every system is influenced by other systems.

So what are the real major problems facing the global systems? This is one area that will be extensively discussed in this plenum. But as I participate in some of these meetings, there is one problem about which nobody has clearly made up their minds. The current crisis has demonstrated that the G7 setup couldn't really handle everything. That's obvious. That is over. So to resolve the current crisis in 2008, 2009, and for the first two to three years, they had to create the new setup—the G20. They had done their share of the work and successfully dealt with some of the initial crises we had faced together. But during the last couple of years, the G20 is losing the kind of dynamic it originally had because no one clearly understood what it meant to join this new international setup. To adjust themselves to the G20 world, everybody has had to make a major adjustment. My impression is that no one really prepared for this. So

this is something I hope we can discuss during this Plenum. Also, I hope we can discuss globalization and moving toward a new international setup by evolving the process. But, evolving the process requires vision and clear leadership to make real progress. That is something lacking in today's world and this is something that I would like for many of you to pay more attention to and discuss.

In Europe, the real question is whether they can have a monetary union without a fiscal union. That is not a simple question, and they have been struggling with it for a long time. In the next few years, they would like to find leadership that can come up with some sort of solution. But this is something outsiders could also pay a great deal of attention to because sooner or later, every region faces similar problems.

In Asia we have a small trilateral group consisting of China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. It meets annually at different levels, including summits. Last year, with the agreement of the leadership in all three countries, we set up a Trilateral Secretariat here in Seoul. We also have second-track discussions and so forth. In Asia, one of the main things that we have agreed on is that our cooperation is much more economically oriented. We have high savings rates and quite substantial foreign reserves, particularly dollar reserves. So there is money in the region, particularly in China and Japan, and to a lesser extent Korea. But we don't know exactly how and where to invest this money because making money and saving money had been a simpler operation. Now the region is finding out that Korea, particularly after the financial crisis of 1997–1998, and even China, have investments that require much more sophisticated operations. Without a real infrastructure for banking, particularly in investment and so on, you cannot make wise investments that will help you, your region, and the global community. So this is something to also take note of during the discussion in this meeting.

Now, speaking of the Middle East and other regions, the number-one thing for them is to get out of dictatorships or topple their authoritarian structures. However, establishing a stable and democratic state is quite another issue. The Arab Spring is exciting, but what are you going to do in the summer and autumn after the spring, and then the winter? That's a very difficult question we also have to deal with, and here I'd like to emphasize that we really need wise and brave leaders to handle these issues. One general pattern we find is that those people who took the leadership in bringing down authoritarianism are not able to establish themselves as the central force in running the country afterward. Very often, other forces or the next generation takes over. So in this context, how are you going to organize the system and what sort of leadership are you going to create? These are the really crucial questions I hope we can address.

Now, I still have five minutes or so, so let me say something about totalitarianism. We thought that totalitarianism was a thing of the past—Hitler and Stalin. What is totalitarianism? It's a system with one man, one leadership, and one party. It is total isolation and control of the population. All these are hallmarks of totalitarianism. Now, here I have to say a few unkind words toward North Korea. I don't normally say this in public, but for our discussion I'm just offering these ideas. To call someone totalitarian is not a very kind thing to do because no one likes to be called a totalitarian, even if it's true. But

North Korean totalitarianism is a very special brand. The closest model I can think of is this: Imperial Japan's totalitarian structure before 1945. There are two distinguishing characteristics. One is the monarchical succession of a family made to be very special and mythical. The people are asked to feel honored to die for that monarchy. This is what Japan in the pre-1945 era had taught the people in order to brainwash them. The second distinguishing characteristic was the supreme legal status of the Japanese military. Unfortunately, North Korea has moved in this direction. I don't think they wanted to copy the Japanese, but the result of what they have done follows that model. It is an outdated model and you certainly cannot survive long using it in the 21st Century.

This constitutes a real problem for the Koreas. I think 20 years ago, when the Cold War came to an end, there was a kind of metaphorical spring on the peninsula. North Korea had a chance to make a transition because it saw that Russia's Gorbachev was making a great change by dissolving the Soviet Union. More importantly, Deng Xiaoping had set a new course for China. The only way to feed 1.3 billion people and make the economy grow was to open up and move to a market economy. Vietnam did the same thing. I think the late Kim Il-Sung had some notion that he had to take the same path. In fact, from 1991 to 1992 we had a very productive conversation and produced an important document called "The Basic Agreement" between the North and South. We decided to create joint committees in all fields—economics, society, culture, and so on. In 1991, the two Koreas were admitted to the United Nations. In other words, we accepted the existence of two state structures, but would try to find a way to preserve one society and eventually move toward unification. Conversations between us went so well that we produced an even more important document in 1992, "The Joint Declaration" to keep the Korean Peninsula nuclear-free. We agreed, and particularly the late Kim Il-Sung agreed, that the best way to keep the 70 million Korean people on the peninsula safe is to not have such weapons. We asked our American ally to remove all tactical nuclear warheads from the Korean Peninsula, which it did. We had a chance to make progress on

a lot of levels, but the sudden death of Kim Il-Sung brought an end to this era.

I've been speaking privately, and I'm just expressing my personal wish. But I want to convey my message, if possible, to the young North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un. You had a wonderful grandfather. The only way you can survive—that North Korea can survive—is if you follow your grandfather. Forget about your father; the 17 years of Kim Jong-Il's rule were an absolute failure. But we don't want to make it an issue; after all, he's dead. You can't blame a man who has already passed away. This is the only way that I think North Korea can survive and we can resolve this problem.

Finally, since I'm on the unification issue, let me say a couple of things on the United States and China. We welcome the United States emphasizing the importance of Asia in recent months, which is nothing special because that's the way it should be. It's not surprising news. But we have had a discussion on the problem of unification over the years with the Germans more than everybody else. Both Germany and Korea have experienced division, although Germany was lucky and united back in 1990. Last year, we had a long discussion with the leaders who played a pivotal role in the reunification of East and West Germany. The last prime minister of East Germany, Mr. de Maizière, was here, too. What they said that impressed me was that no one really did anything special. By the mid-1980s, the United States and all of Europe, with the exception of maybe only one or two countries, had firmly decided that without the resolution of the German question there could not be peace in Europe. And when Mr. Gorbachev and others began to agree with this position, it became possible to find a way to resolve it.

Of course, the situation in Europe is quite different from the situation in Asia today. Germany, by far the biggest power in Europe, is different from Korea, the smallest party in Northeast Asia. So the situation is different. But what we would like to see from the United States in the coming days is a firm stance on the priority of East Asia and this problem. Which is to say, unless the United States, China, and others resolve the Korean question, there cannot be a stable peace in Asia. This would constitute a big step in bringing about common prosperity to the region.

I am extremely careful when I talk about China because what is needed is more trust between the leaderships. When we have conversations, what Chinese leaders are looking for is whether their counterparts are trustworthy or not. It's not this or that item. And in this context, I hope the Chinese will exercise real leadership in the region. Take the nuclear question, for example. The situation in East Asia is very strange. Everybody accepts China as the sole superpower, both militarily and economically, and feels it is entitled to have a nuclear capability and nuclear weapons. No one else contests this or seeks nuclear weapons. Japan accepts it; the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia, accepts it; as well as everyone else. In short, we are begging China to remain the sole nuclear power in East Asia and China says, "not necessarily." It lets North Korea continue with its nuclear operation, which is a little bit beyond the textbook wisdom. So how are we going to really have more frank conversations, particularly between the United States and China, in order to change the situation?

The resolution of this issue is related to how we think about the status of North Korea. And here I remind you again that we accept the fact that both of us are members of the United Nations and we are not trying to undermine the stability of North Korea. We are just asking it to return to history. You can be an exception to history for five years, 10 years, but there's no such thing as permanent exception from historical trends. So come back to history. I hope the Chinese will help us on this.

It is perhaps a good time to stop here. I have already raised so many items. Maybe the next two days are not enough to resolve all these problems, but with all the wise people around here I'm sure we can move at least a few steps forward. I welcome you and I'll end my remarks here. Thank you very much.

Gala Dinner

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 18:45-20:30
Place: Crystal Ballroom, Lotte Hotel

Gala Dinner Speech by Dr. Chung Mong Joon, Founder and Honorary Chairman of the Asan Institute

Your Excellencies, distinguished guests, and dear friends.

Good evening, and welcome to the *Asan Plenum*. This year, more than 50 nation-states undergo leadership transition. Naturally, the theme of this year's *Asan Plenum* is "Leadership." Four of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council—the United States, Russia, China, and France— experience political transition. Such political transitions are taking place in the midst of a global economic crisis. The global economic downturn is bringing about major shifts in the political landscape of the world.

This is why we seek leadership today. This year, we noticed the rise of two Korean leaders to global prominence. One is Dr. Yong Kim, President of the World Bank. The other is Kim Jong-Un, the 28-year-old First Secretary of the Workers' Party of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. Both were born in Korea and both have the last name "Kim." However, that is where the similarities end. The types of leadership that they represent cannot be more different.

Plato said, "A tyrant is always stirring up some war or other, in order that the people may require a leader."

Kim Jong-Un's assumption of leadership was marked by the launching of a long-range missile. Last Monday, he threatened South Korea with "special actions" by the military.

H.L. Mencken, an American journalist, said, "Under democracy one party always devotes its chief energies to trying to prove that the other party is unfit to rule—and both commonly succeed, and are right." He was describing American politics. The description holds true for South Korean politics, too. South Korea has earned the admiration of the world for its economic development and democratization.

Yet, it still faces many challenges ahead.

South Korean politics is trapped in the past. Neither the right nor the left represents the new Korea symbolized by the world's most IT-savvy young generation. Korea's political parties have become unrepresentative and irrelevant organizations. We need leaders who can restore the people's trust in our political parties as institutions that truly represent their interests, aspirations, and dreams.

Korean politics needs leaders who can say no to populist demagoguery, no to North Korea's nuclear threats. We need leaders who can restore trust in our economic future.

The deliberations of the *Asan Plenum* will enable us to better define the leadership that can quench our thirst for a better future.

Plenary Session I

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 14:15-15:30
Place: Grand Ballroom

Crisis on the Korean Peninsula

Organizing Institution:	The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Moderator:	David Sanger, The New York Times
Panelists:	Christopher Hill, University of Denver
	Vasily Mikheev, Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
	Pan Zhenqiang, China Reform Forum
	Kim Tae-woo, Korea Institute for National Unification
	Izumi Hajime, Shizuoka University
Young Scholars:	Amy Studdart, The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
	Kim Kyungtae, Seoul National University

Days after North Korea marked the centennial anniversary of the birth of its first and eternal president, Kim Il-Sung, by launching the Unha-3 rocket, which had South Korean, Japanese and US forces on high alert, Mr. David Sanger opened the first plenary session by observing that the conversation about the crisis on the Korean Peninsula has gone by almost unchanged in 20 years. During this panel, Ambassador Christopher Hill, Major General Pan Zhenqiang, Dr. Kim Tae-woo, Mr. Vasily Mikheev, and Dr. Izumi Hajime discussed why so little progress has been made, and how to move forward in finding a solution.

Sanger began by outlining the immediate context of the discussion. President Obama came to office three and a half years ago with a plan to reach out and attempt to negotiate with North Korea. The North Koreans had different designs and greeted his arrival with their 2009 nuclear test. An Obama advisor observed that "that test turned everyone in Obama's White House into a Korea hawk overnight." From that point on, the relationship between the United States and North Korea was frozen—until the "Leap Day Agreement" in February of this year. The agreement lasted all of two weeks before the North Koreans announced that they would test a rocket. The United States cancelled food aid and, with that, lost the best chance the West had to gain access to the Yongbyon Nuclear Complex and figure out what stage the North Korean nuclear program had reached. This was significant for the United States. The Obama administration wanted to know if the next North Korean nuclear test would be more advanced than the last, and it was also interested to know whether or not Kim Jung-Un was fully in charge. On his trip to South Korea, President Obama very deliberately said that he did not know who was in charge in Pyongyang.

Did the North Koreans read Obama and the world situation correctly? Hill argued that it would be wrong to assume that the North Korean strategy was as well calibrated as that. The North Koreans, he said, are as confusing to each other as they are to the outside world. On the part of the United States, the agreement had been designed to test whether or not the North Koreans were—with all of the changes that have taken place in the country recently—finally willing to move toward denuclearization. The answer, clearly, was that they are not. It is hard to say why, but Hill is unsure that the "why" is important. What is important is that the Chinese are kept at the head of the process. Conflicting priorities have meant that Beijing has failed to make North Korea the priority that the United States believes it should be. Instead, the Chinese have pursued a status quo effort, keeping the Six-Party Talks underway in order to avoid real confrontation. But keeping North Korea in the hot seat will eventually force it to respond.

From where Pan sits, the Six-Party Talks have also been frustrating for China. None of the other parties have been very cooperative in getting the multilateral approach on track. And while China has been willing to criticize North Korea for its many provocative actions, it takes two to tango, and the United States and other parties also share the blame for the stalemate. The current situation is simply the culmination of six decades of confrontation between North Korea and South Korea, and North Korea and the United States. At this point, building trust is the key to making progress on denuclearization. There is a need for the building of an atmosphere in which all parties can come together to talk. Pan, for his part, is unconvinced that the United States really believes that the DPRK is a top priority on its agenda right now, and asked whether, instead, it was something that could be put aside for a while.

In Japan, the primary interest has been the North Korean kidnappings of Japanese citizens, some of whom have still not been returned. Denuclearization has been the secondary interest. The progress that has taken place in the North Korean nuclear program may have changed that calculation, but the domestic concerns of Japan have meant that while there are worries about North Korean missiles, the bigger issue is still the missing Japanese citizens. Izumi explained that until the North Koreans have the capability to create nuclear missiles and mount a credible threat against Japan, Tokyo will continue to be capable of living with the situation on the Korean Peninsula.

As Mikheev sees it, the Six-Party Talks will not secure denuclearization. The different parties have different goals. While five of the parties want to find some permanent solution, North Korea wants to trade its nuclear capabilities for economic aid. The talks are focused on the wrong goal: denuclearization. Instead, the goal should shift to marketization and regime change. There is a need to have Five-Party Talks to create a coordinated vision of how to make the North Korean regime more open. If this could be done, denuclearization would happen automatically. This is not to say that Russia is not concerned about a nuclear North Korea. The Russian president, Vladimir Putin, has become much tougher on this issue, but while Russia is happy to help solve the nuclear issue, it does not have any incentives to be the leader of the process. North Korea has neither oil nor gas, and despite sharing a border, it is a country very far from Moscow and St. Petersburg. While there are fears that North Korea might try to threaten the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit that will take place in Vladivostok in December of this year, North Korean technology is such that the North Koreans would not be able to produce a fully capable nuclear device that could reach the city. Thus, the threat is not that serious.

In all of this, it is Seoul that could really be the driving force behind finding a resolution to the crisis, but the government in South Korea frequently redefines its position on the issue. The government shifted from the progressive Sunshine Policy of the last administration to the current, more hard-line position of Lee Myung-bak's Blue House. With South Korea facing another presidential election this year, no one knows where the government policy will end up, but we may see a return to the previous view. This, explained Kim, is one of the more painful aspects of South Korean society. There is an ongoing confrontation between the orthodox right-wing argument and the more revisionist argument, which means that South Korean policy regularly shuffles between two extreme points. As long as there are leadership changes, there will be changes in the line that is taken on North Korea, giving Pyongyang good reason to disregard South Korean requests.

Kim went on to explain that the orthodox view says that there needs to be a strengthening in US-South Korea cooperation, which has not been a problem. The problem has come from the relationship with China. Although the Chinese are becoming more hard-line, there are still some big divisions. Whereas Beijing believes that much of the instability on the peninsula is the result of how South Korea, the United States, and Japan treat North Korea, South Korea believes that the problems stem from Pyongyang, that North Korea should improve its human rights, and that North Korea should denuclearize. The six countries need to find a way to get to a common ground.

Hill described the Six-Party Talks as an effort to maximize the leverage of the various involved parties. The United States would bring prestige to the process, the Chinese would bring economic leverage, South Korea has a lot to offer, and so on. While the other parties have come to think of this as being about the United States and North Korea, it is also largely about trying to make sure that those involved fly in formation with the South Koreans. The talks have created a better, more sustainable way to consult and work together as partners. They also keep the Chinese, who would have liked nothing better than to see

the United States and North Korea work out the situation between each other, engaged in the process. And so the United States did its best. In the statement made in September 2005, the United States included everything it wanted, and agreed to everything the North Koreans requested: aid, a peace treaty, etc. The North Koreans, however, have never actually decided to denuclearize and they have treated these agreements flippantly.

Pan explained that one belief held by many in the international community is that the North Korean approach could be changed if China used its influence in Pyongyang to put pressure on the regime. This analysis, however, overestimated China's influence. The North Koreans are very proud, and are emphatic about their independence. While China has been willing and able to criticize North Korea, there is still an obligation to respect the country's sovereignty. It is, after all, a member of the United Nations. There is, therefore, reluctance on the part of the Chinese to discuss regime change as a means for providing a resolution of the nuclear issue. A major element in the Chinese approach has been to try to shape the perceptions of the North Koreans, convincing them that they need to change their behavior if they want to maintain their security, but a part of that is creating a more favorable neighborhood. With the military pressure that currently exists, the military-first policy is understandable.

Hill posited that the Chinese strategy might simply be making a virtue out of its weakness. Chinese trade with North Korea is five times what it was in 2005, and it is not necessarily clear that this is something that Beijing is encouraging. Instead, a large part of it is the result of the close ties to China's Northeast, and the increasingly porous Sino-North Korean border. Disagreeing with Hill's assessment, Mikheev came out in defense of economic and cultural engagement with North Korea on the principles of a market economy, arguing that it worked with the USSR. Kim Jong-Il's death creates the space to shift gears.

Speculation about when and how the North Korean regime will collapse has been rife since rumors of Kim Jong-Il's stroke emerged. Kim Tae-woo stated that while North Korea is in mourning for the elder Kim, nothing will happen. Kim Jong-Un will be able to survive and muddle through for the short term. But over the longer term, it is likely that we will see signs of instability. Mikheev argued that the regime is already collapsing. There are no opposition groups, but the system has changed from according status to those with political influence to instead supporting those with access to money: the security bureaucrats involved in overseas operations and the military with their access to state rice.

With the longer-term goals, there are some principles that Kim believes South Korea has stuck to. Seoul does not want regime collapse, but just very gradual change, change that would involve the leadership in Pyongyang as decision-makers. This is a policy shared with China. Sanger, however, was quick to remind the panelists and the audience that when it comes to regime change, other countries do not get a vote. As with the Arab Spring, collapse could come quickly. In that situation, would South Korea see itself as the inheritor of the peninsula? Unification, Kim said, is always the ultimate goal.

Session 1

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 15:45-17:00
Place: Orchid

Leadership Changes and Their Implications for Security in Northeast Asia

Organizing Institution:	China Reform Forum
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Pan Zhenqiang, China Reform Forum
Panelists:	Chung Jae Ho, Seoul National University
	Jin Canrong, Renmin University
	Alan Romberg, Stimson Center
Young Scholars:	Sarah-Lena Vonderberg, Seoul National University
	Hanna You, Yonsei University

Major General Pan Zhengqiang opened the panel by inviting panelists to discuss recent and upcoming leadership changes and their implications for Northeast Asia. Dr. Jin Canrong shared his opinion on the leadership transition in Northeast Asia. With strong emphasis on China's solid ground on foreign policy in Northeast Asia, he began his speech with remarks on the recent Chongqing incident. The incident, which has recently gained media attention internationally, will not change China's direction in foreign policy. He described the incident as a typical power struggle between central and local government relations during a Chinese leadership transition. Such an internal political dispute between the central government and the local government is unlikely to have a direct impact on China's foreign policy. Looking at the recent flow of events, Jin does not anticipate any major change in the near future.

Secondly, Jin quoted former General Secretary of the Communist Party of China Deng Xiaoping on the importance of maintaining power in a humble way. After the Bo Xilai incident in Chongqing, Chinese local leaders hid their charisma. As the 18th party elections draw near, presumably the bargaining process on this issue will continue between the factions until August. However, this process has little impact on the current course of Chinese politics, since the leaders in China are not revolutionaries with expectations of major changes in the government policy. Rather, they compromise through collective leadership, as shown in the aftermath of the incident.

Finally, Jin warned against the oversimplification of China's foreign policy. China's Standing Committee faces an uncertain future as the 18th party election draws near. There is a high probability of leadership changes at the strategic level; nevertheless, many experts do not anticipate significant changes during the leadership transition because China's foreign policy processes are complicated and the Chinese

prefer stability in the system. There is increasing pressure on the central government, with more domestic voices rising. Still, Jin predicted that the Chinese government will continue to aim for consistency through consensus with China's future foreign policy, even with leadership transitions.

Sharing his opinion on US-East Asia relations, Mr. Alan Romberg opened his speech with a quote from Lord Palmerstone: "Nations do not have permanent friends or permanent enemies but only permanent interests." Yet he emphasized that nations may have enduring interests but not necessarily permanent ones. The government is composed of people, and people's perceptions change as situations evolve; therefore, perceptions of interest naturally take different forms over time. Especially for nations, transitions in their interests occur concurrently with leadership changes.

Consequently, Romberg discussed the major leadership transitions in the three main countries in East Asia: China, Japan, and South Korea. As for the Chinese transition, he agreed that Chinese foreign policy stands solid and is unlikely to change its direction anytime in the near future. However he disagreed with the assertion that the Bo Xilai incident was merely a power struggle between local and central power. Carefully projecting its possible impact in policy terms, he also pointed to the uncertain future of the standing committee, which would make a considerable difference. New leadership comes with different backgrounds; therefore, who sits in those seats will make a difference in terms of the potential policy decisions and the course of action they wish to pursue. Romberg also mentioned the mutual strategic suspicion between China and the United States. Some of the recent US foreign policy announcements might have been misperceived by China. Obviously leaders strive to search for the win-win situation. However, there is nothing automatic or assured about the upcoming election, and the power struggle between the parties will continue. While some try to be partisans, continuity will be the name of the game.

Romberg maintained that Japan is still a major power in East Asia. The US-Japan relationship is the bedrock that contributes reliable security in the region, and Romberg does not expect it to change with a leadership transition. Globally, some countries have raised concerns that Japan is becoming marginalized in security issues. Japan has had problems, such as recent internal political disputes; however, it remains an economic powerhouse and a source of impressive innovation. Even as a politically insecure player, Japan will continue to maintain considerable influence in the global market.

As for the ROK-US relationship, Romberg pointed out that the core attention has been drawn to North Korea and security problems on the peninsula. However, the recent economic consolidation in the ROK-US relationship showed the changing nature of the circumstances and proved that the relationship goes beyond security issues. He added that Japan, South Korea, and China will continue to have productive relations through cooperative leadership as he quoted Martin Luther King Jr., saying "the ultimate measure of a man is not where he stands in moments of comfort and convenience, but where he stands at times of challenge and controversy." There are obvious problems, as leaders are aware; however, Romberg assured the audience that the parties involved can make a difference through cooperative effort.

Professor Chung Jae Ho analyzed the first half of 2012 in terms of leadership changes in Northeast Asia. The main focus lies on whether 2012 will be a year of significance, since a third has already passed. His assessment is that overall the real surprises have been minimal. In Taiwan, Ma Ying-jeou won a second term in office, promising to further improve ties with neighboring China, which means that the cross-strait relations will be on a steady course and thereby minimize trouble for Washington and Beijing. In Russia, Vladimir Putin was elected again, although it is not known whether his Russia will be substantially different from Medvedev's Russia. Chung noted that leadership changes in Japan have now become a constant rather than a variable. As expected in North Korea, Kim Jong-Un succeeded his father and made it clear that he had inherited his father's habits and future plans for North Korea by launching the Unha-3 rocket, which was meant to put a satellite into orbit, while the rest of the world thought he should have been concentrating on domestic affairs. Overall evidence points toward very little change through the leadership transition. This leaves us with three nations, China, the United States, and South Korea. Looking at Northeast Asian dynamics in the last 10 years, the relationship between Washington and Seoul has become an important variable in defining China's effective leverage. The overall situation will be stable and representative of continuity if the post-2012 system resembles the 2008 situation, Chung stated. But, if the post-2012 system resembles the situation in 2003, it could be quite unstable. The whole assessment leads to the conclusion that, despite the transitions, the problems will basically remain the same.

Responding to Pan's question about the upcoming presidential election in South Korea, Chung stated that it is too early to predict. However, Pan observed that if one were to use the past 10 years as a guide, then it appears that South Korea has two different types of parties with very distinct policy orientations. Therefore, there will be very significant changes depending on which party wins. Pan reiterated that the outcome depends on the degree of similarity to either the 2003 or 2008 election results. As for the presi-

dential election in the United States, Pan is sure that regardless of who becomes president, the big picture will not change. Regarding recent criticism of China, he pointed out that the ROK-China relationship is cold when it comes to foreign security issues. He also stressed the fact that the recent shelling of Yeonpyeong Island and sinking of the Cheonan are raising negative sentiments towards the Chinese government. The US-China relationship for the future is described as continuously threatened by overall suspicion and competition, but this relationship also will involve specific cooperation and compromise. The interval between those two attitudes will become shorter and shorter, but if the competition portion of this relationship becomes bigger and the cooperation component smaller, he believes that South Korea will find sufficient room to wedge in.

Turning to the question-and-answer period, panelists were asked for their opinion on the policy implications if Romney is elected instead of Obama. Romney has already indicated, at least in his campaign, that his positions are strikingly different from Obama's, especially concerning relations with China. Romney stated that there will be a major increase in the US military deployments to the Pacific region as well as in US shipbuilding. It seems that China is seeking predictability in its relations with the United States, so if Romney is elected and proceeds with his course of action, it could have quite perturbing effects on US-China relations precisely at the time that China is itself going through a leadership transition. Would that outcome of the election result in a short-term problem or would it cause long-term issues? If Romney wins the election, Chung believes that he will go on a completely different course of action that may not be moderate, but rather could increase confrontation in the region. In his view, whether it is the United States or China, whoever asserts their exclusivity in the region will be considered the bigger threat, and this is not an action he would like to recommend to Washington. Jin added that in his opinion, if Romney is elected, the China-US relationship will experience a period of fluctuation, but there is a chance that it will be a short-term phenomenon. Romberg mainly agreed with this opinion, but also added that he strongly believes that people, not just the president, matter. The Romney team includes more moderates than extremists on the advisory panels, so it is unknown who will be on the next level under the president and be able to influence Romney's decisions. National interests heavily influence political decisions, and it is very hard to come up with a scenario in which leaders in either Beijing or Washington will not agree that the situation is critical and that there will be differences. Pan also pointed out that, regardless of who is elected as US president, the security commitments abroad in the future years are going to be reduced rather than expanded. Also, East Asia's problem is first of all of an economic nature rather than military. All the governments in that region, with no exception, are more concerned about sustained development than military expansion.

Despite different opinions regarding details, the panelists agreed on one idea: Even though the countries' leadership might change, they will have to work together to solve the existing problems. The overlapping international interests will be the same as they are now and, regardless of the leadership transitions, the existing problems have to be dealt with. The approach might be slightly different from candidate to candidate, but in the end solutions for the existing international issues are necessary.

Session 1

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 15:45-17:00
Place: Grand Ballroom

American Foreign Policy towards the Korean Peninsula

Organizing Institution:	Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Panel Chair:	Victor Cha, CSIS
Panelists:	Lucy Williamson (Moderator), BBC
	Christopher Hill, University of Denver
	Scott Snyder, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
	Bruce Klingner, The Heritage Foundation
Young Scholars:	Seukhoon Paul Choi, CFR
	Steven Denney, Yonsei University

"The subject of American foreign policy towards the Korean Peninsula is something that is always talked about here in Seoul," moderator Ms. Lucy Williamson said to start the panel. To shed greater insight on this topic, Dr. Victor Cha provided an overview of US foreign policy towards Asia during the Obama administration, former Ambassador Christopher Hill discussed US relations with countries in Northeast Asia, Mr. Scott Snyder identified critical questions that would determine the future of the ROK-US Alliance, and Mr. Bruce Klingner spoke specifically about the US perspective on security in the region.

Cha described the evolution of the Obama administration's policy towards Asia, noting that the current policy reflects a broad shift from the beginning of Obama's presidency. Initially, the Obama government recognized Asia's importance, but as it faced numerous other challenges, it did not consider the region a top priority. Consequently, the limited attention and resources that the administration could devote to Asia required that it identify and pursue one strategic objective for the region. Thus, the focal point for the Obama administration's original policy towards Asia was improving relations with China and Japan.

It was hoped that facilitating cooperation with these two major powers would establish a stable basis upon which to build the rest of US policy toward Asia. However, US expectations for cooperation with China on a wide array of issues were quickly stifled during the first year of Obama's presidency. Hopes to further cooperate with Japan were also complicated by the March 2011 disasters. Ultimately, it became evident that an Asia strategy based primarily on cooperation with China and Japan would be unsuccessful, and the administration was required to adjust its approach.

The subsequent shift in policy was both innovative and good, according to Cha. The Obama administra-

tion effectively changed its policy focus to the G20 and a new trade agenda, which was revealed by Obama's region-wide trip that did not include a visit to Tokyo or Beijing—a first for a US president. This move was a conscious effort to demonstrate a novel Asia policy that was not simply about Japan, China, or Northeast Asian security. On trade, the Obama administration made a complete reversal of its original position. Whereas Obama had once called "timeout" on the free trade agreements passed by the previous administration, he has since become a champion of free trade. Moreover, through the national export initiative, his administration has focused on connecting free trade to the domestic economic agenda, a position reflected in the promotion of the Trans-Pacific Partnership.

South Korea fits largely into the US policy shift, because whether it is in the G20 or trade, South Korea plays a central role. South Korea hosted the G20 summit and became an important US partner in a variety of initiatives around the world. For Cha, the passage of the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement represented a critical component of the shift in Obama's agenda towards trade.

Hill started by noting that among America's many important relationships, the ROK-US relationship ranks high on the list. This was revealed in the high degree of continuity between the Bush and Obama administrations, which trumped the pattern of every new administration "denouncing and renouncing" everything the previous administration said and did. Hill then addressed the following topics: Sino-US relations, US-DPRK relations, and the role of the United States in the region.

In his comments on North Korea, Hill discussed the difficulty in getting the Chinese to cooperate. Despite the United States having high hopes for Chinese cooperation early on, the Obama administration quickly learned about the complexities of dealing with China over an issue like North Korea. The United States has encountered a China with a multitude of internal issues: a slowdown in economic growth, mass rural-urban migration, and evolving state-society relations in a one-party state. The cumulative effect of these internal issues has made China less of an ideal partner in dealing with external issues, such as North Korea.

Hill's assessment of US-DPRK relations was no more optimistic than his appraisal of Sino-US relations. The Obama administration came in with high hopes of restarting the Six-Party Talks. However, after the nuclear test of 2009, officials in the Obama administration were "turned into real hawks." The February 29 "Leap Day Agreement," which was the administration's effort to bring the Chinese back into the negotiation process, also ended in failure. These failures have made Hill pessimistic about engagement with North Korea. For the time being, he "expects nothing more out of it."

Hill concluded by addressing the mischaracterization of the US "pivot." He rejected the notion that the United States is moving to confront and contain China. The new Asia-centric strategy has more to do with the United States signaling its intent to shift focus away from Iraq and Afghanistan and toward a more important region of the world, which implies US willingness to strengthen its relationship with

South Korea. Responding to comments made at an earlier panel that misunderstandings about the US role in the region are due to a lack of trust between Beijing and Washington, Hill said, "There is a bit of a problem in the Sino-US relationship, but it is not a lack of trust."

Snyder highlighted the fact that 2012 is a time of political transition in both South Korea and the United States, and he identified four key questions that will shape ROK-US relations in 2013. The first question concerned whether South Korea and the United States will continue to focus on North Korea's denuclearization as a common objective and a top priority. Snyder found that, unlike in the past when there was uncertainty about the coordination of their objectives, South Korea and the United States under the Lee and Obama administrations have come to an early agreement on this issue that is likely to be sustained into the next year.

The second question dealt with the sustainability of "Global Korea," about which Snyder was less certain. In his opinion, "Global Korea" is associated with President Lee Myung-bak. As every new president in South Korea desires a unique approach to foreign policy, it is uncertain whether the next government will continue the Global Korea initiatives. Snyder noted this has implications for the future of the ROK-US Alliance, because the Global Korea initiatives have been a source for the expansion and strengthening of the bilateral relationship.

The third question dealt with the nature of US policy toward the Korean Peninsula vis-à-vis the next US administration's broader policy toward Asia. Snyder noted that while the United States has a clear understanding of what it desires on the Korean Peninsula, contradictions sometimes emerge when these goals are placed in the context of a broader Asia policy. Since US policy toward the peninsula is contingent on its regional policy, focus on the Korean Peninsula is sometimes lost in the bigger picture, which always involves China.

To conclude, Snyder gave the audience a question to ponder. He asked whether the Lee-Obama relation-

ship, which has been widely touted as a close personal relationship, represents a peak in ROK-US relations, or if it will serve as a platform from which ROK-US relations can be strengthened.

Klingner next analyzed the security component of US policy, discussing issues that influence US policy and the ability of the United States to implement its policy: concerns over the North Korean leadership transition and its behavior, the "Asia pivot", and defense cuts.

From the viewpoint of US policymakers, the leadership transition in North Korea appears to be on track. Kim Jong-Un has acquired all the necessary ruling titles, and there is no evidence of resistance from other elites—with little likelihood of popular uprising. Furthermore, the increasing flow of information in and out of the country, and the growing number of cell phones, may serve as a future catalyst for change. For the time being, however, there is no challenge to regime stability.

Despite an apparently smooth leadership transition, Klingner expressed some skepticism toward the opinion that all is well on the peninsula. Given North Korea's opaqueness, factors leading to a regime overthrow or collapse may be present now, even if not easily noticed. Furthermore, even a stable North Korean regime may act in destabilizing ways—its recent missile launch and threats being prime examples. Also, while the country may have a new leader, Kim Jong-Un seems to be pursuing the dangerous policies of his predecessors. Some observers worry that he is more likely to miscalculate than his father in a way that provokes a military response. Overall, Klingner noted that both the United States and South Korea are less certain now than ever before of how North Korea will behave, making it even harder to predict action during a crisis.

The Obama administration's "Asia pivot" is a good strategy in its valid premise and multifaceted approach, according to Klingner. He supported the notion that the United States should use its sources of national power—diplomatic, military, economic, and information—to better engage Asia. However, while US allies in Asia have been comforted by this strategy and statements from the US government, Klingner found the strategy lacking in substance. The assumption that the new Asia strategy will result in an increased presence in the Pacific is false for two reasons, he said. First, the reality is that this strategy and the US presence in Asia are not new. They are a continuation of former policies. This strategy is the result of an evolution in policy from previous administrations, and an overview of security documents will reveal similarities between the current strategy and that of George H. W. Bush.

Second, although Defense Secretary Leon Panetta has declared that the United States will strengthen its presence in Asia, there is no evidence to support this claim. None of the forces being drawn down from Europe or Afghanistan are scheduled to be redeployed to the Asia-Pacific. Even initiatives like the Marines' rotation to Australia are not permanent. This is problematic because allies reassured by the rhetoric of this strategy may incorrectly infer that they do not need to do more for regional security when, in fact, the United States is relying on them to increase their contributions in order to compensate for cuts in the US defense budget.

Klingner was also skeptical about whether the United States can fund an ambitious rebalancing strategy and continue to deliver on previous commitments. Adjustments in US defense spending will impact security in the Pacific, and deterrence is only plausible if the United States has sufficient resources to maintain US commitments. There have already been $300 billion in defense cuts under the Obama administration, with $486 billion more slated for this year, and a sequestration effective in January of an additional $5 billion. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates said that weapons and other programs considered most questionable have already been abandoned. Furthermore, Secretary Panetta testified in February that the proposed budget for Asia will maintain the current bomber, aircraft, and amphibious fleets while reducing overall force levels to pre-Iraq and Afghanistan levels for the Army and Marines; but this too is a false statement, said Klingner. Although US forces in the Pacific may not be reduced, overall cuts in the defense budget will impact the region and degrade the ability of the United States to redeploy capabilities from other areas.

During the question-and-answer session, Williamson inquired about the panelists' thoughts on the North Korean leadership transition under Kim Jong-Un. Hill remarked that "there is less there than meets the eye." The third installment of a dictator in a calcified system is "interesting," but it is not likely that he will change anything. Hill cited the outcome of the "Leap Day Agreement" as evidence that more of the same will occur under Kim Jong-Un. Cha agreed with Hill that it will remain the same, despite many people who were willing to give the new leader the benefit of the doubt. Cha did note, however, a sense of unpredictability regarding Kim Jong-Un compared to his father, Kim Jong-Il.

In closing, questions were asked about the importance of North-South dialogue for American foreign policy towards the peninsula after the upcoming presidential election. Snyder responded that stable North-South relations are a prerequisite for healthy and productive diplomacy toward the region, particularly Sino-US relations. Regarding the future of American foreign policy, Klingner reiterated the well-known adage that politics stops at the water's edge. In his opinion, there will be a continuation of policy regardless of who is elected. A second-term Obama or a first-term Mitt Romney will look at the violation of resolutions and the way Obama was burned by a nuclear test at the beginning of his first term, and thus will take a more calculated approach towards the peninsula.

Session 1

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 15:45-17:00
Place: Lilac/Tulip

Humanitarian Crisis in North Korea

Organizing Institution:	The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Shin Chang-Hoon, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Panelists:	Go Myong-Hyun, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
	Sandra Fahy, University of Southern California (USC)
	Joanna Hosaniak, Citizens' Alliance for North Korean Human Rights
	L. Gordon Flake, The Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation
Young Scholars:	Kim Rancy, Ewha Womans University
	Won "Pia" Ho Jung, Seoul National University

Moderator Dr. Shin Chang-Hoon opened the panel by inviting panelists to present their views on a specific aspect of the humanitarian crisis in North Korea according to their areas of expertise.

Mr. Gordon Flake spoke about the grave situation in North Korea's political prison camps and its continued categorical denial of their existence. The humanitarian crisis in North Korea always competes for international attention with other security concerns, such as its military provocations involving missiles and nuclear weapons. Even on the specific subject of humanitarian issues, there are a range of concerns, including freedom of the press and food shortages, but the serious human rights violations of North Korea's political prison camps are the most compelling. The lack of access to North Korea and the lack of any real political leverage against the DPRK make it difficult to remedy the situation. However, activists are increasing pressure on North Korea by raising awareness, for instance by releasing a report by the US Committee of Human Rights in Korea.

Improved satellite technology substantiates personal narratives with hard data, presenting opportunities to bring the situation in prison camps to light. For instance, the exact locations of the prison camps can work as evidence for testimonial facts. The data help to directly counter North Korea's continued assertions that there are no political prisoners and prison camps, and by providing evidence they improve the credibility of individual testimonies. This puts a human face on the humanitarian crisis and gets the attention of high-ranking political leaders. Knowing the exact locations of the camps also allows activists to produce more specific requests for access within the DPRK.

Flake also noted the growing level of attention given to human rights conditions in North Korea. The

combination of the death of Kim Jong-Il, the succession of Kim Jong-Un, the recent attempt at a missile test, and rumors of another weapons test has sparked a flurry of heavy media coverage on the DPRK. However, this is only the most visible manifestation of the international community's interest in the DPRK; a less visible but more fundamental change has recently taken place with the way the world views and acts on the DPRK's humanitarian crisis. For example, in March 2012, the US Congress approved the North Korean Human Rights Reauthorization Act, intended to facilitate assistance to North Korean refugees.

The most notable change is taking place in South Korea. For a long period of time, South Korea had mostly turned a blind eye to human rights violations in North Korea for fear of jeopardizing the success of the amicable Sunshine Policy. In recent months, however, issues like the forced repatriation of North Koreans by Chinese authorities have become part of a relatively nonpartisan political discussion in South Korea. In the end, Flake argued, the question of human rights in North Korea should not be separated from the security questions involving the DPRK's possession and development of missiles and a nuclear program. They are all entwined into the same core system, which is the apparatus that makes it possible for the regime to continue committing horrific human rights violations.

Dr. Sandra Fahy, an anthropologist who conducted ethnographic research with North Koreans living in South Korea and Japan, described her unique methodology of using linguistic analyses of personal narratives to extract insights about North Koreans' awareness of the social injustices they face. In Nazi-occupied Europe, language had also been an instrumental part of the institutions that sustained the violence destroying the region. The same mechanism is now apparent in the DPRK; the North Korean authorities control language and daily communication to suppress their people and perpetuate their regime. According to Fahy, language analysis revealed socio-political insights about how hunger, starvation, and trauma were understood in the North Korean cultural context. When asked whether their government was responsible for the famine and food crisis, North Korean interviewees answered that the situation was an inevitable result of North Korea's low capacity for food production. However, North Korean defectors, speaking in a more linguistically liberal setting, displayed their dissatisfaction with the evident social inequalities in food distribution through jokes and word choice. This is evidence that people in North Korea are aware that they live in an unfair system and learn to cope with that knowledge through linguistic release. Despite the central government's attempts at censorship, North Koreans are linguistically and critically aware of their lives and power imbalances.

Fahy also emphasized that social inequalities exacerbate the problems resulting from food shortages. Nutritional discrimination hits the most vulnerable social groups, women and children, hardest. Under the Public Distribution System (PDS), North Korean women experience discrimination in food distribution since they receive food rations only through their fathers or husbands, in accordance with the social norms of a strongly patriarchal society. However, when husbands are unemployed, the burden of work falls to women who become responsible for making a living by going to black markets. They are also

exposed to domestic violence by their husbands who turn to alcohol and drugs for stress relief. Children, in turn, are likely to be abandoned and receive no education. They also suffer malnutrition and disease. The inefficiencies of resource distribution in North Korea exacerbate pre-existing social inequalities and humanitarian suffering.

Dr. Go Myong-Hyun spoke about the ways in which satellite imaging could be used to shed light on the humanitarian crisis in North Korea by providing more detail about the PDS. The PDS is structured so that North Koreans cannot access food until it is delivered to them, and the delivery system is set up in a hub-and-spokes style to maximize the centralization of decision-making and rationing. This would not be problematic if the population was also concentrated along the lines of delivery, but unlike the food transportation system, the North Korean population is homogeneously dispersed throughout the country. Government controls prevent the population from moving about freely to find locations where they have optimal access to food, so those populations that live far away from the railroad networks are systematically excluded from the system. Go contended that the North Korean state creates this imbalance intentionally to reduce the proportion of the population that is supported by the state and to economize on the state's resources. He also stated that the PDS exacerbated the food crisis by creating waste; everyone receives the same amount of the same resources as determined by the state, rather than the resources that they need. Moreover, satellite imaging shows that the western parts of the country are much more agriculturally viable than eastern areas, yet surpluses of food grown in the west are not reallocated to the east. He proposed that the problem could be alleviated if North Korea implemented a market system to complement the PDS, but said that this is unrealistic given North Korea's politico-economic climate. Go concluded by noting that satellite images show that the source of North Korea's food crisis has more to do with a poorly built transportation infrastructure and inefficient resource allocation rather than abso-

lute shortages of food, meaning that additional food aid given to North Korea will not solve the problem unless these fundamental issues are resolved first. If food aid were delivered directly to the deprived eastern areas, the shortcomings of the PDS could be supplemented, but this would circumvent the central government's authority and be a major affront. He also noted that the emergence of black markets represented the North Koreans' attempt to create their own alternative to the inefficient system in place.

Ms. Joanna Hosaniak began by calling attention to the caste system of social organization in North Korea. She echoed Flake's statement that this caste system was the basis of all inequality and human rights violations in North Korea. Every aspect of life in North Korea is determined by the caste to which a person belongs, including access to basic necessities. Hosaniak remarked that this represented a collapse of the socialist contract, because the PDS was unable to provide means of sustenance for the general population and led to the creation of black markets. She outlined the positive and negative impacts of the black markets. On the one hand, the black markets empowered women who, for the first time, had opportunities to become self-sufficient. Under the PDS, they had been tied to their husbands or fathers for food rations. In addition, with time, the black markets were able to change the flow of information and cultural products into North Korea. However, the black markets also contributed to the perpetuation of the inefficiencies of the PDS by creating new avenues for personal profit for corrupt officials who want to encourage black-market activity. Black markets also encourage child labor, but there is no viable alternative. If the children go to school instead, there is a high likelihood that they will be used for forced labor.

Hosaniak also remarked on the emergence of an entrepreneurial spirit in North Korea. Whenever the state tried to impose controls on the markets, the markets died down, indicating that North Koreans were adjusting themselves to working in a free market economy. When the government tried to clamp down on markets, many people chose to go to China to make their living, spilling the effects of North Korea's inefficient system over to China. China tries to control the tide of North Korean migrants through strict deportation measures, but North Koreans who are deported and experience the worst of North Korea's punishments become more determined to leave the country for good and attempt to move back into China permanently. Noting that North Koreans who escape to China or South Korea send back significant amounts of money to their families or relatives in the DPRK, Hosaniak offered that a change in Chinese policy allowing certain economic activities along its border with North Korea could potentially improve poor North Korean provinces' standard of living and fuel the country's overall development.

Following the panelists' presentations, Shin offered his own thoughts on the legal aspects of the issue of North Korean defectors. The concept of refoulement—repatriating defectors—has now gained the international spotlight. The main route of defection is across the China-DPRK border, but China does not recognize North Korean defectors as refugees but as economic immigrants. The international community is concerned about allegations that North Korean defectors are returned to the DPRK without Chinese authorities examining the merits of each individual case, despite international conventions' encouragement of non-refoulement policies; a clear gap exists between law and practice. Countries tout the idea of

non-refoulement, yet they are unable to demand this from China because they are worried that if a similar dispute were to break out in their own areas of jurisdiction, it would set a dangerous precedent.

The moderator then opened up the floor to questions. The first question concerned efforts to raise awareness about the North Korean humanitarian crisis using popular media or high-profile nominations, such as nominations for the Nobel Prize. The panelists answered that there were some biographies of North Korean defectors, some written in Korean and some in English, but none have been well-written enough to capture the public imagination. The second question revolved around the role of the international community in monitoring and improving the human rights situation in North Korea. The panelists responded that the number of special rapporteurs and envoys on the ground in North Korea was increasing, hopefully improving monitoring efforts, but also recognized that sovereignty rights still limit the envoys' degree of access. The concept of an international "responsibility to protect" is still an evolving one in international legal discourse, and as it stands the shortcomings of the international community's efforts stem from inherent gaps in the power structure of national sovereignty.

Session 1

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 15:45-17:00
Place: Violet/Cosmos

Insurgency and Stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan after bin Laden

Organizing Institution:	FOI-Swedish Defence Research Agency
Panel Chair & Moderator:	John Rydqvist, FOI-Swedish Defence Research Agency
Panelists:	Robert Lamb, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
	Thomas Ruttig, Afghanistan Analysts Network (AAN)
	Shuja Nawaz, The Atlantic Council
Young Scholars:	Jamola Khuasanjanova, Ewha Womans University
	Kyle Cassily, Seoul National University

In this session, panelists analyzed the shortcomings and difficulties of leadership within countries that are ethnically and politically diverse. The complexities of regional politics and avoiding tempting, but ultimately futile, shortcuts in Afghanistan remain crucial tests. Moderator Mr. John Rydqvist opened the session by pointing out that Afghanistan today faces a multitude of problems and challenges, and that it is difficult to see how current conditions will develop in the future. Afghanistan has been a global strategic concern for more than a decade. The war has been long and sometimes intense. There are many serious challenges that threaten the stability of Afghanistan today, such as high levels of corruption, societal grievances, a weak central government, bleak economic prospects, the Taliban insurgency, and rivalries amongst neighboring states.

The panelists discussed the war-torn nation through the lens of leadership, regionalism, and the transition of the United States out of the theater by 2014. Key factors determining the future of the region will be US politics and the support that will be given to the Afghan government and its security forces. Pakistan's behavior will be important as it attempts to balance key interests and address the fundamental challenges of the region. The best realistic scenario is a political compromise in which key power holders agree on a way to organize and strengthen the central Afghan state. However, Mr. Shuja Nawaz noted that there is currently no center of gravity on decision-making in regards to Afghanistan.

Mr. Thomas Ruttig criticized the tendency of US foreign policy in Afghanistan to install abusive, illegitimate leaders and to focus authority in the regime of President Hamid Karzai. Ruttig outlined several challenges for peace and state building. One is the declining interest and attention toward Afghanistan from the West, where the responsibility for managing Afghanistan is now shifting to the Afghans themselves and the Karzai government. Ruttig, however, argued that the transition should have begun earlier.

Another challenge is how the international community views Afghanistan. There is a lack of knowledge about Afghanistan's customs and a tendency to view the nation's problems only through the lens of terrorism. From the beginning, the US-led counterinsurgency strategy has suffered from a lack of differentiation between the internationalist/jihadist agenda of al-Qaeda and the purely national one of the Afghan Taliban. However, Ruttig stressed that the problems go beyond terrorism. The Afghan Taliban is often viewed as a terrorist organization, but it is a movement that has roots in Afghan society as an ideology. It uses terrorism as a means to secure its goals.

Lack of knowledge also deflects the international actors from looking at the problems occurring inside of Afghanistan, which have to do with historical conflicts. The approach is that the Taliban is the cause of all problems in Afghanistan. They are only one side, while the US and Kabul governments account for the other half. This view was a stumbling block in the early political involvement of the Taliban. It led to a military escalation that undermined reconstruction and stabilization.

Nawaz said that the overarching issue for the region is proper governance. However, Afghanistan is affected by what he called "the tyranny of timetables." The goal for Afghans and for outside powers is stability, but that gets lost in the short-term goals of domestic and foreign politicians. Conventional wisdom does not factor in the complex relationships within societies. Nawaz views most of the solutions currently offered as outmoded assumptions.

The next year will be crucial for Afghanistan, as well as the rest of the region. Within the next two years, there will be elections in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran, India, and the United States. China is also unlikely to make major decisions in the region until its power transfer is complete. Thus, "it has been frustrating for regional analysts to watch every power refuse to take initiative," Nawaz said. In Washington, there has not been a great desire to make creative decisions. The United States has "kicked the can down the road" and waited to see where it leads. It is a dangerous policy, and the United States and regional powers cannot afford to not react this year.

Nawaz also argued that it is anachronistic to think that Pakistan would wish to have Afghanistan as a client state. Pakistan could never control Afghanistan, nor would India allow it to happen. Therefore, the key to stability in the region is normalcy between India and Pakistan, which has emerged as a new idea. If those two nations achieved normalcy, Afghanistan would cease to be an issue of instability in the region. In the next year, however, it is important not to ignore the possibilities of "black swans." There is a chance that India could suffer another attack from Pakistan-based militants, or al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri could be uncovered within Pakistan's borders. Another massive flood could cause large food and energy shortages, or there could be a political assassination in Pakistan. "Any of these 'black swans' would threaten a potential normalcy and would further destabilize the region," Nawaz said.

"The US has a history of promising more than it can deliver in Afghanistan, while pursuing counterpro-

ductive shortcuts," stated Dr. Robert Lamb. The overarching theme for the United States currently is transition, which is a fancy way to say that US officials want to leave. The problem is that the West has never been sure how to accomplish it, and Lamb argued that the West is simply not good at it. The key is to pull out of Afghanistan without leaving chaos behind.

The United States entered Afghanistan to prevent terrorists from using it as a "safe haven." It unveiled a new counterinsurgency strategy to combat the severe deterioration of conditions by building relationships with the people and the government. This was done in the midst of fighting the current war. There has been no shortage of commentary on the proper role of state building in Afghanistan, whether it should be a top-down or bottom-up approach. "There has, however, been no unified concept," Lamb said.

"The US also does not have a clear sense of what it means by governance," Lamb argued. There is a sense that if the formal government is built up, then the situation will stabilize and an exit will appear. Informal power brokers, such as tribal leaders and organized crime members, have power and influence in some areas, however. There are many leaders in Afghanistan, and they have authority over a wide variety of groups in the complex political landscape. Yet, none of them are unifying figures.

One of the weaknesses of NATO's effort in Afghanistan is that NATO began with a linear and rational approach, but did not provide room for luck. Wars tend to be unpredictable; thus, it is impossible to know what kind of leaders will emerge. The hope that Karzai could bring the country together has not worked out. It has become sport to speculate upon which new leader may emerge in the upcoming election. It, however, will not make a significant difference. Lamb argued that Afghanistan needs a Nelson Mandela who can unite the disparate factions within Afghan society, while the West needs a Lawrence of Arabia who can coordinate the NATO powers. However, the plan seems to be to "muddle through and hope for the best."

Nawaz believes that it is a mistaken notion to argue that Afghanistan is in need only of a transformative figure. Afghanistan is a nation that is held together by its mosaic of languages and ethnicities. It goes against all of Afghan history and society to argue that the nation needs a leader who can mold it behind a unified image. He argued that Afghanistan needs a leader who is honest, regardless of his ethnicity.

He cited former President Abdurrahman Wahid of Indonesia, who emerged after a long period of economic malaise and bad politics. Wahid was not a charismatic leader who grabbed the imagination of the people. He proceeded simply to mold an honest government with credible institutions. Wahid was able to accomplish this because he was not corrupt, which is what Afghanistan needs. Nawaz further stressed that it is a mistake to build a Kabul-centered government where every small decision, down to the appointment of teachers, must emanate from the capital. It has never worked like this in Afghanistan in the past, and it will not work in the future.

“There are many small Nelson Mandelas who have suffered under six oppressive regimes spread across three decades,” Ruttig said. However, the West chose to bring back leaders who had already delegitimized themselves in the eyes of the Afghan people for previous abuses and crimes. They were men who had been thrown out of Afghanistan and were anything but democratic. Ruttig argued that this has been the West’s biggest mistake in Afghanistan. The Western powers chose Pashtuns and non-Pashtuns from a broad spectrum with the idea that they could unite the different regions. But the international community ignored the hopes and opinions of the majority of Afghans, which has led to the chaotic leadership situation today.

The West tends to focus on a single preferred leader. “If that doesn’t succeed, then an alternate leader is sought,” Ruttig said. In Afghanistan, however, the future of the nation was entrusted to Karzai, which has closed down any alternate choices. Thus, the West has caused a large share of the problems in the national power structure, which the Afghans see. Karzai blames the West as well, even though he is also at fault. But the United States and its allies cannot approach Karzai about the corruption and mismanagement in his regime, no matter how credible it is. The Afghans know who is corrupt, but the United States must clean up on its side first.

“There has been progress in Afghanistan when compared with the Taliban regime of the 1990s,” Lamb said. The Afghan ministries function at a basic level. Many Afghans are dedicated to increasing the greater good of the nation and do it for poor pay. But the West has consistently overpromised and underdelivered to Afghanistan, which has become a major problem. International conferences issue communiqués that promise the world, but they offer things that the West has no intention or ability to deliver. Western donors make long-term promises about human rights and democracy, but then implement six-month and one-year strategies that ignore the difficulties of the situation within the country. Lamb said, “Afghanistan has come a long way in 10 years, but it still has a long way to go.”

In response to a question from Rydqvist about what kind of leadership would resonate with the various Afghan communities, Ruttig responded that the system of government is the most crucial issue. The

Karzai government operates a planned economy akin to the Soviet Union where everything is decided at the center, down to the smallest details. However, there is a young generation of intelligent Afghans who received their education abroad. It is important to incorporate this generation into politics. The West must level the political playing field, so Afghans can choose for themselves. Nawaz added that currently the Taliban is being given more than its due in talks about the future of Afghan politics. The Taliban does not represent every part of Afghanistan. If the Taliban continues to be strengthened, then Pakistan's hedging policy toward the legitimate Afghan government will also increase.

The discussion lastly touched on the state of the Taliban peace talks that were suspended this year. Ruttig said, "The Taliban has evolved since it came back in 2004." It is more open to education and development projects, but it wants control. The Taliban views itself as a legitimate government in exile. It suspended talks in 2012 because it knew that it was an election year and Obama could not fulfill his promises. The West talks about every policy in the open until they are no longer serviceable. The US military does not listen to what the Obama administration officials say because it believes it can finish off the Taliban militarily. Ruttig concluded that talks with the Taliban have made progress, but they need to be broadened. Other political groups must be given a say in Afghanistan, especially women.

Session 2

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 17:15-18:30
Place: Lilac/Tulip

India and China: Collision or Collusion?

Organizing Institution:	The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Dhruva Jaishankar, GMF
Panelists:	S. Jaishankar, Ambassador of India to China
	Rory Medcalf, Lowy Institute
	Shi Yinhong, Renmin University
Young Scholars:	Sung-Yeon Melissa Kweon, Korea University
	Sunkyo Hong, Korea University

Moderator Mr. Dhruva Jaishankar opened the panel by observing that while talk of the G2 relationship between the United States and China has been popular, the India-China relationship also merits attention. India represents the world's second-largest population, third-largest market, and fourth-largest military. The potential for shared understanding and cooperation and the sources of tension were the main points discussed by the panelists. As India's ambassador to China, Dr. Subrahmanyam Jaishankar brought an authoritative perspective to the discussion. Dr. Shi Yinhong's appointment to China's State Council in early 2011 and his renown as a scholar of international relations in China gave weight to his analysis. Mr. Rory Medcalf brought his experience in diplomacy, intelligence analysis, and journalism, as well as his knowledge of India-Australia relations.

Ambassador Jaishankar made three points regarding India-China relations. First, referring to the panel's title, the ambassador remarked that collision "is a very 20th-century term." The increased interdependence of today's world makes countries risk-averse and limits the range of their foreign policy and strategy such that any movement in the India-China relationship will entail convergence and divergence, rather than dramatic change.

His second point focused on convergence and divergence with respect to the political orientation of the two countries across the global, regional, and bilateral dimensions. Globally, India and China have the greatest convergence, of which there are two kinds. First, as developing economies, both countries are concerned about international regimes that can curb their growth or affect domestic economic policies, such as welfare. Second, both countries are conscious of their sovereignty. Part of this consciousness arises from history and post-colonial experience. This common factor finds expression in India and China's similar stances toward global issues, including climate change, the World Trade Organization, Responsi-

bility to Protect, Libya, Syria, and Iran to some extent.

India and China diverge most in regional issues. The preponderance of the two states in the region leads to balance-of-power politics, which is the tacit purpose of regional policies. If any factor mitigates the regional competition, it is the awareness of both states of the need for regional stability.

Rather than distinctly convergent or dramatically divergent, China-India bilateral relations are mixed. The competitive aspect of the relationship has traditionally been emphasized, but economics has come to counter-balance the troubled political history between the two states. Economic cooperation has burgeoned over the last 10 years so that today India is China's sixth-largest export destination and 10th-largest trade partner.

The ambassador's final point was pragmatism. He highlighted four developments within the past 10 years that he viewed as possible signs of pragmatism in China-India relations in the medium term. Economically, bilateral trade multiplied from less than $3 billion 10 years ago to $75 billion last year. This trade continues to grow annually at 20 percent. Moreover, the two countries are looking to increase their investments, and the renminbi has become an important currency for Indian companies wanting to borrow money.

With regard to the border issue, its 3,500-kilometer length makes the dispute between India and China possibly the world's largest. It remains unresolved, but progress has been made in bringing stability to the disputed region. Agreements in 1993, 1996, and 2005 contributed to stabilization and this year, India and China agreed to a new mechanism to handle problems that arise.

The third development is the new forms of cooperation that have arisen between the two nations. China and India have agreed on maritime dialogue; regional-issues dialogue covering Central Asia, West Asia, and Africa; and a comprehensive economic dialogue that takes a long-term view of the bilateral relation-

ship. Thus, the various channels of communication and cooperation serve to give greater substance to the relationship.

Finally, various non-intergovernmental developments also show pragmatism. Chinese is being taught in Indian middle schools, the number of flights between India and China has increased, and the two countries are exchanging a greater number of tourists than before. These changes signify India's normalization of its relations and its movement toward a full-spectrum relationship with China. The four types of developments that have occurred over the last decade are expected to serve as a foundation for bilateral relations between India and China in the future.

Shi spoke next about cooperation and discord. He emphasized that the fundamental nature and orientation of China and India are toward peaceful development, while both countries are concerned about progress within their borders. They should expect to be able to avoid a deterioration of relations and, in the near-to-medium future, become each other's top priority. Both countries are proud and have an eye toward great-power status, but their foreign policy objectives are limited. India wishes to maintain a comprehensive diplomatic approach and attain great-power status within South Asia and in some global issues. China is similar, and although many people have spoken recently about China's increased assertiveness, the top leadership is conservative and domestically focused. While China deals with numerous foreign policy issues, many of these are forced on China by external situations and rapid domestic growth.

Shi said that India and China have great potential for cooperation. Cooperation can be augmented in the areas of trade and global issues like climate change, among the developing great powers and in international financial reform. China and India can consult with each other in regard to relations with Pakistan and may be able to reduce strategic mistrust resulting from each other's rapid military buildup.

Shi argued that the potential for discord between India and China arises from domestic political forces. In India, the people are proud and compare themselves to China. They gain an inferiority complex when they view China's growth and size. The Indian people view their foreign policy as too conservative and limited, while they aspire to great-power status. The Chinese, proud of their current growth and elevated position, view India with envy because India has more strategic friends. India's foreign policy, in addition, is more comprehensive than China's, especially in the past three to four years. Thus, the jealousy goes both ways. China is an aspiring nation, but it too has a conservative foreign policy in its leaders' eyes, though others may disagree.

History and nationalism play an additional role in China-India discord. The two countries fought a war in the 1960s, which has remained in both national memories, often spoiling the potential for positive developments. Nationalist sentiment frustrates efforts to solve, control, or mitigate problems.

Furthermore, four other major problems act as stumbling blocks in the China-India relationship. The first

is the attention paid to the military buildups. Indian strategists pay too much attention to China's strategic weapons buildup and naval development, while many strategists in Beijing do the same with India's buildup. The problem is that the strategists pay far greater attention to the capabilities possessed and in development rather than to actual intentions, which are more difficult to see.

The second obstacle is the border dispute. The border has not experienced military conflict within the past decade, and the two governments have engaged in rounds of serious negotiations. The fact remains, however, that the border issue has not been completely resolved. The governments should, according to Shi, aspire to resolve the dispute through more constructive diplomatic negotiations.

The third problem is the thorny issue of Pakistan. Pakistan is China's ally and has been India's enemy in the past. However, in recent years, India-Pakistan relations have improved remarkably. Complications in the Chinese view of Pakistan and Pakistan's future have accompanied this change. In Shi's assessment, leaders in Beijing are gradually becoming less and less willing to sacrifice relations with India for Pakistan. Rather than to play a zero-sum game, the countries can focus on a positive-sum outcome by engaging in constructive consultations and negotiations.

The last major issue is the foreign policy orientation of India and China toward each other. Although the two countries are neighbors and rising giants, their foreign policy attention, especially Beijing's in recent years, has gone disproportionately to Washington. It is important to work constructively to improve relations, to prevent wasting time and mutually undesirable conflicts arising from competition or nationalism, and to pay more balanced attention to their neighbors in order to develop the potential for cooperation.

In conclusion, Shi remarked that India and China are both "very ancient civilized people[s]" with deep histories and philosophical traditions. Leaders in New Delhi and Beijing can embark on a path to much better relations if they look to the future and take more time to consider the India-China relationship.

Medcalf then began by characterizing the bilateral relationship as competitive coexistence. He said that the challenge ahead is for Beijing and India to emphasize cooperation and minimize competition. He then delineated sources of mistrust in the relationship that need to be understood in order for them to be managed.

Despite confidence-building measures, there has been no major progress to resolve the border dispute, which is the legacy of the 1962 war between India and China. Given China's missile and nuclear assistance to Pakistan, Pakistan is a greater source of mistrust for the India-China relationship than the border issue and the 1962 war. This mistrust will not be overcome unless China puts relations with India ahead of those with Pakistan. There is also concern in India over China's growing commercial and diplomatic ties in South Asia and the Indian Ocean and the potential encirclement strategy by China this poses.

Medcalf argued that, Beijing fears that the US-India relationship may involve the constriction of Chinese strategic options, including in the Indian Ocean. China also fears that India wishes to exclude it from the Indian Ocean. Excluding China may be a futile strategy for India; therefore, India should engage China through maritime dialogue, while it is in a position of strength. The interaction of the Tibet issue and the India-China border issue is testing the relationship and may worsen when it comes to the succession of the Dalai Lama.

Military modernization in the two nations breeds mistrust. Nuclear weapons are increasingly important. The current situation is one of asymmetric deterrence in China's favor, which is destabilizing. The recent Indian missile test may bring stability through symmetry. A dialogue on the nuclear issue must now be built, because China cannot deny India's nuclear weapons status in the long run.

Nationalism should not be underestimated, because this relationship represents two enormous populations exposed to each other's often sensationalized media. This situation could deteriorate into a spiral of negative opinion, and the respective governments likely have not figured out how to manage this possibility.

Medcalf noted that complications in the bilateral relationship include competition for energy, water, and other resources. In addition, China and India's growing importance as aid donors with strategic goals may develop into a soft-power competition. Finally, while the two countries have exhibited partnership in some multilateral efforts, each has tried to exclude the other from multilateral forums; for example, China sought to exclude India from the East Asia Summit.

While these obstacles may not stop cooperation, they must be addressed, said Medcalf. Talk of mutual respect by leaders of both countries provides a way to move forward, but competition will remain in the relationship. India should not compete with China directly in terms of power, for it is likely to lose. Rather, if India is able to improve internal governance and "demonstrate that a democratic mega-state can also be a prosperous mega-state […], that will raise some very interesting questions in Beijing."

During the question-and-answer session, Ambassador Jaishankar stated his preference for having economic relations even with flaws, while Medcalf observed that the clear imbalance in China's favor makes progress in the China-India relationship uncertain. Regarding intentions versus capabilities, the panelists did not denounce the development of military capabilities, but Shi suggested that intentions should be judged by diplomatic behavior rather than by capabilities. An interesting question concerned a rumored proposal by China and India to divide up the disputed territory. The ambassador noted the closely held nature of this issue. Medcalf, citing his past experience as a diplomat in New Delhi, said that he understood that the proposal was in existence at the time and possibly had been made and withdrawn more than once. Finally, all three panelists agreed that there was much more to the India-US relationship than China, and the China factor in the relationship concerned India just as much as the United States.

Session 2

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 17:15-18:30
Place: Orchid

Is China Prepared for International Leadership?

Organizing Institution:	The Brookings Institution
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Jonathan Pollack, The Brookings Institution
Panelists:	Evans J.R. Revere, The Brookings Institution
	Christopher Clarke, Independent Analyst
	Dennis Blasko, Independent Analyst
Young Scholars:	Erik French, The Maxwell School of Syracuse University
	Shwe Mar Than, Ewha Womans University

Four American experts on China from academic, diplomatic, and military backgrounds were brought together to provide American perspectives on China's role in international and regional relations. The main debate covered in the panel was whether China is ready to take on a larger role as an international or regional leader.

Despite the widespread attention paid among external observers to China's political, economic, and military ascendancy, the Chinese leadership still remains tentative and cautionary about the country's strategic opportunities. More assertive voices are far more prevalent among scholars and commentators than among officials. This uncertainty reflects unease about China's daunting domestic challenges as well as concern about the coming leadership transition. A mindset preoccupied with self-preservation remains widespread within policymaking circles; however, this often leads to insufficient coordination in decision-making.

Dr. Jonathan Pollack began by arguing that a more practical perspective is necessary, looking at a confined set of issues. These issues included: (1) the current leadership transition and how it will support or undermine China's international role; (2) China's military modernization and how it will affect China's capacity to lead; and (3) China's leadership role within its own region, which may give observers a sense of how it might handle international leadership in the long term. Pollack noted that it is important to consider whether or not our expectations about China's leadership role are set too high and whether or not China believes it is ready to take on this role.

Mr. Christopher Clarke continued the discussion by noting how the leadership transition in China would influence China's role and leadership status in the international system. He posited that the leadership

transition is complicated by two factors. Firstly, the transition is a "moving target" that has not been following a predictable or constant trajectory, as highlighted by the Bo Xilai incident. Secondly, the leadership overhaul is unprecedented in terms of the number of positions being vacated. China must also replace most of the members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (PSC) without any Long March veterans to help guide the process. Leadership change will be the first test of whether the Communist Party as an institution (as opposed to China's revolutionary veterans) can design a successful leadership transition.

Clarke made several predictions about the transition and its importance for China's leadership status in the international system. China's current leaders have failed to prepare adequately for the upcoming transition. Many top Politburo members, military leaders, Central Military Commission (CMC) leaders, Central Committee members, and provincial party secretaries have been or will be replaced in 2012. China's leadership did not try to bring the next-generation leadership into the PSC ahead of time to prepare for the forthcoming transition. It has also failed to bring new leaders with critical expertise in the security realm into the Politburo in preparation for the PSC's security responsibilities. This lack of adequate preparation has produced several oddities in the current leadership structure. There is no obvious candidate for the traditional "number two" leadership position, the head of the National People's Congress. Similarly, China's leadership has not groomed any candidates for vice-chairmanships in the CMC. Whatever compromise is reached about the composition of the post-18th Party Congress leadership, intra-party tensions will remain and possibly increase, according to Clarke's assessment.

Ultimately, China's poor preparation for its leadership transition will undermine the country's capacity for international leadership in the near future. It will take longer for these new leaders to establish legitimacy and consolidate control over the bureaucracy. They are unlikely to pursue an assertive policy abroad until they are more secure at home. Clarke argued that this will limit China's potential for a larger international role for some time.

Mr. Dennis Blasko discussed China's military modernization and argued that China is not yet prepared for international military leadership. China is not interested in this role presently and will not likely be in the mid-term, either. At the moment, China is not involved in a set of alliances like the United States and is instead focused on its own military modernization program with fairly limited aspirations for operations beyond its own borders. Although China's out-of-area operations in UN peacekeeping operations or anti-piracy missions often get a lot of attention, only a few of its troops participate in these exercises relative to the overall size of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Much of China's modernization is focused on defending the Chinese mainland and coastal waters. Its military doctrine is strategically defensive, and it is only gradually expanding its operational reach. Blasko's analysis found that, rather than focusing on improving equipment and hardware, China's military modernization has prioritized "software." particularly personnel development, training, logistics, and command and control.

China has performed some substantial operations beyond its borders, but Blasko argued that most of

these operations have been focused on disaster relief and other non-traditional security missions. Although the PLA has been preparing for these types of operations, the focus is often on conducting these non-traditional missions at home rather than abroad. This focus on the Chinese homeland is reinforced by the fact that the PLA lacks the strategic lift capability to get large numbers of troops and equipment far from its shores.

Blasko concluded that Beijing's timeline for military modernization may give us some indication of when it will be prepared for a role in international military leadership. Beijing announced in 2006 that by 2049 it would be prepared to fight and win a local war under "informationalized conditions," which meant that the PLA would be prepared to handle conditions of modern information-based warfare. Although the PLA later revised this goal to "complete modernization," it is likely that by this time China's military modernization will allow it to begin to take on more of an externally oriented role and conduct more out-of-area operations. For now, however, the PLA is content to follow Deng Xiaoping's advice and bide its time while keeping a low profile.

Mr. Evans Revere argued that observers should look more closely at China's leadership in its own region and use it to draw conclusions about its potential for a broader leadership role. Before asking whether China is ready for leadership, Revere found it prudent for people to ask whether the region is ready for Chinese leadership. A vital component of leadership is that the people must be ready to be led and must accept the leader. As such, China appears to be a long way from being a leader of the region. Regional actors express a great deal of nervousness, concern, and antipathy in regards to the notion of Chinese leadership.

According to Revere, states throughout the East Asian region are unnerved by the prospect of Chinese leadership for a number of reasons. China's military modernization alarms some states because of the lack of budgetary transparency and concern over China's intentions. More importantly, historical issues,

contested islands, and territorial disputes create friction between China and its neighbors. Contested islands and borders lead to suspicion and occasionally produce physical confrontations such as the ongoing stand-off between China and the Philippines. China's policy for handling these disputes is determined by a variety of agencies reporting to the top leaders yet competing for budgets and authority. Each agency brings a different approach to the issue, and each has a different set of interests, so China's handling of these disputes is often uncoordinated, complicating the problem.

Another issue that drives a wedge between China and the rest of the region is China's relationship with North Korea. For many regional actors observing Chinese policy on the Korean Peninsula, China appears to be part of the problem, playing the role of an enabler of bad behavior for North Korea. Although these judgments may be harsh, China seems to value maintaining the current status quo and saving face for the North Korean leadership as more important than the denuclearization of the peninsula. The irony of the situation is that the North Koreans seem to value nuclear weapons and their current policy more than they value the reputation of their ally. Revere argued that China needs to rethink its stance on North Korea if it is serious about pursuing a leadership role in the region. Despite China's decision to sign the UN Security Council Presidential Statement condemning North Korea's recent test and its growing frustration with North Korea in general, China remains committed to its current policy.

Revere concluded by pointing out that the region will expect other changes from China if it intends to be a regional leader. China's human rights policy in particular does not fit with regional standards. Also, its restrictions on the Internet and information sharing do not conform to regional trends. As long as this continues to be the case, the region will not be receptive to Chinese leadership.

The audience asked several questions regarding China's interests in economic leadership and its participation in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Clarke argued that China has not made an effort to be an economic policy leader in world organizations, and has primarily been on the defensive in international economic forums. The SCO is also a defensive mechanism designed to insulate the member nations' borders from the influence of the United States and Russia and involves little in the way of political leadership, although China is attempting to expand its economic influence in Central Asia. Pollack agreed that China is focused in the SCO on insulating its borders.

Questions also focused on whether China is interested in international leadership and whether international actors are interested in China as a leader. In response to questions regarding the meaning of leadership to China, the panel answered that this subject is actually a widely debated issue among Chinese intellectuals. Blasko pointed out that China sees itself as a leader in regards to nuclear weapons, reflected by its "no first use policy." It has also prioritized stability and economic and social development as its goals, as well as efforts at projecting a positive image of itself in the eyes of the world. These goals, however, remain somewhat elusive, according to the panel. China's elites and intellectuals also are considering the price their country must pay in order to be a leader. Leadership requires respect from neighbors

and followers, but territorial issues -especially in the South China Sea- and China's policy toward North Korea undermine China's efforts to become a regional and potential global leader. The panel also argued that internal issues detract from China's ability to lead. China must first provide for its own internal security and stability before it can consider handling the security of regional or international communities, according to the panelists.

Questions were also raised about how many countries will accept China's leadership in the international system given the fact that China is a rising power. Pollack pointed out that global leadership is based upon norms and commitments and at the moment China's behavior is focused on self-protection, not assuming broader, more global, commitments. China has yet to truly mesh with international relationships and norms. However, Blasko had a slightly different view. He noted that countries far from China are less concerned about China's rise and will be more willing to accept it as a leader.

The panel concluded that China does not appear to be fully prepared for a larger role in international leadership. The combined effects of a poorly planned leadership transition, an incomplete and defensively oriented military modernization, and an unreceptive regional environment will continue to impede the development of China as both a regional and a global leader in the near term. The panelists also agreed on the conservative inclinations of China's military and political leaders and the absence of a true internal consensus on what a leadership role for China would ultimately entail.

Session 2

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 17:15-18:30
Place: Grand Ballroom

Implications of Iran's Nuclear (Weapons) Program

Organizing Institution:	Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Mark Hibbs, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Panelists:	Adnan Vatansever, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
	Han Hua, Peking University
	Mark Fitzpatrick, International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)
	Cheon Seongwhun, Korea Institute for National Unification (KINU)
Young Scholars:	Moira Alice Kelley, Seoul National University
	Hanna You, Yonsei University

Iran's nuclear program has garnered enormous interest from the international community in recent years. Despite the US-led war in Afghanistan raging on, worldwide attention has peaked since last November's inspection produced new evidence of an Iranian nuclear weapons program. Sanctions from the United States and Europe and threats from Israel have made Iran a pressing topic for politicians and academics alike.

Mr. Mark Hibbs offered a number of thought-provoking questions to the panelists. Mr. Mark Fitzpatrick shared a modicum of optimism on the Iranian nuclear issue. Dr. Cheon Seongwhun and Dr. Han Hua discussed South Korean and Chinese perspectives and positions on the Iranian nuclear issue, respectively. Finally, Dr. Adnan Vatansever discussed current oil sanctions on Iran, as well as the sanctions' positive outcomes and challenges. Each panelist provided different viewpoints on the topic and delved into vital facets concerning solutions and future possibilities.

Fitzpatrick opened the conversation by noting the rare sense of optimism the international community felt as negotiations with Iran began over its nuclear program. Unfortunately, optimism has a tendency to fade, and a time of pessimism may be looming. A number of obstacles block progress toward a mutually acceptable outcome. Most importantly, the fundamental gap that has prevented resolution for nearly a decade remains unbridgeable: Iran seeks a nuclear weapons capability that the P5+1 (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States plus, Germany) do not accept.

Iran's negotiating partners seek three confidence-building measures from Iran as an initial step to slow the momentum in Iran's nuclear program that could lead to war. Iran is asked to stop enriching uranium

to 20 percent, to send its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium out of the country, and to suspend operations at the Fordow enrichment facility But, Fitzpatrick was doubtful, that Iran would accept these measures without some sanctions relief in return.

According to Fitzpatrick, the world may have a crisis on its hands this autumn unless Iran accepts limits on its enrichment program. Israel, in particular, worries that the increased number of centrifuges operating at the deeply buried Fordow facility will give Iran a "window of immunity." This may coincide with a "window of political opportunity" for Israel to take unilateral military action against Iran before the US presidential election in November. The hope is that biting EU and US sanctions will give Iran more of an incentive to take the confidence-building measures called for.

Cheon touched on the South Korean perspective on the Iranian nuclear weapons program. He specifically compared the issue to North Korea, showing the correlation between the two programs. He explained that the path followed by Iran has been a déjà vu of the North Korean case. North Korea also originally launched nuclear programs for peaceful purposes until its refusal to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). He argued that North Korea made false promises by claiming to use its nuclear program solely for peaceful purposes, yet actually assembling undetected nuclear weapons in its "backyard." Despite increasing complaints from the international community as well as pressure from other nuclear states, North Korea has declared that its nuclear usage is for deterrence and military purposes as opposed to peaceful purposes. Since then, there have been numerous negotiations in the international arena, such as bilateral inter-Korea talks, Four-Party Talks, and more recently the Six-Party Talks. However, these resulted in no substantial outcomes and have led to fluctuations in optimism and pessimism.

Cheon argued that the current diplomatic state of Iran very much resembles the path followed by North Korea in the early 2000s. Iran launched its nuclear program as a part of an energy provision for economic development and promised that its use was for strictly non-military purposes. However, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found evidence of unregistered enrichment programs in Iran. Since then, Iran has purposely declined peace talks. Cheon emphasized that Iran is another country that has not signed the NPT. Moreover, Iran has maintained a relationship with North Korea in terms of its national military. Even though there may be no direct security ties between South Korea and the Middle East, such a correlation between these two countries has become troublesome for South Korea. Cheon's conclusion raised several questions of concern: What is the ultimate "red line" for Iran's nuclear weapon program that would justify a counterstrike? What is the likelihood of a successful outcome in the new rounds of negotiations? Assuming Iran peacefully gives up its nuclear program or it is destroyed by a third party, should we categorize Iran as a non-nuclear state incapable of producing nuclear energy?

Han began by elaborating upon China's optimism towards Iran. First, she explained that recently there have been positive signs of possible diplomatic talks between the P5+1 and Iran. China is confident that Iran is willing to respond through diplomatic means. Following fruitless discussions in Turkey, the nuclear

nations and Iran established momentum for diplomatic solutions. The United States under the Obama administration has insisted that diplomatic talks with Iran are critical, despite the fact that the United States cannot yet rule out military actions in times of escalation. More recently Iran has shown a willingness to return to the negotiation table. Despite Iran's maintained refusal to make compromises, Han and the Chinese community expect more substantial outcomes from future negotiations.

Second, she continued by pointing out that Chinese leaders have not reached a consensus on whether Iran will actually cross the threshold to develop into a full nuclear state. In essence, this means that, for many Chinese, Iran itself has not yet decided whether to cross the proverbial "nuclear red line". One important factor for Iran is to determine how much energy it expects to use via nuclear means; at the current stage, Iran has not been able to calculate its expected energy consumption in this way. Iran today is deciding whether to use its nuclear capabilities for economic development or military deterrence, or both. It must carefully measure the possible dangers and repercussions of this crucial decision, and China looks on through a hopeful lens.

Finally, Han said that Iran's nuclear history seems to indicate that the program may still be underdeveloped. Chinese leaders question the Iranian nuclear capability, doubting it is as developed as some reports claim. She declared that the latest IAEA report shows that so far there is no hard evidence that shows that Iran has a very advanced enrichment capability. Iranian leaders claimed to have advanced 20 percent of the uranium; however, sometimes the leaders claim more resources than there are in reality in order to gain or maintain leverage at the negotiation table. At the same time, the Chinese government recognizes Iranian sovereignty and legitimacy in its nuclear energy program. However, China's tipping point is production of more than 20 percent of uranium. Iran's militarization would put China in a difficult position in terms of diplomatic measures in the Middle East.

Vatansever commented on the importance and effectiveness of the oil sanctions placed on Iran. Iran depends heavily on its oil revenues. For many, oil sanctions might well be the last non-military means for resolving the ongoing Iranian nuclear impasse.

Vatansever discussed four essential questions regarding the sanctions: (1) What are the sanctions about? (2) Are they working? (3) What are the challenges? (4) What can be done in the future? First, with the hope for a diplomatic breakthrough, the goal of the sanctions is to substantially reduce Iran's oil export revenues while maintaining price stability in the oil markets. Second, are the sanctions working? Some reports indicate progress, but Vatansever cautioned that it is simply too early to reach a conclusion. Third, some major challenges remain. Oil demand is shifting away from countries intent on imposing the sanctions with demand growth driven by several countries in Asia that happen to be among Iran's chief export markets. The next obstacle concerns oil trading. Oil is traded in a market that is largely fluid, but also non-transparent, leaving Iran opportunities to disguise the origin of oil. Furthermore, Iran has offered discounts and is continuing to lure shipping and trading companies. Finally, to make the sanctions more effective, the current approach to sanctions needs to be carefully refined. The United States and the European Union need to facilitate a broader and more effective coalition on the Iranian oil sanctions, while aiming for a greater clarity on the time frame and extent of these sanctions.

Questions from the audience focused on Iran's relationships with other nations and the future of those relationships if Iran were to become nuclear armed. First, keeping China and Russia together in future discussions regarding Iran's nuclear program would mean emphasizing the relationship between these two countries and Iran through economic and energy perspectives. However, China has limited strategic purposes in the Middle East, and the relationship status would only change if China felt threatened. The second question dealt with the possibility of an Iranian attack on neighboring countries and the possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Panelists commented on the possibility that Iran, or groups within the Iranian borders, could launch an attack on Iran's neighbors, and coupled this with the likelihood that a nuclear-armed Iran would spark a proliferation cascade in the region. Finally, an escalation in nuclear proliferation would open up opportunities for miscalculation and misuse—a possibility indicated by the rising tension within the international community.

Iran's nuclear program has stirred up great controversy in the international community as its stockpile of enriched uranium steadily grows. Iran continues to develop its nuclear capabilities, and the most recent generation of Iranians includes a well-trained group of nuclear-savvy technicians and physicists. The P5+1 and Iran continue to gather in order to discuss possible solutions to Iran's controversial nuclear program. The essential issue for scholars and politicians today concerns how the world should approach Iran—through the lens of crisis management or through the lens of conflict management.

Session 2

Date: April 25, 2012
Time: 17:15-18:30
Place: Violet/Cosmos

"It's Complicated": Making Sense of China's Relationships with the Two Koreas

Organizing Institution:	Korea Economic Institute (KEI)
Panel Chair:	Abraham Kim, KEI
Panelists:	Nicholas Hamisevicz (Moderator), KEI
	John Park, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
	Liu Qun, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
	Kim Hankwon, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
Young Scholars:	Brian Reams, Yonsei University
	Madeleine Foley, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
	Stephanie Nayoung Kang, Seoul National University

China's relationships with the two Koreas have grown increasingly complex as both Koreas pursue opposing strategic interests. Whereas South Korea has attempted to establish a strategic partnership with China based on common commercial interests, North Korea seeks a stable relationship with China despite turbulence within its own regime. Moderator Mr. Nicholas Hamisevicz framed the debate by highlighting some of the challenges ahead. According to Hamisevicz, mutual misperception and impending leadership transitions in these three countries will complicate efforts to predict how their relations will unfold. In light of these complexities, China must reconcile its incongruous policies toward the two Koreas with an eye toward promoting stability and economic growth in the region.

Dr. John Park began the discussion by analyzing the triangular relationship between the two Koreas and China. He first compared the scope and effectiveness of South Korea's Sunshine Policy to China's own "sunshine policy". South Korea's Sunshine Policy saw economic engagement with the North as a catalyst for regime transformation that would orient North Korea away from nuclear adventurism and towards economic development.

At its height, the Sunshine Policy produced modest economic engagement between the North and the South in the Kaesong Industrial Complex and tourism sites at Mount Kumgang. Despite the gains of the Sunshine Policy, Park argued that an important gap existed within the South Korean government's engagement strategy. Although South Korean firms actively invested in the North, North Korean companies did not operate in the South. Investments under the Sunshine Policy remained limited to very few industries,

most notably tourism. Thus, the Sunshine Policy failed to stimulate the mutual economic investment believed to be the key to North Korea's reform.

In response to South Korea's attempts to economically engage North Korea, China has adopted its own "Beijing sunshine policy" by building relations between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the Worker's Party of the DPRK. The Beijing sunshine policy has achieved greater success in securing reciprocal economic engagement. The policy has stimulated active Chinese investment on the North Korea-China border where North Korean companies have entered the Chinese mainland to build factories. Party-to-party institution building, separating commercial activity from denuclearization, and an engagement strategy that does not seek leadership change have also contributed to China's successful engagement of the DPRK.

In South Korea, the question of "who lost North Korea" has driven a wedge between the conservative and progressive parties. Conservatives in South Korea find fault in the progressives' Sunshine Policy, while progressives cite conservative hard-line policies towards the North for pushing North Korea into the arms of China. South Korea's failed engagement has motivated China to adopt a more active strategy towards North Korea. China has come to favor the two-party approach between the CCP and the DPRK Worker's Party over the Six-Party Talks, which it associates with past failures.

Dr. Liu Qun offered a Chinese perspective on future diplomacy toward the two Koreas. He began by emphasizing that China's main goals for North Korea are denuclearization, stability, and eventual reunification. China's ties to both countries have led it to seek neutrality on the Korean Peninsula. Ultimately, China believes that the most responsible course is one that engages North Korea and assuages its considerable security concerns.

Liu first sought to dispel the notion that China holds sway over North Korean foreign policy. Rather, China's detente with South Korea since 1992 has meant China's influence over North Korea has waned. North Korea's prioritization of national security ahead of all other priorities has resulted in a "military first" policy. This manifested itself clearly when Chinese diplomatic pressure failed to halt the launch of a North Korean satellite in early 2012.

Second, the threat of a belligerent and nuclear-armed North Korea is also of great concern to China. North Korea's nuclear testing site is located just 100 kilometers from a densely populated Chinese border region. The human implications of a North Korean test could be grave and long-lasting for Chinese citizens.

Third, Liu observed that, in general, past diplomatic efforts to engage North Korea have not assuaged its deep sense of vulnerability and insecurity. The failure of the sunshine policy and other efforts were not individual failures but a collective one. Taken together, these efforts placed varying emphasis on North Korea's security concerns and resulted in incongruent security guarantees that have failed to win the

trust and confidence of the regime. The sunshine policy, juxtaposed with the Bush administration's accusations that North Korea was part of an "axis of evil," fed regime paranoia. Hindsight reveals that greater coordination among individual policies of Six-Party nations was a prerequisite for successful DPRK engagement.

Prospects for leadership change in China and both Koreas may yield new opportunities for addressing the disarmament challenge on the peninsula. Liu argued that a new engagement strategy coupled with diplomatic outreach to Kim Jong-Un is necessary to overcome North Korea's sense of vulnerability and isolation, which remain the primary obstacles to peace.

Dr. Kim Hankwon analyzed China's policy toward the Koreas from the South Korean perspective. He listed three main limitations to deeper engagement and argued that universal recognition of these limitations might lead to a more effective peninsular strategy.

First, South Koreans do not understand New China's pragmatic approach to North Korea. South Korea associates present-day China with the Confucian values of the Chinese empire, which ruled according to norms of justice. The approach of New China, however, follows a pragmatic policy that favors near-term stability at the expense of long-term gains. Kim Hankwon feels that this nuance is not widely understood in South Korea.

Second, China feels encircled by growing US influence in the region. This, paired with India's expanding missile capabilities and naval posture, weighs heavily on China. Therefore, China's attentions have been split between the Koreas and other regional powers, such as Japan, the Philippines, and India. This is indicative of the differing national interests of the neighboring countries.

Finally, China's Korea policy must be consistent with existing policies towards other neighboring countries. For example, the repatriation of North Korean defectors is viewed within China as more of a diplomatic or domestic political matter rather than a human rights issue. This policy ought to be consistent

with China's policies regarding the perceptions of sovereignty in the Tibet and Xinxiang regions, as well as the policies toward Southeast and Central Asian countries in dealing with territorial disputes and migration issues.

Ultimately, all parties concerned seek a denuclearized and stable peninsula. The current Chinese government's dependence on a stable Korean Peninsula will continue to stymie efforts to coordinate Chinese, South Korean, and US policy toward the DPRK. Focusing on points of contention that arise in the short term will yield confusion and conflict. With this in mind, South Korea and China should focus on common, long-term interests rather than allowing short-term disagreements to derail the negotiating process.

Dr. Abraham Kim cited three factors that will complicate China's relationship with the two Koreas in the years ahead. First, intransigent interests exist between China and its partners. These hurdles may prove impossible to overcome without detente in other areas. Most notably, China's patronage of North Korea, motivated by its desire to maintain stability on the Korean Peninsula, has drawn criticism from the United States and a key trade partner, South Korea. According to Abraham Kim, both parties view China's support as enabling North Korea's provocations.

On one hand, the economic and humanitarian disaster resulting from North Korea's collapse would unquestionably bleed into China. On the other hand, South Korea is a major investor in China. It conducts over $180 billion worth of business in China annually. Indeed, South Korean investment aided China's economic recovery following its isolation after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989. Given that China's current regime depends on economic prosperity and nationalism to ensure public support, a step in the wrong direction on North Korea or South Korea diplomacy could prove disastrous. Finally, North Korea remains an important bargaining chip for China in its relations with the United States. North Korea keeps the United States and its allies in East Asia off-balance and dependent on China's goodwill and cooperation.

Second, the three countries face what Abraham Kim calls a "diplomatic security dilemma." In pursuing divergent engagement strategies that reflect their own interests, the peninsula is made less stable. The United States, South Korea, and Japan have adopted a seemingly hardline approach to North Korea, which in China's view has provoked aggressive responses from North Korea. China's conciliatory engagement has achieved limited success, but in the opinion of US negotiators has left North Korea with little incentive for constructive engagement. North Korea has exploited this dynamic for its own limited gains, at times pitting negotiating partners against one another.

Finally, economic dynamism in Northeast Asia has attracted the attention of the United States. The Chinese view US economic involvement on the peninsula through its "Asia Pivot" policy as a form of economic and political containment. South Korea is caught between its largest economic partner, China, and its closest and most important political partner, the United States. As competition between China and

the United States grows, South Korea will struggle to reconcile its interests in both relationships. Moreover, while South Korea views China as a valued economic partner, it is also a future competitor.

The question-and-answer session focused on the relationship between North Korea and China. When asked whether China had control over the degree and nature of trade with North Korea, Park argued that the open trade policy means that China must take the good with the bad. Though China's own "sunshine policy" has yielded licit cross-border trade, it has also opened the door for North Korean counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs and other products to enter the Chinese market. As a follow-up, the questioner asked why North Korea, so dependent on China, would want to antagonize it with repeated military provocations directed at Seoul. Park said that the provocations kept China off-balance, effectively tempering North Korea's dependence on its neighbor.

When asked whether China's economic stakes in North Korea would force it to intervene militarily in the event of North Korea's collapse, Park said that Chinese economic interests in North Korea are very small compared to the North's investment in China. He further speculated that Chinese intervention in such a scenario would be likely, regardless of the economic implications.

In responding to a query about the specifics of China's DPRK engagement, Liu said that China's assistance to North Korea is purely civil and has included food and fuel aid. China does not transfer arms or aid North Korea's military development. Such a move would embolden North Korea and compromise prospects for a stable Korean Peninsula. China seeks to bring North Korea closer to economic parity with the South so that peaceful and gradual reunification can be achieved.

In the years ahead, common economic goals and divergent strategic interests will continue to complicate the relationship between China and the two Koreas. While expanded trade among the three countries is a promising means of North Korea's gradual and peaceful reform, power and security dynamics continue to undermine these efforts. US involvement in the Pacific is slated to grow in the coming century, challenging China's political and economic stake in the East Asian region. Ultimately, China and the two Koreas must reconcile their security interests with the potential benefits of economic and diplomatic engagement if any real progress is to be made.

Day 2

April 26, 2012

Session 3

How Can Leadership Save the Eurozone?

American Foreign Policy in East Asia: Prospects for Shared Leadership?

Regionalism in Central Asia and the Politics of Energy

The New Latin America in the Emerging Global Order

Plenary Session II

Think Tanks and Crisis: How Can the Policy Research Community Help Cope with Major Crises?

Session 4

The Future of the Middle East Peace Process

Nuclear Crisis in Northeast Asia

Regional Leadership in Southeast Asia: Can ASEAN Still Occupy the Driver's Seat?

Leadership and the Legacies of the Arab Spring

Session 5

Energy and Oil in the Middle East

EU Migration Policy after the Arab Spring: Searching for Domestic and Foreign Policy Coherence

Japan's Nuclear Crisis

Social Polarization in the United States: Searching for Civility

Session 6

Leadership Transition in China

Leadership Transition in Russia: Continuity or Change?

Leadership Transitions in the Two Koreas

Plenary Session III

A New Era of Mass Politics? Leadership, Populism and Information

Session 3

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 8:45-10:00
Place: Orchid

How Can Leadership Save the Eurozone?

Organizing Institution:	Bertelsmann-Stiftung
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Andreas Esche, Bertelsmann-Stiftung
Panelists:	Helmut Hauschild, Bertelsmann-Stiftung
	Iain Begg, London School of Economics
	Ansgar Belke, University of Duisburg-Essen
Young Scholars:	Huang Xiao, Ewha Womans University
	Carolyn Marie DuMond, Center for Strategic and International Studies

The EuroZone, has had a long and continuing struggle with a debt crisis stemming from troubled nations such as Greece, Spain, and Italy. As the crisis drags on and threatens to embroil France and other EU members, many wonder if the leadership of the European Union or its strongest economies could do more to improve the situation. Dr. Iain Begg, Dr. Ansgar Belke, Mr. Helmut Hauschild, and Mr. Andreas Esche who are leading experts on the economics, politics, and leadership of the European Union, offered an indepth look at the Euro Zone and the role leadership can play in the resolution of Europe's economic woes.

Begg argued that rumors of the Euro Zone's imminent collapse are greatly exaggerated and that there is in fact strong political commitment behind the euro. It is important to understand that the core of Eurozone

leadership is determined that the euro will "not only survive but succeed." Since Europe is not a single unified political entity and each state has to agree to all major decisions, the past two and a half years of apparent leadership failure have actually been precisely the kind of drawn-out political process that is required for decisions to be made. The majority of power in Europe rests at the level of states, rather than with the EU leadership, which helps explain why the process has looked like such a failure to outside observers. However, through this process, the European Union has made great strides in improving the structure of the euro.

Despite the recent progress in improving the euro's structure, the system was created with flaws. It was thought, at the time, that the discipline enforced by the euro would cause its members to transform themselves in such a way that would solve any problems that arose. The rising debt levels the Eurozone countries are facing today is something with which the system was not designed to address. The system was made without a fiscal union that could mitigate the many asymmetric shocks that impact one part of the Eurozone more than another.

The current process of deleveraging is a harder adjustment to make than those necessary for the cyclical downturns in the business cycle that the European system has experienced since the end of World War II. This has exposed a major structural problem, the lack of a fiscal union, within the Eurozone. The lack of leadership in decision-making at the center of the system is one of the reasons that the crisis has been so hard for Europe to properly address. While the leadership has failed to find ways to move forward, it has begun to establish a model to address future problems. However, Europe needs to find a way to overcome the current crisis before it can move to the future model.

Belke argued that since the Eurozone has only one currency it has been unable to depreciate the currency, influence the exchange rate, and reduce public debt. If austerity is imposed in a credible fashion, it might be beneficial in reducing the detrimental effects of public debt. To date, however, the Eurozone may have focused too much on austerity. Belke said that fiscal contraction in the European Union might increase since leaders and economists from the European Union have distinct opinions on the EU economic situation. If they cannot make an agreement quickly, then the European Union may be likely to break up.

Hauschild said that in a monetary union of 17 sovereign member states, leadership is a challenge because of the complicated EU governance structure. The idea of one leader taking initiative does not apply in Europe. It takes time for a leader to be capable of performing and organizing a majority. He argued that after two years of hesitation and indecision, which added costs to the crisis, the European Central Bank (ECB), together with European governments, has at last shown leadership and implemented appropriate countermeasures. The fiscal compact highlighted by Begg and Belke, together with the 800-billion-euro bailout fund and the ECB's supply of cheap money, have so far prevented a widespread conflagration.

The panel then began a period of group discussion on a wide variety of topics. Esche noted that, due to

distinct structural differences and imbalances within Europe, structural reforms in the European Union might not turn out to be solid, lasting, and sustainable. Therefore, the governance reform measures agreed upon at the European Council in December 2011 may not be sufficient to update its crisis prevention and management mechanism.

Belke argued that, so far, government reform measures thus far have relied too much on two things: austerity and wishful thinking that debts will be honored. Sharply cutting budget deficits has been the priority—hence the tax increases and spending cuts. But this collectively large fiscal contraction is self-defeating. By driving enfeebled economies into recession, austerity increases worries about government debts and European banks. Mere budget-cutting does not deal with the real cause of the mess, which is a loss of credibility.

Italy and Spain are under attack, not because their finances have suddenly deteriorated, but because investors fret that they may be forced into default. For this loss of confidence, blame the pretense, Belke said. Europe's leaders have repeatedly denied that Greece is insolvent, failing to draw a line between it and countries like Spain and Italy, which are solvent but short of liquidity. The excuse is that a Greek restructuring may cause contagion. In fact, denying the inevitable has undermined pledges about solvent governments.

Belke asserted that a reform package should include four things. First, it must make clear which of Europe's governments are deemed illiquid and which are insolvent, giving unlimited backing to the solvent governments but restructuring the debt of those that can never repay. Second, reform has to shore up Europe's banks to ensure that they can withstand a sovereign default. Third, it needs to shift the Euro zone's macroeconomic policy from its obsession with budget-cutting toward an agenda for growth. And finally, it must start the process of designing a new system to stop such a mess from being created again.

The fourth reform will take a long time to complete, because it will involve new treaties and approval by parliaments and voters. The other parts of the reform package must be decided on quickly with the clear aim that European governments and the ECB act together to end today's vicious circle of panic, in which the weakness of government finances, the fragility of banks, and worries about low growth all feed on each other.

Esche next inquired if there is a so-called "German leadership" that will rise to the challenge and be able to lead Europe out of its worst crisis since integration. Hauschild argued that a German leadership exists, but Chancellor Angela Merkel took too much time to accept that Germany, as the Eurozone's largest economy, carries a particular responsibility in resolving the crisis. There are two fundamental beliefs in German politics that are deeply rooted in history. The first is to curb inflation. The second, which arose out of its experience in World War II, is Germany's long-standing, overarching foreign policy commitment to be deeply integrated in the European community.

Consequently, Merkel's cure for the euro crisis is based on three principles that are derived from those two beliefs. The first principle of "austerity, not stimulus" posits that confidence can only be restored if states adopt a balanced budget. Investments in the economy, which would stimulate growth, are not currently seen as a priority. The second principle of deeper integration suggests that, despite growing Euro-skepticism, even in Germany, Merkel believes that the euro crisis must result in deeper European integration. The final principle is to prevent inflation. Domestically, Merkel is adamant about keeping inflation at a low rate. Germans have so far remained relatively relaxed about the euro crisis, but if inflation kicks in, the savings of millions of Germans would be at risk.

Hauschild concluded that Germany should take credit for preventing the Eurozone's continued slide into the economic doldrums. However, recently there is growing suspicion about whether Germany is leading Europe in the right direction. The rigid insistence on strict austerity in the Eurozone's peripheral countries runs the risk of setting off a downward spiral and widespread social unrest. Europe must find the appropriate balance of austerity measures and the stimulation of economies in recession.

Third, Esche debated whether a new Eurobond is the solution to the Eurozone crisis. Begg argued that the answer is yes and no. If Eurobonds were introduced, it would provide cheap financing for overly indebted countries that currently suffer from high costs, possibly at a few basis points above German bonds. However, the Eurozone already has implicit Eurobonds. Before the crisis, even countries with excessive debt, like Greece, Italy, Spain, and Portugal, paid only small spreads over Germany since the market assumed that the "no bailout clause" would be disregarded in a crisis situation. Consequently, with real Eurobonds, the moral hazard problem would not only remain, but might become worse. In order to avoid the risk of moral hazard, there must be restrictions attached to the issuance of Eurobonds. Begg said that there also must be rules about national economic policy in order to promote economic growth, while at the same time limiting indebtedness.

Hauschild also highlighted the moral hazard problem discussed by Begg, arguing that the dominant problem with the introduction of Eurobonds is that they are not a silver bullet. In fact, it is hard to get them right, even assuming that all the legal and constitutional obstacles could be overcome in time. He stressed that Eurobonds are bound to create two sorts of problems. The first problem is determining the right amount of issuance. And, second, in order to avoid moral hazard, there must be rules and joint decision-making. However, according to the past experience, there is no real hope that this will occur more than on paper. The result will be that either the rules keep Eurobond issuance volume too low to end the crisis, or Eurobond issuance will be so vast that it would involve the peripheral countries solving their financing problems by shifting the crisis from the periphery to the center.

Belke stressed that if Eurobonds were created, they would defragment the EU bond market and create an alternative for Chinese - or Russian - investors who, until now, still invest in safe US Treasury bills. This would occur in spite of increasing doubts about US macroeconomic policy and their fear of returns

disappearing over time due to inflation.

Esche lastly asked the panelists to envision the future of the Eurozone two to three years from now and the prospects for Eurobonds. Begg answered that the Eurozone will not be exactly the same because there will be more members and Eurobonds will exist. Belke said that there is a great chance the zone could break up, a chance of 10 to 25 percent as estimated by commercial banks. On the surface, the Euro zone will stick together, but European countries are going to diverge below the surface, which will undermine the surface harmony. In the end, exit strategies will be damaging due to the high exit costs involved. Belke believes that there will not be a Eurobond in the short run. Hauschild argued that the crisis is the birth pains for a stronger European Union, which will create a stronger Eurozone in five to seven years.

An audience member then asked what specific things could go wrong in the near future. Hauschild answered that the biggest dangers for the Eurozone will come from France, not from Greece, Portugal, Italy, or Spain. France urgently needs structural reforms, but it has not been ready to realize them. France's presidential election in May 2012 may have been a very decisive day for the European Union. If France does not initiate reforms after the election, it will be heavily punished by the financial markets. This will create a tougher time for the Eurozone.

In conclusion, the panelists reiterated the necessity of effective political leadership in resolving the current crisis, while acknowledging that greater challenges for the Eurozone leadership are yet to come. With the Eurozone crisis continuing to wax and wane, quality leadership at the national level and at the helms of EU institutions will play a crucial role in calming financial markets and reassuring investors. As European voters begin to reject the pain of austerity and the specter of a Greek exit looms larger on the horizon, those in leadership positions will have to make difficult fiscal, monetary, and political decisions. The panelists highlighted the multifaceted challenges the Eurozone leaders face and the great role leadership has in realizing a solution to save the Eurozone.

Session 3

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 8:45-10:00
Place: Grand Ballroom

American Foreign Policy in East Asia: Prospects for Shared Leadership?

Organizing Institution:	Maxwell School, Syracuse University
Panel Chair & Moderator:	James Steinberg, Syracuse University
Panelists:	Richard Falkenrath, Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
	Jonathan Pollack, The Brookings Institution
	Choi Kang, Korea National Diplomatic Academy
Young Scholars:	Robert Warshaw, The Heritage Foundation
	Suh Jihye, Korea University

Against the backdrop of China's rise and America's "pivot" towards Asia, analysts have increasingly scrutinized the future of US foreign policy toward the Asia-Pacific region. The recent proliferation of transnational challenges has required strong leadership and multilateral cooperation. The distinguished panel of Dr. James Steinberg, Dr. Richard Falkenrath, Dr. Jonathan Pollack, and Dr. Choi Kang sought to address critical questions for the region, such as the sustainability of US regional engagement, the future of Asian policy, the expanded role of America's allies and partners, and the challenges posed by a rising China. In essence, as the region's myriad complex challenges expand in scope and become increasingly difficult to solve unilaterally, the United States will need to adapt its leadership to become more forward-leaning, more strategic, more oriented toward cooperation, more inclusive, and more visible.

Steinberg, drawing from his experience as former Deputy Secretary of State in the Obama administration, framed shared leadership in the Asia-Pacific region when he deemed the United States an "indispensable nation" to the Asia-Pacific countries, echoing President Barack Obama's remarks in the 2012 State of the Union Address. Steinberg provided insight into the thought processes behind the Obama administration's pivot, or rebalancing, toward the Asia-Pacific region. He noted that the White House is committed to US leadership in the region and recognizes that new challenges in the region require shared leadership. Indeed, as Secretary of State Hillary Clinton highlighted, these new challenges are often transnational in nature. No individual country can solve them unilaterally, yet none can be solved without the United States, owing to America's economic and strategic strength.

Washington's tripartite engagement strategy involves multiple layers of interaction with allies and partners. First, Steinberg argued that the White House is committed to sustaining traditional partnerships and alliances in the region. The US-led alliance system has remained the core of America's regional presence, and as traditional partnerships evolve, the United States is continuing to find new ways to maximize their utility. Second, the United States is expanding that circle of engagement to include new and emerging powers, such as India, China, Vietnam, Indonesia, and others, in an effort to diversify its approach. Finally, the Obama administration is expanding US political and economic engagement with the region through multilateral institutions. It has joined the East Asia Summit, taken a more active role in the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings, and energized the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). These actions have demonstrated a clear American commitment to seize leadership via partnership and apply it across a diverse range of contexts, such as promoting greater multilateral cooperation, economic integration, and trade liberalization.

Steinberg noted that questions still remain over the sustainability of the US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. While such issues are not new, he argued that the Obama administration appreciates that sustainability is more than the sum of issue-driven engagement and White House actions, like high-level visits and the invigoration of the TPP. The TPP has been America's answer to a bifurcated region seeking both US security guarantees and Chinese-led economic growth. Finally, in the long-term, the United States must be patient and continue to be engaged economically and involved in regional processes through attending various meetings. It must also remain committed to working with new partners, like Europe, to address a host of new challenges, such as improving relations with China.

Falkenrath next tackled the long-term sustainability of US commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. He detailed what the US presidential election cycle, and a possible change in administrations, would mean for US-Asia policy. A victory for Mitt Romney would naturally elicit some change from the Obama administration's own policies. However, US policy toward Asia is fairly bipartisan in nature, with debates emerging over minutiae rather than the region's overall significance. Therefore, observers should not expect drastic changes but should rather expect the following phenomena to occur as an incoming administration transitions from campaigning to governing. First, new administrations will generally not know

the specific details of their own policy yet. Second, incoming administrations will sometimes negate old policies without a positive alternative, simply to break from past decisions. Events often force an administration's hand in the early months, like the P-3 incident or North Korea's missile test, and allies and partners will often be left dangling while a specific policy is formulated. Finally, every administration must reconcile campaign rhetoric with responsible policy, which is no easy task.

Furthermore, Falkenrath said that US-Asia policy needs a grand vision, rather than remaining out the sum of issue-driven engagements across areas such as free trade, proliferation, and human rights. New generations will eschew traditional thinking regarding security issues as economic pressures grow and military capabilities rise. Traditional challenges, like Okinawa base agreements and troop levels, will increasingly pale in significance to fiscal problems, such as America's sustained deficit spending and reliance on Chinese debt purchasing. Falkenrath concluded by imploring the Asan Institute to host a discussion on cybersecurity at next year's Plenum. He believes that Washington still has no correct answer to Chinese sponsorship and tolerance of large-scale corporate espionage.

Pollack discussed the challenges and implications for US strategy in Asia, faced with the growing influence and centrality of the region. He emphasized that a systematic and functional approach is needed in adjusting US policy to this diverse and changing environment. While inheriting its traditional alliances and relationships, the United States needs to carefully examine the big picture of fragmented functional pieces, with various security partners alongside adversaries, in order to pursue clearer long-term goals and expectations. The recent US Marine Corps rotation in Australia, despite budgetary reductions, demonstrates a firm commitment to the Asia-Pacific region. In this sense, the expansion of US naval deployments in Australia is seen as an effort to increase distributive capability and flexibility. It also reflects a devotion to Southeast Asia, rather than a threat to China. Not anticipating a major shift in regional power distribution, Pollack added that the United States must address the expectation that its allies will commit to America's defense policy. Furthermore, the United States must consider the burgeoning role of Australia, especially while the United States devotes more attention to Southeast Asia.

Pollack argued that the change of dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region, as allies are becoming more capable, poses a challenge for the United States to articulate its roles and reconcile them with the regional powers. The design of the US military presence, for example, will have to be repositioned from high-end contingency planning to a range of multiple missions that reflect regional realities. Particularly, he views China as the subtext behind the whole power distribution. While China feels uneasy about the US presence in the region and attempts to weigh its own role accordingly, there should be no single power or strategy placed into so diverse a region as Asia; there can be no "one size fits all" policy. Likewise, it is not a preferable option for any surrounding country to choose between the United States and China as the dominant power. In the meantime, it is neither a sustainable option for Asian nations to presume that the United States will remain the primary security guarantor, while they reap economic benefits from China. The most important action the United States should take to reinforce its long-term

credibility is ameliorating its domestic fiscal concerns and addressing its spending issues.

Kang shared his views on current US policy toward the Asia-Pacific region and presented his recommendations for a mutually beneficial relationship. America's visibility in the region is diminishing amid increasing Japanese and Chinese regional influence. He attributed this to several factors—namely, that the United States is relying too heavily on bilateral alliances, and that it has only focused on traditional security concerns, which do not address the recent transnational and multilateral challenges. US-Asia policy is driven by issues, not by future planning; the result is that US policy oftentimes lacks continuity and sustainability. A more proactive leadership to tackle today's challenges and to establish a long-term policy is crucial in order to rectify these shortcomings. The US emphasis on its traditional alliances is a reactive approach and cannot respond to the changing circumstances. Kang stressed that in order to establish a more sustainable long-term policy, a fundamental review of US concerns and interests in Asia will have to be followed by concrete plans for action.

Kang also encouraged more cooperation between the United States and China, which is desired by many other regional states. Seoul desires continued US presence and commitment, although there exists a paradoxical concern that such commitment would concern China. Although South Korea believes a US presence will contribute to regional stability, an increased presence will also raise China's ire. This stems from the complexity of Northeast Asian relations between China and the United States. More efforts are needed to engage China in different dimensions, which would create a larger framework for US policy towards Asia. Security, as the weakest part of US regional policy, can be enhanced with a better understanding and clarification of the United States and its allies' roles in responding to the US defense budget cuts. Defining varying roles and missions for US allies and partners can increase cooperation and strengthen US leadership.

In closing, Kang suggested that the Obama administration build more confidence and trust with its counterparts through enhanced communication and consultation, taking a presidential policy statement on US-Asia policy as an example. He also argued that identifying the conditions for peace and stability in the region, as well as forthcoming challenges, will lead to a more concrete policy roadmap shared among regional allies.

Following the panel, audience members raised numerous comments and questions. One audience member questioned Pollack's argument that the US Marine Corps rotation in Australia is not intended to deter China, noting that such public denials create mistrust between the United States and China. Pollack responded by encouraging a more candid discourse between the two countries, noting that the two sides need to be able to have adult conversations on sensitive issues. Another audience member noted that the United States tends to view regional architecture purely from a security perspective, while there are trade and economic issues involved in the core. Steinberg admitted that the bifurcated approach is unsustainable, and he highlighted US economic re-engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, primarily through the ongoing TPP negotiations. Pollack said that the structure of the United States as a security provider and China as an economic beneficiary should not be sustained.

In a wider perspective, Steinberg argued that US cooperation with China, as well as a US-European coordinated policy toward China, plays a significant role in the trans-Atlantic relationship. Concerning the issue of incompatibility between the US-led alliance system and other regional security architecture, Steinberg said that they can be compatible if the example of NATO and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe after the Cold War, which existed side-by-side, is considered. According to Pollack, the United States might be in the process of reconciling traditional alliance structures with a larger commitment to adapt to the new architecture of the Asia-Pacific region. This again would require a candid set of discussions to articulate the consequences of different pathways.

In conclusion, throughout the panel discussion, there was a general consensus on the growing presence and centrality of the Asia-Pacific region in an economic, strategic, and geographic sense. The Asia-Pacific region is, however, becoming more dynamic and multi-polar, which requires a new strategy and relationship for its members. The panel also widely agreed that US leadership and presence in the region is necessary, but it needs to be focused and flexible. It needs to adapt to the evolving environment in order to deftly confront new challenges. However, the credibility and long-term sustainability of that leadership will be perennially questioned by friend and foe alike. Although the region wants a US presence, America's financial constraints, budget issues, and political stalemates may endanger its long-term commitment and create more instability. This sober assessment underlies the panel's central theme: The complex challenges in the Asia-Pacific region demand new forms of leadership, partnership, and fellowship between traditional allies, emerging partners, and potential adversaries.

Session 3

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 8:45-10:00
Place: Lilac/Tulip

Regionalism in Central Asia and the Politics of Energy

Organizing Institution:	Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Gennady Chufrin, IMEMO
Panelists:	Igor Tomberg, Institute of Oriental Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
	Vladimir Matveev, Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences
Young Scholars:	Shin Heeyoung, Seoul National University
	Won "Pia" Ho Jung, Seoul National University

Dr. Gennady Chufrin opened with remarks linking the topic of energy policy with the concept of leadership. He spoke about the weak democracies and unstable leadership that appeared in Central Asian countries after the collapse of the Soviet Union, emphasizing that a well-designed energy strategy would be crucial for leaders seeking to pursue national development through the use of natural energy resources. He introduced the discussion as one that would primarily focus on the use of carbon energy resources for development in the three largest Central Asian countries: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan.

According to Chufrin, Central Asian countries are gaining the interest of major trading countries such as China and the United States, thanks to their large resource bases; however, they also face significant challenges. First, any energy strategy must be connected to the political and economic stability in the region, and take into consideration threats coming from international terrorism, organized crime, and religious extremism. Central Asian leaders must also remain cognizant of the changing international political situations in Iran and Afghanistan, because they will both have a major impact on Central Asian energy regimes. Second, Central Asian leaders must find a way to resolve legal disputes arising over territorial rights in the Caspian Sea after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The treaties originally concluded by the Soviet Union are no longer valid, and the current five Caspian states cannot reach a consensus on how to divide rights regarding resources in the Caspian Sea. No trans-Caspian energy regime can be built without the resolution of these issues. Third, leaders in Central Asian countries must focus on overcoming transportation barriers, as they are all landlocked nations. In Chufrin's opinion, this can be done by expanding existing export routes, mostly across Russian territory, or by developing new routes.

Dr. Igor Tomberg described the economic state of Central Asian countries. The Caspian countries all had negative growth rates in 1996, but now show relatively stable economic growth, even after the 2008 finan-

cial crisis. Tomberg noted that the inflation rate remains stable, allowing for economic growth that had previously been hindered by inflation reaching up to 7.1 percent. Macroeconomic stability is essential for growth in the hydrocarbon export industry, according to Tomberg. Beyond these commonalities, the situation differs from country to country. Per capita gross national product varies widely, with Kazakhstan as the highest, thanks to its large oil production relative to its small population. Other countries, such as Tajikistan, are much weaker economically. Despite oil and gas exports, these countries show a high level of poverty. Tomberg pointed to the case of Tajikistan, where 44 percent of the population lives below the poverty line.

Following his discussion of the economic state of Central Asian countries, Tomberg then provided an overview of the energy resources in Central Asia. He stated that the main energy resources are natural gas and oil, but that some amounts of uranium exist in addition to the rivers that have potential for use in hydro-power generation. Large commercial hydrocarbon reserves still remain as well. Studies estimate the region to have between 4.5 and 7.5 percent of the world's oil reserves, with five percent commercially viable for extraction. The International Energy Agency predicts the Central Asian or Caspian countries will supply nine percent of the world's demand for hydrocarbons. This is the same level currently produced by Latin America, although Latin America is expected to increase production capacity in the future, with increases coming mainly from Brazil. As for natural gas, the Caspian countries currently account for 11 percent of global gas sales. Another major natural resource in the region is uranium. Kazakhstan is estimated to hold around 12 percent of the global share of uranium resources. Uzbekistan's share is estimated to be around two percent.

Tomberg pointed out that energy exports are an integral part of the Central Asian economy, but the transportation system for these resources is yet to be modernized. Much could be improved in terms of extraction technology as well. Overall, the infrastructure leaves much to be desired, leading to inefficient energy consumption. Tomberg's analysis indicated that Central Asian countries show the highest energy consumption per capita, while productivity from this energy use falls below the global average. In his opinion, the electrical capacities of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are still what they were decades ago, and only the "Soviet heritage" keeps these countries from complete economic collapse. Turkmenistan and Tajikistan are heavily dependent on the international community and the international energy resource market. They remain very dependent on foreign investment for the funding of major projects dealing with infrastructure, which is complicated by political uncertainty in the region. Furthermore, power-generating systems are being maxed out and facilities are close to exhaustion. Also, the facilities necessary for exporting resources out of the region need modernizing, but these needs are not being sufficiently addressed. For example, Turkmenistan is far from China and other energy markets, requiring it to negotiate with neighboring countries for transportation of energy resources by land or sea. These additional agreements add to the final cost of exporting energy resources. Therefore, the landlocked Central Asian countries are making serious efforts to utilize the Soviet pipeline system, which is outdated but still functional. For the moment, most of the oil exports from Kazakhstan go to Russia or to Europe via

Russian territory. Most of Kazakhstan's natural gas is exported to Russia as well. In the case of Turkmenistan, Tomberg noted that its pipeline to China is considered a big success; he followed up this statement with more analysis of the Turkmen pipeline and the future of Turkmenistan's economy.

Currently, Turkmenistan's pipeline capacity is around 30 billion cubic meters per year, and is expected to increase to 60 to 65 billion cubic meters per year. For two years, Turkmenistan exported natural gas via this pipeline. However, the total amount was cut short because of the high price of natural gas rather than any physical limits of the pipeline. China is modernizing its pipelines, but only very gradually because the government is afraid of creating runaway inflation. Once the prices of domestic supply in China drop, causing a subsequent drop in the general price of natural gas, Turkmenistan will have to search for other export markets. Iran is a logical choice, but the European market is just across the Caspian Sea.

As for the legal problems surrounding the Caspian Sea, Tomberg was pessimistic that any viable solution is in the works. Progress was being made with agreements signed for further pipeline deals, but with the political and military situation turning unstable, it is doubtful that construction will start this year. Tomberg concluded by saying that, due to these shortcomings and despite its rich natural resources, the prospect of economic growth in Turkmenistan is uncertain.

After hearing Tomberg's presentation, Chufrin added that until recently the numbers concerning the proven recoverable resources of carbon resources in the area were based on estimates from the Soviet era. More recent geological surveys of oil and gas resources in the region have either not been carried out or only begun recently. This has made it difficult for governments to work out policies regarding their energy resources, which in turn makes it difficult to work out economic policies based on the export of these resources to the international market. Results from the most recent surveys indicate that the region's gas resources are more plentiful than previously thought.

Dr. Vladimir Matveev focused his presentation on challenges facing the Turkmen gas export industry. Turkmenistan is ranked fourth in the world in the size of its gas reserves, after Russia, Iran, and Qatar. It has surged ahead to become a major player in the global gas market after the discovery of the South Iolotan-Osman field in 2007, which is projected to have 21 trillion cubic meters of gas. The Turkmen government hopes to actively increase production of this important resource, and, according to the "Development Program of Oil and Gas Industry of Turkmenistan Until 2030," is planning to rapidly increase production fourfold, to 250 billion cubic meters. However, Matveev expressed doubt about the viability of this goal and noted that, according to various sources and his own expertise, a more realistic strategy would bring gas production in Turkmenistan up from 90 to 100 billion cubic meters by 2030. Matveev contended that, in any case, the problem facing the Turkmen government with regard to its gas export industry was not production, but the transportation of gas for export.

With lower import demand in Iran and Russia, the Turkmen government has three main strategies that it

can pursue to expand its gas export industry. The first involves working out an agreement that would allow Turkmen gas to flow through Iran to a gas liquefaction plant on the Arabian Sea shore, giving Turkmenistan an entry into the world liquefied natural gas market. The second is expanding its gas trade with China. The two governments have already reached an agreement to increase gas trade from 40 to 65 billion cubic meters in the near future. As Chinese internal infrastructure develops and improves accessibility to more areas, demand will continue to rise, and Turkmenistan could take advantage of that spike in demand. China is currently offering Turkmenistan funding and human resources to maintain the trade relationship because of benefits from Turkmenistan's low contract price and because it is afraid that Turkmenistan would pursue an export agreement with Europe, where it could get a higher price. However, as noted before by Tomberg, this partnership with China also presents risks for Turkmenistan because the country could become overly dependent on the Chinese market, and may suffer significant losses if it maintains its low contract price while global gas prices rise.

A third strategy would involve expanding Turkmen exports to Europe through the Caspian Sea. The most well-known and politicized effort to do this was the "Nabucco" project, but the project has since run into significant trouble. First, it must grapple with legal issues. There are many unresolved questions about territory and ownership of the Caspian Sea, so going ahead with the Nabucco project before these questions are answered may be in violation of international laws. Second, many of the initial supporters of the project doubt the commercial viability of the pipeline itself. As Matveev noted earlier, the Turkmen government's projections for its production capacity of oil are far larger than those proposed by international consulting organizations, and other investors worry that Turkmenistan does not have a large enough resource base to fulfill all of its export obligations.

After Matveev's conclusion, the moderator took the floor once again to elaborate on some of his earlier remarks about the multilateral nature of the Turkmen government's strategy in the Caspian Sea. Chufrin commented that there are several countries involved in any potential agreement, including Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan. For any trans-Caspian project to be successfully maintained, the political conflicts in Afghanistan must be settled first. Second, Turkmenistan must gain the approval of countries like Russia and Iran, which have raised environmental issues regarding a trans-Caspian pipeline. Third, Turkmenistan must convince its investors that that it will be able to fulfill its export obligations. Chufrin

quoted a March 2012 Financial Times article that described a new proposed plan for the Nabucco project, shortening the pipeline and nearly halving its capacity. The pipeline's shortening will, according to Chufrin, create new transportation problems for Turkmen exporters.

Chufrin went on to compare Turkmenistan's development strategy with that of Kazakhstan. He praised Kazakhstan's economic progress over the past two decades, achieved through economic development goals that aimed to also further social and political stability. He implied that while Turkmenistan's gas industry was crucial to its development, the Turkmen leaders should make more efforts to link their economic goals with social and political goals.

The panelists generally agreed that natural resources are the key to Central Asia's economic growth and political stability. None of the countries in the region can afford to have their exports of oil and natural gas jeopardized by international discord. But as it stands, those concerned are still working around the legal issues surrounding the Caspian Sea, and none are willing to take a leading role in mitigating the disputes. While modernizing the energy industry's export sector, Central Asian countries must make additional efforts to explore new markets.

Session 3

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 8:45-10:00
Place: Violet/Cosmos

The New Latin America in the Emerging Global Order

Organizing Institution:	Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Jorge Heine, CIGI
Panelists:	Amaury de Souza, Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
	Andres Serbin, Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research (CRIES), Buenos Aires
	Marcos Robledo, Diego Portales University, Santiago
Young Scholars:	Min Kyung Cha, Yonsei University
	Kyle Cassily, Seoul National University

Moderator Dr. Jorge Heine opened the panel by relating a story about traditional perceptions of Latin America. There was once a contest in a US journalism school to create the most boring headline, and the winner read: "Small Earthquake in Chile, Only a Few Dead." Heine explained that earthquakes still plague the region, yet political coups and low economic growth have receded in the past 10 years as a new Latin America has emerged. Since then, the region has seen extraordinary change and growth, while it has turned its ambitions outward to global politics. Heine was joined by Dr. Amaury de Souza, Dr. Andres Serbin, and Mr. Marcos Robledo to discuss Latin America's role and prospects in the 21st century international order.

In 2002, just over 40 percent of Latin Americans lived in poverty, but, Heine said, "this rate dropped to 33 percent only six years later." Latin America has traditionally been vulnerable to fluctuations in the international business cycle, because it is a commodity-producing region. It is especially sensitive to changes in the US economy, which prompted Heine to quip that when the United States sneezes, Latin America catches a cold. During the financial crisis of 2008, analysts expected Latin America to be hit hard by the recession. However, for the first time in 200 years, a downward turn in the American markets did not seriously affect Latin American economies. It is a clear sign that the region has found stability and is no longer reliant solely on the United States. Moreover, democracy has seen a resurgence in many nations throughout the region, and Latin America now finds itself questioning its role in the world.

Heine argued that it is necessary to look at Brazil and Chile in order to analyze how the region is handling the challenges of globalization. Latin America looked inward in the past. That is no longer the case. Between 2002 and 2010, Brazil opened 40 embassies—a rate unmatched by any other nation. In terms of

the total number of embassies, Brazil trails the United States by only 138 to 164. In addition, Brazil has expanded its voice in the G20 and seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Brazil's rapid increase in its interactions with the world gives a sense of the shift from a regional to an international focus for all of South America.

Chile has also pushed for a greater global role through its international trade strategy. Heine said that Chile took a unique approach with its small market by signing free trade agreements with 59 nations, which allowed it to increase its exports from US$9 billion in 1990 to US$70 billion today. As a result, affordable Chilean wine, among a variety of other goods, can be purchased throughout the world.

These proactive foreign policy strategies have been matched with greater political cooperation among the Latin American nations, Heine said. The Latin American governments have concluded that unless they formulate a common strategy for a globalizing world, the entire region will be left behind. There has been a collective sense that they must work more closely together, which has led to an increase in the number of Latin American presidents meeting to address concerns. A number of regional groups have emerged in the past 20 years to foster closer relations, of which the two most important are the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR).

Next, de Souza discussed Brazil's role in the world, as well as its regional role in Latin America. Globally, Brazil has emerged as a rising power on par with other developing giants such as Russia, India, and China to form the BRIC nations. Brazil's US$2.5 trillion nominal GDP is the sixth largest in the world and the second largest among the BRICs behind China. The country aspires to take over France's position as the world's fifth largest economy by 2020. "This growth was possible because Brazil is a great trader," de Souza said. Brazil's strength lies in its agribusiness and energy markets. With roughly one-third of its foreign trade taking place in the Western Hemisphere, one-third in Europe, and the rest mostly in Asia, it constantly strives to enter new markets, both developed and emerging alike.

Although Brazil's prominence on the world stage is growing with its rising economic power, its sudden economic expansion has put its foreign policy in a state of flux. It is trying to adjust to a formidable change in the world order, especially with the rise of China. As Brazil's main trading partner, as well as a competitor, China imports Brazil's agricultural commodities and minerals while exporting industrial goods. This is a problem for Brazil because its neighbors in South America have switched from importing Brazilian industrial goods to importing them from China. As a remedy, Brazil plans to collaborate with the United States, which also faces severe challenges, in the development of science, technology, and innovation to strengthen their economies and compete with China in the future.

Regionally, Brazil has special interests in the integration of physical infrastructure—transportation, logistics, and communication—in South America. It looks to materialize its blueprints via financing in Brazil's National Bank, which in 2011 loaned three times the amount of funds as the World Bank. Brazil has enjoyed 142 years of unbroken peace with its 10 neighboring countries and is under no regional threat, but it seeks a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council to be able to support its economic actions in the region with credible foreign policy. Brazil is currently among the top 20 contributors to the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, leads MINUSTAH in Haiti, is one of the three leading manufacturers of aircraft worldwide, and has broadened its national security parameters beyond its borders.

De Souza noted that despite its active role in the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund, and other multilevel organizations, Brazil is not willing to lead the region. It is willing to provide international public goods by contributing to regional political stability, security, and environmental protection, but its main goal is to become a global player whose values will be better represented in the global community.

Robledo next tackled the issue of how small and medium-sized nations can compete with emerging powers like Brazil in the new economic and political global order. Robledo argued that Chile responded by opening up its markets to the Asia-Pacific region with considerable success. The average per capita income in Chile today is comparable to Spain in the 1990s. Chile's Asia-Pacific strategy has been imitated by other nations in the region, especially Colombia and Peru. The success of Latin America in the Asia-Pacific markets has sparked debate about what kind of relationship should be forged between the two regions. Chile is determining how to consolidate its economic gains with Asia and add further value to its economy.

Chile has further sought to keep pace with much larger rising powers through a more active foreign policy both in the region and throughout the globe. Since the 1990s, Chile has taken on a significant role in regional governance issues. It now views economic and social performance throughout Latin America in a positive light, especially when compared with the 1990s. However, the region remains pragmatic about the realities it faces. Latin America contains varied social models and leaders in a delicate coalition. Also, there is an economic split in the region. The northern part of Latin America is integrating into

the North American economy, while the south is both diversifying and aligning more closely with the Asia-Pacific region.

Chile has also pushed for more equitable global governance and has been active in the construction of global social policies. Robledo argued that there are questions as to how much the G20 is able to deliver today in terms of international economic governance. World leaders are clear that the demand for global governance is rising. However, there is tension about how to formulate the norms of governance that current global trends require. The world economy will continue to reach unprecedented levels and create new challenges, but not every nation has the same urgency to reach agreements on key issues. Chile and the rest of Latin America will seek a greater role in determining global outcomes in the future.

Next, Serbin presented his observations on the new phase of regionalism in Latin America. He asserted that it is essential to understand the underlying conditions of the region over the last 10 years that helped create the new regionalism. First, the US interests in terms of trade moved away from Latin America in the late 1990s. In the 1990s, the main trade project on the table in the Western Hemisphere had been the Free Trade Area of the Americas, launched in 1994. However, with its rising autonomy, the region was able to develop alternative regional integration projects. Second, with the exception of Mexico and the Caribbean, Latin America has shifted its focus on trade from the Atlantic to the Pacific. While the north maintains strong ties with the United States, the proportion of trade with Asia in the south has been on the rise. In 2011, 34 percent of Latin America's trade was with the United States and 24 percent with Asia.

Under these conditions, Latin America has switched to what Serbin calls the three returns: to the state, to politics, and to a development agenda. In the last 10 years, the state became the key actor in the search for regional solutions. States joined one another to advance ideas about fighting crises jointly and attaining stability and peace in the region. During this time, Latin America has experienced a proliferation of meetings and interactions between leaders, which has allowed the region to increase south-to-south cooperation and to develop new integration mechanisms such as UNASUR and CELAC. The creation of new regional schemes marks a differentiation from the north in that none of these organizations include the United States or Canada. The regional agenda prioritized infrastructure, energy, finance, and security issues over trade—as opposed to in the past. There has also been a strong emphasis on a developmental approach within the organizations. One of the failures of US policy towards Latin America in the last few years has been Washington's inability to recognize the significance of this new regionalism and the collective diplomacy instances it has given rise to.

Serbin noted, however, that the region faces challenges in the lack of citizen participation in parliaments and civil societies. These organizations are institutionally weak compared to the powers granted to regional presidents. There are no aspirations to strengthen the structures of the regional organizations by introducing permanent bonds via secretariats.

In response to an audience member's question about Latin America's approach to dealing with the United States, three of the panelists discussed the US role in Latin American growth. Heine reiterated that Central America and the Caribbean have become more integrated with the United States in economy, migration, and sports. South America has linked itself closely with Asia. China is currently Brazil and Chile's largest trading partner, while Argentina and Peru are moving in that direction. South America's shift away from the United States could be seen in the disagreement at the 2012 Summit of the Americas, where no joint communiqué was issued.

Robledo stressed, however, that the United States is and will remain Latin America's number-two trading partner. The United States does not have a clear policy for the region beyond its border with Mexico, but countries like Brazil are satisfied with their relationships with the United States. Next, de Souza argued that free trade agreements between the United States and Latin American countries keep the two regions institutionally integrated. These institutions position the United States permanently on Latin America's radar.

"Latin America, however, has not been a major concern for the US in strategic terms for a long time," de Souza said. It is advantageous for Latin America to bring the United States to the negotiating table over such issues as Cuba's admission into the Summit of the Americas. Latin America's push to include Cuba in hemispheric politics is a notice to the United States that a new political environment has grown south of its border. Cuba has not been a threat to the United States since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Yet, Latin American countries have a strong economic interest in Cuba. Brazil is investing in Cuba and currently building the largest port in the island nation. If the United States can work with Latin America to resolve this and other issues, then a lot of the misgivings and mistrust that have marked inter-American relations over the past decade could be overcome.

Plenary Session II

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 10:15-11:30
Place: Grand Ballroom

Think Tanks and Crisis: How Can the Policy Research Community Help Cope with Major Crises?

Organizing Institution:	The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Moderator:	Simon Long, The Economist
Panelists:	Ellen Laipson, Stimson Center
	Camille Grand, Fondation pour la Recherche Strategique
	Jan-Olof Lind, FOI-Swedish Defence Research Agency
	Edwin Feulner, The Heritage Foundation
Young Scholars:	Amy Studdart, German Marshall Fund of the United States
	Sinn Jeongsu, Korea University

From natural disasters to geopolitical competition and global financial meltdown, the number and severity of crises that governments and multilateral organizations face have increased drastically over the last few years. In the same period, think tanks have not only multiplied, but they have also become increasingly influential, broadened their breadth, and taken on new tasks in how they support public policy. In a new, crisis-driven policy environment, it is often asked if think tanks have a role to play. Mr. Simon Long, the moderator, asked if they could help "save the world." Four members of think tanks from around the world—Ms. Ellen Laipson, Mr. Camille Grand, Mr. Jan-Olof Lind, and Dr. Edwin Feulner—came together to discuss these questions and more at the second plenary session.

Laipson began the session by reflecting on the important role of think tanks in the creation of public policies. There are increasing expectations that think tanks can become "Do Tanks" by being more active in carrying out, and not just thinking about, policy. However, before venturing into new territory, it is important to reflect on both the capacity and the appropriateness of the research community in the implementation and execution of policies. She said that think tanks are more useful when they deal with crises of longer duration and those that are geopolitical, rather than unanticipated, humanitarian, and naturally caused crises. It is important to keep this in mind, because think tanks play a crucial role in certain ways, but their roles should not be exaggerated. They are not substitutes for the critical roles of governments.

Laipson then elaborated on the roles of think tanks during two crises: the Iran nuclear issue and the triple crisis in Japan. Concerning Iran, think tanks played an important role in informing and educating people,

while also criticizing the Iranian government. They provided possible policy solutions to the Iranian government and international organizations. Overall, the interaction between officials and think tanks has been reasonably productive and positive. The crisis in Japan was a combination of a humanitarian crisis and a large-scale crisis. Laipson argued that think tanks were not quick to interpret the data compared to the Japanese government; therefore, they were not able to provide help at the outbreak of the crisis. Over time, however, think tanks will be able to contribute to analysis and public policies. Moreover, think tanks have tried to bring together actors from the private sector, civil society, and the public sector in order to provide a platform on which they can present their views on long-term policy implications. Research institutes have contributed to the forming of a US-Japan alliance on nuclear energy. During both crises, think tanks acted as a bridge between different actors, such as international organizations, national governments, the private sector, and civil societies.

Grand then reflected on his personal experiences as a government official and a member of a think tank. He assessed the limitations of think tanks in dealing with new challenges as they try to play the difficult role of forecasting the future. Grand presented five ways that think tanks can improve their performance. In the age of strategic and economic uncertainty, surprises are becoming the rule rather than the exception. For this reason, many forward-looking policy planning documents and the policy research community have started to incorporate the unexpected, which can be seen in the 2008 French White Paper on Defense and National Security. According to Grand, the main purpose is not to focus on predicting crises.

Think tanks have been unsuccessful at forecasting some of the most important international events and developments of the past 25 years. These events include the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Arab Spring. One of the possible reasons is that think tanks tend to be too conservative. They assume that the status quo is the most favorable scenario and that it will prevail in the future.

Taking into account the limitations and characteristics of think tanks, Grand believes that managing crises, not predicting sudden crises, is where the strengths of think tanks lie. He gave five ways in which the policy research community can improve its performance in this regard. First, it is important to focus on the next potential crisis rather than the current one. Grand said that the next potential crises are unfavorable situations or scenarios that the current crisis may lead to. Second, long-term trends that are shaping the future should be the main focus, and include climate change, energy challenges, and changes in demographics. Think tanks should try to address these issues rather than sticking to traditional ones, because they are becoming increasingly important. The third way in which the policy research community can improve its performance is in scenario-based planning. Grand said "cold planning" exercises should be done more often. Think tanks can play an important role in looking at break-out scenarios, leading discussions on how they might evolve, and testing consequences of events. Fourth, policy research centers should perform detailed analyses of major crises that have not yet been closely examined. Lastly, exchange and cooperation among different communities of experts from varied backgrounds should be encouraged in order to add new perspectives and insights.

Lind started his remarks by pointing out that the role of think tanks depends on the type—independent, political, etc.—and also on what stage the crisis is at. The more important question is how research institutes can influence, convince, and support political leaders in times of crisis. However, the prerequisite for any interactions between think tanks and policy makers is a sound and trusting relationship. Lind said that think tanks should understand the main concerns and questions policy makers have in mind, and policy makers need to have confidence that think tanks will help bring about positive and tangible results.

There are a number of ways in which think tanks can shape policies, but they all depend on the think tank's expertise and experience. Their competence is a mixture of technical, political, and scientific know-how, and this substantially influences the research institute's performance. Think tanks are helpful in the long-term management of crises and also in providing measures, approaches, and analytic tools in analyzing crises. One example of this is *The Handbook on the European Union Crisis Management*, which was published by the FOI-Swedish Defence Research Agency in 2010. The handbook provides instruments and tools that are necessary when trying to understand crises.

Lind believes that the publication of these tools was one of the most significant contributions of think tanks. Furthermore, think tanks analyze the alternatives of a specific situation for policies, but also for the general public. They provide information in mass media, as was seen during the Arab Spring. Research

institutes were on television and in newspapers providing explanations and analysis of the situation in the Middle East. Lastly, think tanks can be helpful after a crisis occurs. One example is the tests that they conducted after the North Korean nuclear crises in 2006 and 2009. Another example is the gathering of all government agencies and think tanks after a crisis to identify the lessons that were learned.

Feulner spoke next about the fundamental role of think tanks, their other important functions, and the interaction among think tanks. The primary objective of think tanks is to provide sound measurements, such as baselines and indicators, that can be used in a particular field or community. For example, with the Wall Street Journal, the Heritage Foundation produces an index of economic freedom, which shows how economic freedom differs from country to country, and how it changes over the years. To explain the other important roles that the research community plays, Feulner quoted Milton Friedman to make his point that think tanks should have ideas lying around waiting to be instilled into politics so that they can actually make a difference.

Feulner said that think tanks plan for the short term and long term, which largely involves exploring the available options. He agreed with Laipson that think tanks can be better at providing long-term plans and cited the example of the Fukushima disaster. Although think tanks did not predict the Fukushima incident, they provided useful and constructive insights into its long-term effects, such as the future of nuclear power and whether countries should seek alternative energy sources. Think tanks were also influential in security policies after the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 by looking at the future of homeland security.

Another role of think tanks is to be unashamedly conservative, Feulner argued. In the United States, each think tank stands for a certain set of principles, which provides an independence that permits them to stick to their principles. Feulner also emphasized the significance of collaboration among think tanks, because it helps think tanks agree on measurements and numbers, even though the solutions proposed by each institution may differ.

The panelists held conflicting views on certain issues, one of which was the role of think tanks in short-term and long-term analysis. Laipson and Grand held that the core role of research centers is their contributions to long-term analysis, while Lind and Feulner argued that there are ways in which think tanks can play an important role in the short-term. Each panelist related this issue to how much a research institute provides instant analysis to governments and the media during the outbreak of a crisis. Laipson emphasized that the main roles of think tanks are their research on long-term trends and access to governments. Although interactions with the government can provide good opportunities to learn what the government thinks is important, there is the danger of losing freshness and independence. Moreover, although experts may be able to give background information about a certain issue to the public, they should be cautious when giving a briefing if they do not have anything unique or original.

Grand then built upon Laipson's arguments about short-term analysis. He said that there should be a proper balance between short-term and long-term analysis. The former can be more tempting at times, but it is important to focus on long-term research because it is more valuable to research institutes.

Lind, on the other hand, did not fully agree with the previous two panelists. He said that a research institute's role in the short term depends on the characteristics of the institute itself. The FOI-Swedish Defence Research Agency, for instance, has played an important role in the government's crisis management, because the policy makers learned from the institute, which affected the making of short and long-term policies.

Lind also argued that exposure to the media can be beneficial for discussions if the media trusts that think tanks will not make political statements. Feulner offered a differing viewpoint from Laipson, as well, when he put a different emphasis on timeliness. In the case of the Heritage Foundation, the target audience is Washington policy makers and Congress. Although the policy makers ask for the think tank's view on long-term trends, their work primarily involves short-term policies that need to be designed in a short amount of time. Thus, timeliness is important. Feulner said that although policy makers may not agree with the conclusions presented by the research centers, interactions between the two are important because they can agree on facts and on what issues are important.

Session 4

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 14:30-15:45
Place: Lilac/Tulip

The Future of the Middle East Peace Process

Organizing Institution:	Moshe Dayan Center
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Uzi Rabi, Moshe Dayan Center
Panelists:	Paul Rivlin, Moshe Dayan Center
	Rami Ginat, Bar-Ilan University
	Ephraim Lavie, The Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research
Young Scholars:	Steven Denney, Yonsei University
	Kim Jiseon, Ewha Womans University

Moderator Dr. Uzi Rabi led off the discussion by remarking that the Middle East has seen the "most tumultuous change" over the last couple of years under a wave of revolutions—classified by many scholars as part of the larger "Arab Spring." Rabi took issue with the manifold changes in the Middle East being placed under an all-inclusive banner. He suggested that a more nuanced look at the geopolitical and economic landscape and political culture of the states involved would better highlight the issues related to the ongoing peace process in the region. For a deeper discussion of the issues in the region related to the peace process, Rabi announced that three separate topics would be covered by three panelists with extensive knowledge in each: the Israeli-Syrian conflict, presented by Dr. Rami Ginat; the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, discussed by Dr. Ephraim Lavie; and the connection between economics and securing peace, delivered by Dr. Paul Rivlin.

Ginat began by elaborating on the legitimacy of the current regime in Syria. In 1966, Alawi-oriented military officers took power in a coup and imposed their rule over a majority Sunni population. Sunni Muslims expressed discontent and hostility towards the new rulers and even considered them infidels. This led to an anti-regime uprising in Hama in 1982, when tens of thousands of Sunnis were killed by Hafez al-Assad's forces. However, after the Arab Spring, the fear that resulted from the Hama massacre largely faded away and gave rise to new hopes. Ginat argued that the experience after the Arab Spring is an awakening of Syrian Sunnis. Syrian President Bashar al-Assad issued a confident statement following Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak's downfall that his regime was immune from revolution. In March 2011, however, anti-government protests in Daraa marked the beginning of the Sunni uprising nationwide. Since then, Bashar al-Assad has used systematic mass-killing as a means of quelling anti-government protests. As a result of the ongoing bloodbath against Sunni Syrians, the regime is losing its final vestiges of legitimacy to rule, both domestically and internationally.

Ginat also discussed Israeli-Syrian relations and the future Israeli policy after the Syrian uprising. He said that the crucial factor in Israeli-Syrian relations is Syria's unwillingness to strike a peace treaty. In the Six-Day War in 1967, Syria lost the Golan Heights and the territories that its army had occupied since the 1948 war. Before the 1948 war, the territories belonged to Israel as part of the British Mandate of Palestine. Whenever Israel and Syria were about to formulate a deal, the issue of the territories resurfaced. The Syrians demanded not only the Syrian territories occupied by Israel in the Six-Day War but also the Israeli territories occupied by Syria during and after the 1948 war. According to Ginat, even if the Syrian regime manages to survive, it will not be willing to conclude a peace treaty with Israel due to its loss in the 1967 war and the opposition of the majority of Syrians to making any territorial concessions that will not correspond accurately with the lines of June 4 1967

The Syrian government's lack of legitimacy complicates the situation further. In order to break the stalemate, Ginat stated that a democratically elected Syrian government that represents the majority of the people must be brought into power. Syrians also have to understand that even the most moderate government in Israel will not be able to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders—borders that would include territories of Israel in Syrian hands.

The situation in Israel at the moment should also be considered. Unlike previous governments, the current Israeli government is not willing to make any concessions, even to the international borders of 1923. Ginat said that if the current Israeli government wants to negotiate with a democratically elected Syrian government, it will have to make concessions according to international borders. Ginat cited the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty as a good example of how to resolve a border dispute through international arbitration. It was also a similar case when Israel withdrew from Lebanon in 2000 according to the international borders drawn in 1923. If there is any dispute over the territories that were occupied by the Syrians during and after the 1948 war, the best way to deal with it will be international arbitration.

Lavie, in response to the need for a "breakthrough" on the Israeli-Palestinian stalemate, put forward his ideas from a presentation he prepared entitled "The Palestinian Independence Spring in Light of the Arab

Spring." The goal of Lavie's speech was twofold: to address the main political developments on the Palestinian side and to show how the gridlock in Israeli-Palestinian negotiations may affect peace in the region in light of the Arab Spring.

Lavie started with recent political history regarding the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) reached an agreed framework through which both sides could come to an agreement on a two-state solution. But the PLO's inability to reach a political agreement with Israel concerning the establishment of a Palestinian state and Palestinian refugees, which would deal with the resettlement of displaced Palestinians, led to a schism within the Palestinian Authority (PA)—the administrative organization of the PLO established to govern parts of the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

The political party Hamas, a more radical alternative to the moderate Fatah, which does not recognize Israel's right to peacefully exist and is given material aid by Iran, capitalized on popular discontent and the shortcomings of Fatah. By gaining in popularity, Hamas succeeded in winning popular elections in the Gaza Strip. This split the PA's rule over two unconnected Palestinian territories between the two political groups. According to Lavie, this precipitated a major legitimacy crisis for the PLO as a representative of the Palestinian people.

In the post-Arab Spring environment, Lavie identified two ways in which Fatah and Hamas have dealt with their legitimacy problem. One way was to use the rising popularity of social networking services (SNS) to stay connected with the people for the cause of Palestinian solidarity and to ensure that SNS were not used to discredit their rule. The second way came in the form of a call for "national dialogue" and the signing of a reconciliation agreement in 2011 between Mahmoud Abbas, president of Fatah, and Ismail Haniyah, the prime minister of Hamas.

Also, the PA developed a comprehensive strategy to address the situation. The strategy focused on an appeal to the United Nations, despite US and Israeli objections, in order to thrust upon the international community the responsibility of coping with the Palestinian question.

It also focused on the active recruitment of young Palestinians willing to push for international recognition of Palestinian statehood. With international pressure in mind, the "Palestine State No. 194" movement was started. According to Lavie, it was begun in order to show the world that Palestinians were driven to achieve "freedom, dignity, and prosperity" in their own independent state and UN membership. However, due to lack of support, the effort ultimately failed.

Thus, according to Lavie, the PA's failure to garner international support, coupled with Israel's refusal to return to the pre-1967 borders and the Palestinians' refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish state, has resulted in a new political reality: the death of the Oslo Accords. A two-state solution is no longer viable; instead, a one-state solution is becoming the new reality. Unfortunately, as Lavie pointed out, the politi-

cal leadership from both sides is opposed to a one-state solution. Right-wingers in Israel oppose negotiating in an uncertain geopolitical environment, while Hamas wants to avoid the "slippery slope" of the Oslo peace process that resulted in peace for territory—a situation in which Palestinians gave up certain land claims for a peace agreement—and a loss of negotiating leverage. Accordingly, Lavie concluded that unless the leadership from both the Israeli and Palestinian camps can agree upon a new formula for peace, such as the peace initiative accepted 10 years ago by the PLO, political gridlock is likely to continue.

Rivlin maintained that the structure of the Middle East peace process can be summarized within three circles. The inner circle includes countries such as Israel, Palestine, and Syria, the parties that have direct links and should come to agreement. The middle circle, the regional one, consists of the other Arab countries. It includes Jordan and Egypt, which have peace with Israel; Oman and Qatar, which do not maintain diplomatic relations but have links with Israel; and Iran, which opposes moves toward peace. The outer circle is the rest of the world, which has the single most important and overrated player: the United States. The outer circle is perhaps less affected by economics in its relations with the Middle East, but the consumption of Middle Eastern energy resources is a factor that affects relations.

Rivlin also discussed the two roles of economics in peacemaking, which have been suggested by a number of Israeli leaders. First, economic improvement can be an incentive to move toward peace. Second, economic cooperation can be an alternative to political peace. In this case, political changes are abandoned in favor of economic improvement.

The key example of economics used in peacemaking is the European Economic Community, which later became part of the European Union. It was a French-German initiative to build a new structure in which economics would be used to prevent war. There were imperatives that made cooperation necessary. The Cold War and increasing Soviet influence over Eastern Europe were two of the most influential factors. There are also imperatives of the day in the Middle East at the moment, but old quarrels have not been put aside yet, which would allow cooperation like that of Europe.

According to Rivlin, another lesson can be drawn from the European Economic Community. Even though the euro crisis is often talked about, it is important to remember that in its early days the success of the European Union was remarkable. Trade within the region substantially increased, which led to global economic growth. Economics has tremendous power and can move people from place to place, urging them to find a better future. On the other hand, when people have economic difficulties, extremism can develop, as it did in Europe during the 1930s. However, after the Arab Spring, the forces that were not driven by economic incentives took power or gained popularity, as was seen in Tunisia and Egypt.

Rivlin emphasized that when economics is used in peacemaking, it is important to make sure that both parties benefit from it. This is very difficult, because, naturally, one party is wealthier than the other. Also, there should be no divisions or no enemies within a country. In other words, a new economic struc-

ture should benefit as many people as possible. If a small part of the population benefits from a stronger economy, it causes the resentment that showed its power during the Arab Spring. In that sense, any peace-making process should be undertaken with care.

During the question-and-answer session, audience members and panelists discussed several issues related to the barriers to successful negotiations and the role of other actors. In response to a question about whether Israel would attack Iran, thus setting the prospects for peace even further back, Rabi answered that Israel will not attack Iran. "We are in a different ballgame now," Rabi said, in which "the Iranian leadership is practicing the politics of survival … and constraint" rather than war-making. The Israeli leadership understands this and will not seek provocation.

Rivlin, in answer to a question about the most crucial factors that prevent peace talks from moving forward, mentioned a few highly controversial factors. These included the expansion of Israeli settlements into Palestinian territory and the Palestinian insistence that peace talks are made conditional on Israel's commitment to re-establishing the pre-1967 borders. Ginat, maintaining the theme of international arbitration as a useful mechanism, answered a question about resolving territorial disputes between Israel and Lebanon. He noted that the successful mediation of disputes depends on globalizing the process by bringing in international bodies to arbitrate—including the ongoing disputes between Tel Aviv and Damascus.

In a situation not unfamiliar to Northeast Asia, tumultuous, violent, and highly volatile territorial disputes pit one side strongly against the other. Memories of a turbulent past, strained relations in a dispute-ridden present, and uncertainty about the future make the peace process in the Middle East as difficult a situation as denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula. However, as the presentations from all three panelists indicated, "where there is a will, there is a way." Be it through international arbitration, a new agreed framework for peace, or courting political cooperation for mutual economic gain, there is no shortage of avenues left open for all parties involved in the future of the Middle East peace process.

Session 4

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 14:30-15:45
Place: Violet/Cosmos

Nuclear Crisis in Northeast Asia

Organizing Institution:	Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Sharon Squassoni, CSIS
Panelists:	Peter Bradford, Vermont Law School
	Scott Sagan, Stanford University
	Hwang Il-Soon, Seoul National University
	Philip Chaffee, Energy Intelligence Group
Young Scholars:	Brian Reams, Yonsei University
	Sinn Jeongsu, Korea University

Moderator Ms. Sharon Squassoni began by highlighting the expanding role of nuclear energy in Northeast Asia and the challenges it presents to safety, security, and nonproliferation. The assembled panelists included experts in the fields of nuclear materials, nuclear regulation, and international security. Among the key topics was the future of enrichment and reprocessing, as well as a new reactor design potentially capable of leaving only intermediate-level waste material. The panel of Dr. Hwang Il-Soon, Mr. Philip Chaffee, Mr. Peter Bradford, and Dr. Scott Sagan sought to relate these issues back to the main focus of leadership and how it is necessary to manage future challenges, both foreseen and unseen.

Hwang forecasted a nuclear renaissance in Asia within the next decade as many countries take an economic development course. Although the nuclear programs of countries such as India, Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea concentrate more on building military power, the primary purpose of the nuclear programs in most Asian countries and the Middle East is to foster rapid economic growth. For this reason, emphasis is put on efficiency, while relatively less attention is paid to governing nuclear security and safety. Hwang drew attention to current problems with governance in regard to security, safety, and technology issues and provided three explanations for why these issues have received less attention.

The most important agenda in most Asian countries is economic growth; therefore, securing a large supply of energy is crucial to these nations. Nuclear energy plays a major role in satisfying this demand. Energy resources, however, are scarce in many countries; therefore, it is inevitable to focus on improving energy efficiency. Furthermore, there are cultural reasons for why safety and security related technologies are of relatively less significance in the region. According to Hwang, Confucianism is one of the main contributing factors to the primacy of political power over technological perfection. Lastly, the

region is desensitized to security threats. Nuclear safety and security issues are part of the long list of already existing security issues, and thus countries do not feel it is necessary to tackle nuclear-related issues. Hwang ended his speech by stressing the need for a new type of nuclear governance and leadership that will not be restrained by cultural factors, and said that the involvement of inspectors and examiners from outside the region may be necessary in this regard.

Chaffee elaborated on the nuclear renaissance taking place in China as it plans to vastly expand its dependency on nuclear energy to 70 or more gigawatts by 2020. However, whether this ambitious plan will become a reality is in question. Even before the Fukushima disaster, Chinese bureaucrats, such as the head of the Chinese nuclear safety regulator, warned of the rapid expansion of nuclear power and stressed that it would threaten development in the long run. In addition, there have been ongoing bureaucratic battles on a variety of nuclear-related issues, many of which are related to nuclear safety.

Chaffee said that doubts about nuclear energy among Chinese citizens and foreign companies' concerns about the Chinese legal structure are some of the obstacles to China's plans to generate more nuclear power. The core conflicts, however, are mostly among bureaucrats. One of the battles involves two rivals: the China National Nuclear Core (CNNC) and Guangdong Nuclear Power. CNNC, which is the company that started many of the nuclear programs in China, is struggling against Guangdong Nuclear Power, which is currently becoming the largest nuclear power utility in the country. The two companies compete on many grounds, but the most fiercely fought battle is on which Western reactor technologies to champion. Guangdong has been building nuclear plants with second-generation reactors. Due to safety issues, bureaucrats are now wondering if those reactors should be switched to AP 1000s, which the CNNC uses. Other areas of bureaucratic conflict include the construction of inland power plants and the shift from coal to nuclear energy in China's electric utilities.

The Fukushima disaster that took place in March 2011 worsened the situation in China. Although the Chinese environment minister announced that China will not make changes to its nuclear program, it did change because the situation in Japan became worse and the public reacted negatively. For these reasons, the State Council issued a temporary halt on approvals of new reactor projects, and there has been no agreement on when new approvals will begin again. In short, the nuclear governance and leadership problems in China are mostly related to the various large-scale bureaucratic battles, and the future of China's nuclear program is unclear.

Bradford approached the issue of nuclear development in East Asia through the lens of his experience as a US regulator in the 1970s and 1980s. During this period, the growth of nuclear power outpaced regulation and culminated in the Three Mile Island accident in 1979. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) conducted an exhaustive investigation of not only the technical details of the accident, but also the systemic failures of the regulatory system as a whole. These were supplemented by additional efforts to stem the possibility of future accidents, which included a presidential commission with full investigative powers, an external audit of the NRC, two congressional investigations, and the industry developing its own quasi-regulatory body.

The US reaction to the incident at Three Mile Island stands in sharp contrast to its response following the more dangerous Fukushima accident. Bradford highlighted the lack of any review outside of the NRC's extensive technical review and the NRC's lack of an effort to examine potential systemic problems within the regulatory system. For example, prior to the Fukushima accident, the NRC actively sought to prevent the release of information regarding the potential threat of coolant loss in spent fuel pools. Now the NRC has reversed its position, but the Commission has not begun an investigation into why the issue was not taken more seriously at the time.

Bradford characterized the current outlook for nuclear power within the United States as divided. Most planned nuclear plants have been cancelled, with the four remaining plants all having been financed in advance by public funds. Due to heavy competition with cheaper fossil fuels, he expects future growth in civil nuclear power to be modest.

Relating these issues back to the main topic of leadership, Bradford stressed that strong, introspective leadership is necessary to ensure safe results 100 percent of the time. Heavy regulation carries the burdens of cost and disruptiveness, but these issues are negligible compared to the negative impacts a potential accident might cause. He also emphasized that a system designed to reward those who raise concerns and focused on more than just technical flaws is imperative. Lastly, he warned against the temptation to try to "predict the future." Worst-case scenario predictions will always be wrong, but stressing the principles of sound regulation will help prevent future accidents.

Sagan focused on three challenges to managing nuclear security and safeguards in the future. His first

point was that aspiring nuclear energy states are, on average, less stable than those that currently deploy nuclear power. According to a 2009 study in the *Journal of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences*, these aspiring states scored lower in measures of corruption, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and democratization. He further indicated that corruption is related to both safety and security, and high levels of it make a state exceptionally prone to smuggling violations. Because only non-democratic states have attempted covert nuclear development programs outside of Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rules, this highlights the importance of governance in managing states that might possibly circumvent the NPT.

Second, Sagan asserted that the threat of proliferation demands a new conceptualization of the NPT to include enrichment and processing safeguards. Article 6 of the NPT charges all signatories with the responsibility to work in good faith toward the elimination of nuclear weapons, not just the nuclear-weapons states. As a function of this, he suggested a permanent multilateral body charged with ensuring safeguards for enrichment and reprocessing. He suggested that such a system would decrease the incentives and increase the legal costs for withdrawal from the NPT.

Finally, the lessons of the Fukushima disaster include the threat of terrorism on a similar scale. Terrorists have now seen the potential impact an attack on a nuclear fuel pond might cause. Furthermore, terrorists have proven exceptionally creative in their thinking regarding new attacks. One such attack involved extracting americium from 10,000 smoke alarms to create a dirty bomb domestically. Sagan concluded his remarks by stressing the inevitability of a more nuclear world and how his prescribed measures and thinking are critical to maintaining safety and security in the future.

The question-and-answer session engendered a lively discussion about some of the key points raised during the panel presentations. The first question, posed to Hwang, was related to the concentration of most of South Korea's reactor production under a single corporation and the possibility that it constituted governance issues. Hwang responded that the fuel cycle control and core technology is still highly connected to the United States, limiting the risks of abuse or poor governance. He also predicted that as South Korea becomes more independent and perhaps one day develops domestic control of its nuclear industry, the oversight and governance will grow with it to ensure that the checks remain stronger than the financial leverage of the industry itself.

A second question posed to Chaffee dealt with China's rapid growth and whether China would be able to train responsible operators fast enough for its ambitious development plans. Chaffee could only offer an initial response of "probably," citing China's university programs, exchange programs with the United States, and a training center based in China. However, he expressed doubt that China could train enough operators if it pursues a more ambitious plan of having 86 gigawatts of production by 2020. In addition, fierce salary competition among the utilities has left the regulatory agency relatively understaffed. Due to this uncertainty, he reiterated his recommendation for a slowdown of new plant approvals in order for

the staffing to catch up. Bradford said that the current Chinese strategy of building many different reactor designs to determine what is most efficient has exacerbated this problem.

The third question focused on the issue of Chinese and Korean nuclear plant technology exports and their implications regarding the NPT. Chaffee responded that Chinese companies have been bidding for plant projects around the world, but the government is not actively supporting such bids—with the exception of Pakistan. Most Chinese plants are based on French technology that would require French approval, which the French have so far not given. He concluded that Chinese commercial exports are a non-issue for the NPT. Hwang said that in South Korea it is unacceptable for the industry to make mistakes with its nuclear exports because of the country's remarkable trade dependency. The amount that South Korea has to lose by taking shortcuts far outweighs the benefits, and for this reason one can expect the country to embrace leadership that will proactively enforce exporter guidelines and a peer review or auditing system.

Northeast Asia's dependence on nuclear energy is expected to increase in the future, but many unsolved problems remain that either are directly related to leadership or are problems that need to be solved through sound governance and leadership. The panelists relied on their expertise to inform the discussions of the various types of leadership that are needed in Northeast Asia, and the world at large, to combat the issues at hand.

Session 4

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 14:30-15:45
Place: Orchid

Regional Leadership in Southeast Asia: Can ASEAN Still Occupy the Driver's Seat?

Organizing Institution:	Pacific Forum CSIS
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Ralph Cossa, Pacific Forum CSIS
Panelists:	Ian Storey, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS)
	Kavi Chongkittavorn, The Nation (Bangkok)
	Le Cong Phung, Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam
	Jonathan Chow, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Young Scholars:	Shwe Mar Than, Ewha Womans University
	Robert Warshaw, The Heritage Foundation

Amidst China's rapidly growing influence in Southeast Asia, the US "pivot" toward the region, and a new wave of great power maneuvering, the *Asan Plenum 2012* hosted a panel discussion to address whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) can still occupy the driver's seat of regional cooperation in Southeast Asia. Due to increased fracturing within ASEAN over critical issues, and differing opinions over ASEAN's long-term sustainability, this topic has become critically important in the region. The distinguished panel for this topic included Mr. Ralph Cossa, Dr. Ian Storey, Mr. Kavi Chongkittavorn, Ambassador Le Cong Phung, and Dr. Jonathan Chow. Hailing from diverse backgrounds, this group of experts and practitioners, despite espousing oftentimes contradictory views, assessed ASEAN's accomplishments, encapsulated current challenges facing the region, and predicted future developments for the institution's leadership role.

Cossa commenced the session by expressing his delight that America is re-engaging with Southeast Asia, as US policy over the last decade was preoccupied with combating terrorism. Now, the US approach is more balanced and appreciative of an ASEAN increasingly gelling as a community. Cossa framed the discussion by asking whether ASEAN will remain in the driver's seat, and if so, will it even drive. Stressing the importance of good US-ASEAN relations, he noted that ASEAN needs unity, as it is fracturing on several issues, most notably the South China Sea.

Storey believes that ASEAN will continue to remain in the driver's seat in terms of its "instrumental centrality," i.e., leading regional security architecture, primarily because regional actors are comfortable with ASEAN and due to the lack of alternatives. However, he warned that as competition between the

United States and China increases, ASEAN could fracture internally over disputed issues, namely the South China Sea, leading to a weaker, more divided collective ASEAN that is taken less seriously than before. Moreover, ASEAN's record on handling hot disputes is patchy, as it proved largely ineffective in addressing North Korea, Kashmir, Taiwan, and the South China Sea, which has splintered ASEAN into claimant and non-claimant states.

This increasing tension is set against the backdrop of sharper China-US competition, which has raised Southeast Asia's strategic profile. Indeed, according to Storey, Asia's strategic environment has entered a period of flux and uncertainty. The Sino-US rivalry will be played out largely in Southeast Asia, a region increasingly viewed as the "hinge" linking East and South Asia. As China's focus shifts from mainland to maritime Southeast Asia, and as America increasingly engages in mainland Southeast Asia instead of emphasizing only the maritime domain, the United States and China will increasingly "bump up" against each other, especially given China's recent assertive behavior and US force rebalancing.

While Southeast Asia's elites welcome US re-engagement in the region, they are also increasingly nervous about the US-China rivalry. Storey argued that the era in which elites were spared having to "choose sides" may well be coming to an end. Southeast Asian leaders have put a great deal of faith in ASEAN's "stewardship of the architecture of cooperation," as ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan recently stated, to take the sharp edges off America and China's competition for primacy. But many question whether ASEAN is up to this weighty task. ASEAN's attempts to manage tensions in the South China Sea have brought into sharp relief divisions within the organization, divisions that do not engender confidence in its pretensions to "centrality."

Regarding the South China Sea, both ASEAN and China seek a binding Code of Conduct (COC) to best manage the dispute. Despite having agreed on the implementation guidelines in July 2011, negotiations

on a binding COC are fraught with difficulty and have exposed divisions within ASEAN. For instance, some members, such as Cambodia, are pressing for Chinese involvement in formulating the COC from the beginning, while others, such as the Philippines and Vietnam, are pushing ASEAN members to finalize the COC before involving China in the negotiations. With ASEAN comprising claimant and non-claimant states, some with close economic and political ties to China, achieving consensus is extremely difficult.

Lastly, Storey predicted that the COC will be finalized in July 2012, but is unlikely to exert a significant impact on the dispute. Instead, tensions will continue to ebb and flow, although he does not envision a major conflict in the South China Sea. However, due to the lack of conflict resolution mechanisms in the region, the increasing frequency of skirmishes at sea raises the risk of an accidental clash that could then escalate into a more serious diplomatic or military crisis. As Sino-US competition increases, divisions within ASEAN are likely to grow and will become increasingly visible to outsiders.

Chongkittavorn did not agree with Storey's original answer; rather, he argued that ASEAN's patchy record and current fracturing mean that it will not take the driver's seat. Further exploring the increased divisions within ASEAN, espousing a very critical view of ASEAN's track record, and noting distinct failure mixed with success, Chongkittavorn argued that as individual ASEAN members increasingly assume their own positions on global issues, ASEAN's centrality and voice in the global community will diminish. There exist several examples of ASEAN struggling for lack of common stance on global issues, including climate change, Palestine, and the South China Sea, all of which weaken ASEAN's collective capability in the end. Furthermore, he believes that it is increasingly hard to see how ASEAN can manage to hold together over important issues, instead of fracturing apart, providing a stern test for ASEAN centrality in the future.

In addition, as outside powers expand engagement with ASEAN, the institution cannot maintain old, untenable mindsets—the 1995 condemnation of Chinese aggression in Mischief Reef would never be possible today, due to such fracturing, primarily over certain members' relations with China. On that note, Chongkittavorn believes that Cambodia, which gave China access to Southeast Asia, utterly failed in trying to portray ASEAN-China relations over the South China Sea as business as usual. The November 2012 East Asia Summit in Cambodia will prove interesting, as questions about whether Obama will attend and how Russia will try to exert its influence over the region remain. In addition, Myanmar's democratization has enabled it to possibly become a coordinator between the United States and ASEAN over the next three years.

Drawing on his experience as a Vietnamese diplomat, Phung began by noting that ASEAN has to take the driver's seat of regional leadership, as a matter of sovereignty. In other words, the region's leaders must come from within the region, and thus far, ASEAN has performed its leadership duties well. While the leadership position is increasingly difficult, as China and the United States expand their roles, ASEAN

can rise to the challenge for one principal reason—the region, including China, the United States, and other ASEAN Dialogue Partners, needs the organization, due in part to Southeast Asia's rise as a critical region. Moreover, no actor wants to assume ASEAN's leadership roles and responsibilities; no state has a desire to take the leading role in a regional mechanism. To that end, outside powers need to work with and respect ASEAN.

Regarding ASEAN's track record, to Phung, the creation of the ASEAN Plus Three, ASEAN Plus Six, and the Nuclear Free Zone in 1995 precipitated an increased regional leadership role for ASEAN. Since then, new mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Defense Ministers' Meeting Plus, show the ability of ASEAN to adapt to new challenges. In addition, Phung reiterated that separately ASEAN members are not strong, but as a group they represent a major regional power, with the 2015 ASEAN Economic Community expected to bolster that strength. Calling for increased ASEAN unity vis-à-vis heightened Sino-US competition, he noted that ASEAN has to change, and member states, like Cambodia, need to compromise on certain issues. Internal reforms, even at a slow pace, will help promote ASEAN's interests and help the institution continue to occupy the driver's seat. Finally, Phung summarized his position by noting that, despite the criticisms over the pace of ASEAN's leadership, the institution continues to move in a positive direction.

Chow approached the topic from an economic perspective, assessing ASEAN's leadership role as an economic center. To Chow, inter-regional cooperation, through progress towards the 2015 ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), has fallen behind schedule, even though most tariffs have been reduced. However, reducing non-tariff barriers, such as barriers to investment, capital, and skilled labor, is much more laborious, as a wide variation exists regarding individual countries' capacity. In this light, 2015 will mark the beginning, rather than the end point, for the AEC, prompting a gradual increase in trade instead of a large jump. In order to increase regional economic connectivity, Chow suggests member states lend more institutional support to businesses, especially small and medium enterprises, to better utilize ASEAN Free Trade Area tariff rates; improve infrastructure, such as roads, railroads, port facilities, bureaucracy, and networks; and fully implement the ASEAN Single Window program.

Moreover, Chow examined the relationship between the AEC and the ASEAN socio-cultural community by paying particular attention to how trade affects non-trade issues, such as human rights, human security, and the environment. Establishing a potentially unsustainable contradiction between ASEAN's principle of noninterference in domestic affairs and its chartered agenda of promoting human rights, Chow further highlighted a general tension between the way ASEAN has delinked trade from non-trade issues, isolating trade discussion from human rights. ASEAN's stated end goal is not mere trade liberalization, but rather to improve social welfare by protecting citizens from the effects of globalization. In this light, if ASEAN wishes to be a people-centered community, this delinking of trade and social issues could have a limiting effect.

Discussion followed the panelists' statements, with Cossa highlighting the fact that although ASEAN is growing in importance and has the opportunity for leadership, it is also fracturing internally, and not solely with regard to the South China Sea dispute. In response, Phung argued that internal differences are not new and suggested that the dispute must be solved by direct claimants and China, not by ASEAN, through a COC. However, Chow questioned the COC's allegedly binding nature, wondering who would enforce it and how.

The question-and-answer session raised several key questions and comments. The first focused on criticisms of ASEAN centrality, such as its failure to address the North Korean issue that prompted concerned states to create the Six-Party Talks. Storey agreed, noting that ASEAN has abdicated responsibility for not only North Korea but also other hard security challenges, such as the South China Sea, Taiwan, and Kashmir. The second question pointed out the paradigmatic changes underway in Myanmar and the corresponding impact on the region. The question was whether Myanmar's democratization will shift ASEAN's balance of power. In response, Cossa pointed out that Myanmar's reforms will lead to a high-profile 2014 ASEAN chairmanship and boost ASEAN's credibility, with Chongkittavorn noting that a democratic Myanmar tips ASEAN's democratic membership toward the majority and could strengthen its collective stance on human rights.

Concluding the discussion, Cossa asked the panel whether, in five years, ASEAN will be more united or fractured, to which three of the panelists responded that it will be more fractured. Phung answered "50/50." In a sense, this bleak assessment from the panel encapsulates their view on ASEAN centrality moving forward, as each speaker noted the myriad challenges facing that centrality. The general consensus among the panel members was that ASEAN, which is in a rapidly shifting region, must also be willing to change, adapting to new conditions and uniting around common positions. Otherwise, ASEAN risks fading into increasing irrelevance, and the driver's seat, alongside ASEAN's leadership role in the region, will increasingly shift and may even move elsewhere.

Session 4

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 14:30-15:45
Place: Grand Ballroom

Leadership and the Legacies of the Arab Spring

Organizing Institution:	The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Moderator:	Jang Ji-Hyang, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Panelists:	Clement Henry, American University in Cairo
	Diederik Vandewalle, Dartmouth College
	Michael Hudson, National University of Singapore
Young Scholars:	Daniel Katz, Center for a New American Security
	Kim Rancy, Ewha Womans University

The Arab Spring has unfolded in many countries since 2010, each with disparate histories and societal dynamics. The four panelists analyzed the revolutions in each country, which led to a synthesis of developments in the region. They agreed that revolutions in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain were not uniform. Instead, a spectrum of democratization has emerged, with Tunisia and Libya becoming more democratic, while Egypt, Yemen, Syria, and Bahrain are still largely unresolved. The conversation also addressed the role of regional powers such as Turkey and Iran. The panelists asserted that the state-building agenda in the post-Arab Spring Middle East is an ongoing project whose success will be determined by the ability of the societies to cultivate democratic institutions and open economies.

Dr. Clement Henry focused his remarks on Tunisia and Egypt, in particular the contrast between the

revolutions that unfolded in each country. Tunisia started its awakening in December 2010 with an astonishing chain of events that led to the toppling of dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali, who came to power in 1987 in a coup. The events in Tunisia had an immediate effect in other Arab countries. Public protests in Egypt began on January 25 2011, in Tahrir Square in Cairo, and eventually led to the ouster of longtime president Hosni Mubarak.

Tunisia and Egypt both have long histories as states since the 19th Century when they were colonized by the French and British, respectively. In modern times, they became police states with strong security apparatuses. Although both countries had well-developed state and security infrastructures, mass demonstrations that overwhelmed the security services provided an opportunity for rapid change at the top of the political system. The leaders in Tunisia and Egypt could be overthrown with greater speed because their militaries were integrated into and loyal to the states. They were not loyal to the dictators' family clans, such as in Libya. Therefore, they were unwilling to fire upon their own citizens and helped to oust the dictators by protecting their own citizens.

Henry next analyzed the situations in both countries after the strongmen were toppled. The Tunisian and Egyptian revolutions shared common elements in their civil uprisings, such as high participation of disenchanted young citizens and the use of social media to organize and promote protests. However, differences in the countries' transition processes have begged the question of whether the events in both countries were revolutions or democratic transitions. In Tunisia, there was a "textbook transition to democracy." The Egyptians, on the other hand, are still unsure about the proper sequence of democratic processes and have made only incremental progress. After Ben Ali's departure, Tunisia resolved the democracy challenge by utilizing the existing constitution.

The Constitutional Court of Tunisia affirmed Fouad Mebazaa as acting president under Article 57 of its Constitution, and a caretaking coalition government was created. The Tunisian Constituent Assembly, which held elections in October 2011, has since met regularly. The Tunisian economy grew two percent in the first quarter of 2012, evidence that the country had a relatively stable political change. In contrast, the Egyptian army was not politically neutral and elites disagreed on how to draft a constitution, which has led to post-revolution chaos. Henry said it is unclear if the country is going to hold the presidential elections slated for May 2012, after which the army is supposed to withdraw from politics.

Dr. Diederik Vandewalle, the only Western researcher in Libya while the country was under US and UN sanctions, highlighted the difference between popular depictions of Libya as chaotic and the positive reality on the ground. There has been steady progress in the creation of national institutions that have no historical precedent in the country. The Libyan Transitional National Council (TNC) was established by anti-Muammar Gaddhafi forces during the civil war. The TNC declared itself the only legitimate body representing the Libyan people, laying out a road map for democratic and constitutional transition. It systematically prepared to prevent a recurrence of dictatorship similar to that which prevailed under

Gaddhafi. The 42-year reign of Gaddhafi was made possible by Libya's long history as a fragmented country.

Vandewalle said that Gaddhafi was able to maintain his power and organize his security apparatus for such a long period with large amounts of oil money. After Gaddhafi's coup, he replaced the Libyan Constitution of 1951 with laws based on his own political ideology, leaving behind no constitutional institutions. The TNC has thus focused on institutional deficiencies, ensuring that the system operated with checks and balances to prevent corruption. It has strived for national reconciliation and a sense of national identity that the country lacked before. Citizen empowerment via elections and other mechanisms has been important for the TNC since Libya had no civil society under Gaddhafi. Although the TNC is a provisional body and has not been elected yet, it developed through stabilization teams in Dubai and Benghazi that thought systematically about leadership in Libya.

Vandewalle argued that the main lesson of the TNC's experience for other Arab countries undergoing transition is that legitimate leadership should be in place to prevent post-uprising chaos from occurring and to stabilize the country. Constructive communication among the leadership, the public, and the military is essential during a transition. Good leadership without good institutions is meaningless, and vice versa. A constitutional body is also important to draw support from the international community, which provides a measure of legitimacy to a transitional government.

Dr. Michael Hudson focused on the unfinished cases of revolution in Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen. There has been a leadership deficit among both incumbent leaders and opposition movements in all three countries. The key questions for these countries have been what constitutes good leadership and how a nation can acquire it. Countries are much better off if they have legitimate leadership and can build legitimate institutions. Bahrain, Syria, and Yemen cannot and did not achieve either objective or answer either question.

Bahrain is quite different from Syria and Yemen. It is a Gulf country with half a million people that produces some oil, but the country also benefits from the largesse of Saudi Arabia. Although the Bahraini monarchy has displayed deficient leadership and overseen a bloody crackdown that has created international outrage, the corrupt Sunni regime remains in power in a predominantly Shia country. Previous democratic liberal uprisings have been suppressed since the 1950s. The Bahraini people are educated and skilled workers who desire better government. Hudson said that the brutal crackdown has eroded the legitimacy of the monarchy.

Bahrain's ally, Saudi Arabia, views the protests as a national security issue for the Gulf monarchy club, since the protests have the potential to promote widespread Shia uprisings against Sunnis. In principle the United States supports freedom and popular participation, but it is ambivalent vis-à-vis Bahrain because US interests include a large naval base in the country and its relationship with Saudi Arabia. The

blocking role of big powers such as Saudi Arabia prevents US support for the uprising.

Syria is a case study of an overbearing state with a leader, Bashar al-Assad, who has shown an enormous disregard for political realities. The Syrian opposition is very complicated. The Syrian population has become emasculated by decades of fierce, highly efficient authoritarian domination. Hudson argued that larger geopolitical concerns ensure the continued rule of al-Assad, because the convergence of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian interests blocks foreign intervention.

Yemen has witnessed the resignation and departure of former leader Ali Abdullah Saleh, but its revolution remains unfinished. Saleh's relatives still figure prominently in the army and security services. Hudson said that a bloody process, spanning many months, has ensued in which the new regime is looking at the remnants of the old regime. Saleh, an obscure general from an obscure tribe, built a viable governing coalition in the 1970s. He led the country through the unification of North and South Yemen in the 1980s and then adopted the Washington Consensus, along with neoliberal economics, in the 1990s.

The reform efforts of the 1990s failed, however, due to reduced oil supplies and the consequent negative economic impact. According to Hudson, "dreams had turned to ashes." The opposition in Yemen, which includes Salafis and al-Qaeda, lacks coherence and a sense of legitimacy. The current president, Abd Rabbuh Mansur Al-Hadi, has not demonstrated sufficient leadership in the midst of difficult circumstances.

Dr. Jang Ji-Hyang next discussed the prospects for regional leadership. Jang asserted that while Turkey may show regional leadership, Iran is unlikely to do so. Turkey has successfully combined Islam with Western-style representative democracy. The country has grown its economy threefold under eight years of Justice and Development Party government. Turkey's recent foreign policy posture has improved relations with neighboring countries. In addition, Western allies are satisfied, further bolstering Turkish leadership prospects in the region. Iran, by contrast, was unable to compete for regional leadership after the Revolutionary Guards crushed opposition protesters following the rigged 2009 presidential election. Since Iran has proven that it cannot ensure free, fair, and meaningful elections, it now appears as a bully.

The panelists next turned to the other central issue—state-building. Henry said that the Tunisians are proceeding well and are capable of deciding for themselves upon their future course. Whereas the Tunisian military has minimal impact on the economy, the Egyptian military intends to remain a participant in the Egyptian economy. Tunisia and Egypt both have open economies and need tourists, but much additional progress is required in Egypt. Islamism in Egypt is less progressive than in Tunisia. The Egyptian military benefits from the great mistrust between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood on one side and liberal, secular protesters in Tahrir Square on the other. Hudson underscored the idea that there is "no one formula" for state building. Although the United States and international institutions are sympathetic and supportive of the changes taking place in Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya, the countries themselves

will ultimately determine their future direction.

Vandewalle argued that state building is related to institution building. While Libya has a history of destroying state institutions, many Arab countries need institution building. Western conceptions of "markets today and democracy tomorrow" are unlikely to be realized in the region, and processes will evolve gradually. Countries like Libya have no history of state building; therefore, it will be challenging to create mechanisms that are transparent. According to Hudson, downsizing the state would be desirable in Egypt, Syria, and perhaps Bahrain, whereas Libya requires state-building. Hudson added that although analysts often employ engineering terminology, such as building, when referring to state development, organic support for a state that grows over time is a better paradigm and far preferable.

The session concluded with comments on Egypt and Turkey. Henry cited the presence of three societal segments represented at a recent demonstration in Cairo's Tahrir Square—liberals, the Muslim Brotherhood, and Salafis—as indicative of the increased institutionalization of popular participation. The demonstrators' complaints about candidate manipulation or removal are part of broader efforts to limit the degree of arbitrary government in Egypt. Hudson remarked that an "Ataturk model" cannot and should not apply to the countries in revolution. Turkey itself has witnessed a gradual reemergence of claims to public religious expression that has modified the previously existing model.

Although an Islamist character may emerge, an "Islamist Spring" is unlikely due to competitive dynamics that are different from those that prevailed during the time of Ataturk. Henry observed that Arabs draw from Turkey the lesson of liberalization within Islamist communities. The Turks have come to understand that the "Ataturk model" was secular fundamentalism, a model that is unlikely to take hold elsewhere. At the core, Hudson said, Arab publics "will continue to be fed up with arbitrary authoritarian rule."

Session 5

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 16:00-17:15
Place: Grand Ballroom

Energy and Oil in the Middle East

Organizing Institution:	The Heritage Foundation
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Walter Lohman, The Heritage Foundation
Panelists:	Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
	Tanaka Nobuo, Institute of Energy Economics
	Mikkal Herberg, National Bureau of Asian Research
Young Scholars:	Jens Wardenaer, International Institute for Strategic Studies
	Jamola Khusanjanova, Ewha Womans University

Moderator Mr. Walter Lohman began by noting the timeliness of the session's topic, given the current instability in the Middle East and the crisis over Iran's nuclear program. He asked the panelists to analyze the unfolding crisis from multiple angles, and especially how it is affecting the energy security of East Asian countries. Current developments may affect the price of oil globally, while at the same time the March 11 2011 Fukushima disaster in Japan has had a significant impact on the nuclear industry in China and beyond.

Mr. Nobuo Tanaka addressed the issue of Asian countries' dependency on energy imports and argued that countries in the region need to cooperate on regional energy security in the face of multiple crises. The International Energy Agency (IEA) deemed it necessary to open up its strategic oil stockpiles three times during Tanaka's tenure as its executive director: during the Gulf War, after Hurricane Katrina, and during the conflict in Libya; any conflict in the Persian Gulf will be worse than these.

Tanaka argued that Japan would be severely impacted by a regional crisis, such as an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, due to its dependence on Middle Eastern energy. The problem would be exacerbated by the fact that very few of Japan's nuclear plants are currently operational, putting the country's energy security at great risk. The fall in oil supply that would follow any destabilization of Iran could be made up by Saudi Arabia—arguably one of the most stable countries in the Gulf—but only in the short term. According to Tanaka, the political instability caused by the Arab Spring is likely to lead to a deferred investment scenario, where a posited 30 percent reduction in investment will result in an oil price above $130 per barrel in the medium term.

Tanaka pointed out that, in the long term, dependency on energy imports will become a critical economic

issue for Asia. China is now the world's largest consumer of energy and will eventually become the largest importer of oil. As the dependence on imports increases, Asian economic growth itself comes to depend on those imports, putting growth in the world's fastest-growing region at risk. Part of the solution to this problem has to be closer international coordination under the auspices of the IEA. The organization has long attempted to convince China and India to join it, as usage of the IEA's strategic energy stockpiles in case of crisis will require close coordination with these powers. Energy security will only be possible in the future with more energy supply, particularly as consumption increases. Some argue that the "golden age of gas" is coming, and that that will alleviate energy insecurity. However, Tanaka argued that, due to complexity and high cost of transportation, gas can only be part of the solution.

In conclusion, Tanaka said that to ensure the stability of regional energy security in Asia, a cooperative energy security framework with diversified energy sources is needed. The integration of electricity grids across borders, as in Europe, will go a long way towards this. For Japan, it would be useful to be more connected to both South Korea and Russia, and it should maintain its nuclear energy supply. China and Mongolia should also look towards closer energy integration. The question is whether East Asia is able to do this in time.

Dr. Anthony Cordesman put the current situation in the Gulf in a regional context, offering a tour d'horizon of strategic issues in the Gulf states before discussing a possible crisis over Iran. The region is inherently unstable and has serious internal problems relating to population growth, water, governance, infrastructure, and job creation. The low per capita income level of some Gulf countries reveals massive economic mismanagement. Furthermore, the political upheaval currently affecting the Arab world causes many challenges and risks to world energy stability. Almost 80 percent of world oil exports and 90 percent of Asian oil imports come from the Middle East.

Power projection capabilities in the region are low, according to Cordesman, as most of the states are either fragile or failed, and military capabilities are not well developed. On the other hand, most of them face security challenges. The United Arab Emirates is an exception, but it has its own problems in the form of badly run oil companies. On the whole, Cordesman argued that the power of Gulf countries is declining. Yemen's impact on the region is unknown, but potentially critical. It is a failing state in every possible dimension—population pressure, internal divisions, security structure—and al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula is growing in influence. It is the only Arab state where the World Bank has failed to find a convincing development plan, Cordesman pointed out. While Kuwait is to a certain extent stable, it is becoming less so. Its hard power is declining, while in energy terms the state has one of the most inefficient oil companies in the region. Bahrain is one of the most critical countries, hosting a large American naval base and acting as a shield for Saudi Arabia against Iran. Oman, however, has a security problem at the Straits if conflict should break out, as Iran has increasingly been deploying forces in the Arabian Sea off Oman. Qatar, which expended plenty of political capital in allowing a US base on its soil, will be seen by Iran as a US ally in any confrontation. Qatar also shares an oil field with Iran. Saudi



Arabia, whose ties to the United States have become far closer over the past two years, is strategically critical. The United States wants to create Saudi forces that are interoperable with American forces, which would give it the power to deal with Iran's air force or trouble in Yemen.

Cordesman also provided an analysis of the daily flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, with data that indicates that it reached almost 17 million barrels in 2011, up from 15.5-16.0 million bbl/d in 2009-2010. This is roughly equal to 35 percent of all seaborne traded oil, or almost 20 percent of oil traded worldwide. About 85 percent of the crude oil goes to Asian markets, with Japan, India, South Korea, and China as the major destinations. Another important chokepoint, according to Cordesman, is the Suez Canal, which has also been affected by instability. Turmoil in Egypt can affect exports of gas and a limited amount of oil. Total petroleum transit through the Suez Canal was close to two million bbl/d in 2010, or around five percent of the global seaborne oil trade.

There has been much speculation that Iran would attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz should a crisis escalate, but this is unlikely to happen. Cordesman argued that closing the Strait is but one of several options on Iran's table, and it depends on the Strait for its own oil exports. Iran is not seeking conventional military capabilities and lacks a modern navy. However, it has a large force of smaller ships, around 20,000 naval guards, three submarines, smart mines, anti-ship missiles, and long-range guided torpedoes, all of which can operate from Iran to outside the Strait. Iran currently occupies seven islands along the tanker channels. While it cannot win a war, it can easily create a tanker premium, which would not be enough to set off a war. Smart mines can be used without warning and would preclude tanker traffic for weeks. The global energy supply is affected even without conflict, as the Gulf region provides over 20 percent of the world's oil, Cordesman concluded.

Dr. Mikkal Herberg argued that the current crisis over Iran exemplifies the energy insecurity that Asian states will continue to face. Asia consumes 25-26 million barrels of oil per day, most of which are from Gulf countries, including Iran. East Asia's deep dependency on oil imports from the Gulf—around 70-75 percent of consumption—will continue for the foreseeable future. Thanks to the region's phenomenal growth, demand in East Asia is likely to rise by 12 million barrels a day in the next 20 years.

The Middle East is the only viable source of supply for such an increase in demand. Any crisis in the Gulf will, therefore, seriously challenge East Asian energy security. We can thus see an intensification of linkages between the Middle East and East Asia. At the same time, East Asian states are doing their best to diversify their energy sources and end their dependency on Middle Eastern oil. In the short term, it will be difficult for Saudi Arabia to fill the supply gap left by a potential loss of Iranian oil. Saudi Arabia could do this in the short term, but in the long term it is unsustainable due to the pressure that increased output would put on the already low spare capacity in the market. The spare capacity cushion is now down to one million barrels a day in a 90 million barrels a day global system. This is a slow-motion supply shock, and the tighter the cushion gets, the more the market has to bid up.

There is a hope that the unstable global energy market will lead to further cooperation among East Asian states in finding alternative energy sources. The instability in the Middle East means that diversification of energy supply is crucial for maintaining economic growth in East Asia, but it is mathematically impossible for everyone to diversify simultaneously. At the same time, the underlying problem of mercantilist, zero-sum competition for the control of oil supplies and shipping routes is intensifying. We can see signs of this competition in state sponsorship of oil companies, disputes over the control of pipeline routes, tension over small gas fields between Japan and China, and potential energy sources in the South China Sea. However, this is unlikely to secure the supplies those states want due to the global nature of the energy market, and the increased distrust stemming from this decreases the likelihood of much-needed strategic cooperation on energy security in Asia. In the long term, the Indian Ocean—through which 80 percent of the oil will be transported—will become an area of competition over sea lines of communication, which again will amplify tension in the South China Sea. Energy rivalry thus bleeds into strategic rivalry, reducing the chances of regional cooperation on infrastructure.

The current energy infrastructure is geared towards oil as a perfectly transportable energy resource, which makes diversifying toward other energy sources problematic. While natural gas is in plentiful supply, scaling up the current gas infrastructure to the point where gas can replace a significant amount of oil imports will be difficult, posing yet another problem to East Asian energy security. In addition to gas infrastructure complexities, the notion of using nuclear energy as a replacement for natural energy resources is not preferable in East Asia. This will have the effect of making the region dependent on imported energy in the future. Taking into account the dynamic development of the East Asian region, Lohman concluded that any type of instability in oil-exporting countries, mainly the Middle Eastern countries, will have a severe impact on the region.

Session 5

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 16:00-17:15
Place: Lilac/Tulip

EU Migration Policy after the Arab Spring: Searching for Domestic and Foreign Policy Coherence

Organizing Institution:	Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Sergio Carerra, CEPS
Panelists:	Joanna Parkin, CEPS
	Jean-Pierre Cassarino, European University Institute
	Patryk Pawlak, European Union Institute for Security Studies
Young Scholars:	Ardie Ermac, Korea University
	Matthew Jensen, American Enterprise Institute

Respect for human rights and the free movement of people within the Schengen Area are stated principles that lie at the heart of the European Union (EU). Yet the actions of the EU and EU member states following the Arab Spring have been incoherent and, at their worst, betray mounting xenophobia. Moderator Dr. Sergio Carerra pointed to security issues and a trend towards populism in member states' politics as driving the incoherence of policy between member states and the EU institutions. These issues dominated the ensuing conversation.

Although outwardly the EU has expressed support for the spirit of the Arab Spring revolutions, it has not been supportive of the sort of immigration and development policies that might help the new North African governments succeed. Rather than opening the border to immigrants from war-torn North African governments, the EU tightened them. Dr. Jean-Pierre Cassarino made clear that much of this discrepancy comes from the security concerns of each individual member state. Other panel participants shared this view.

The security-driven immigration policies—be they outgrowths of xenophobia or responses to credible threats—are undermining the coherence of EU policy to the extent that Cassarino declared, "The EU migration policy is just incomplete." Although Article 79 of the Lisbon Treaty compels EU policy harmonization in a shallow sense, member states have significant leeway to set the parameters of policy themselves. For example, while a EU family reunification directive dates back to 2003, each member state has the right to define what constitutes a "family." This is but one of many areas of flexibility in just one directive.

The differences among member states' policies constrain the EU's capacity to convince third parties, such as the North African nations, to act in good faith. This hampers negotiations over security and makes it difficult for parties on both sides of the Mediterranean to get what they want out of negotiations. The situation is deteriorating further, Cassarino contends, as the powerful member states lobby the EU institutions in Brussels for more alignment towards the member states' security-driven initiatives. As the financial crisis creates tension and divergent interests among EU member states, it also will enhance the ability of some nations and detract from the ability of others to influence EU immigration policy.

The situation is not entirely bleak for the North African nations if they are able to come to an understanding of their own national priorities. Cassarino's point is that the security concerns of some EU member states, particularly the expressed need for enhanced cooperation on the EU external border, might offer North African nations bargaining chips for negotiating legal immigration options or more developmental assistance. Dr. Patryk Pawlak later expanded on this issue by noting that as the new North African governments gain legitimacy, citizens of those countries will likely develop stronger feelings of ownership towards their domestic situation. As these feelings grow, nations will be more likely to prioritize domestic assistance rather than immigration reform.

Ms. Joanna Parkin presented the main findings of her recent research that established how the recent Arab uprising impacted the EU's migration policy towards the southern Mediterranean. She began by describing two assumptions: first, she recognized how the goals of the EU's comprehensive approach to migration are far from being met (e.g., respect for human rights and the desire to have migration aid economic development in the sending countries). Second, she assumed that strengthening the EU's foreign affairs dimension could provide a more effective framework for the region's global approach to migration.

Testing the EU's response to what recently transpired in the Arab world against these assumptions revealed several interesting points. Firstly, the EU's response to the Arab Spring showed a return to a security-driven approach. In March 2011, the EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs made migration a key pillar in its strategy of supporting economic and political transition in the region. However, contrary to the rhetoric employed by the EU in its public statements about external migration, the region's immediate response to the influx of migrants—primarily from Tunisia and Libya during the periods of unrest—was to tighten its borders. The return to a security-driven approach is manifested in how the EU intensified border surveillance in the Mediterranean Sea and exerted pressure on emerging democracies in North Africa to cut irregular migration.

In order to understand why such a trend is underway in the EU, Parkin looked into who is driving the policy-making process at the EU level, and the impact of the Lisbon Treaty on EU institutions. On the one hand, she pointed to the significant role home affairs and security experts play in the policy-making process for the external aspects of the EU's migration policy. This explains why their ideologies carry more weight in both the policy-making process and in diplomatic missions abroad. On the other hand, the research showed that rather than coordinating the EU's voice abroad, the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty have instead reinforced ideological struggles and turf wars between EU institutions. For example, there is a debate between Home Affairs experts and diplomats over how funds should be spent. Home Affairs believes that resources should be channeled to migration control, an approach the diplomats consider to be an impediment to the development agenda in some partner countries.

Pawlak, in his main remarks, emphasized the inherent linkage between domestic and foreign policy, paying particular attention to the latter. He argued that striking a balance between the domestic and foreign pressures is perhaps the most important challenge for the EU in relation to its immigration policy. He identified the following challenges to the successful execution of this balancing act: first, the domestic political environments in member states are not favorable, as they are growing heavily populist; second, the EU's integration policies are inherently one-way, where the immigrants are expected to meet the conditions imposed by the host societies while the citizens of host countries are usually left unprepared; and finally, the coherence of immigration and foreign policies is hampered by the need to ensure stability despite a potential conflict in values.

Amidst these challenges, Pawlak argued that there is a certain window of opportunity for both the EU and its partner countries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Given that the revolutions in the Arab world were mostly driven by the quest for more dignity, the societies in the MENA region and their representatives in the region may call on the EU to have the same principle reflected in its immigration policies. At the same time, the EU could use this opportunity to prove its commitment to the region by not pushing for its own priorities but rather by supporting the emergence of local knowledge that would in turn accelerate the emergence of genuinely national priorities.

With the various political and paradigmatic changes underway, both in the EU and in several MENA countries, Pawlak argued that the political direction the countries take would influence the EU's immigration policy. For example, more democracy in the region would open the public debate to new voices that would make it more difficult for both the EU and the governments in the region to enact unpopular EU-driven policies. The changes in the EU's political landscape also muddle which path the EU would take in terms of its immigration policy. As a result, Pawlak recognized the need for a more open dialogue between the EU and its constituents where its immigration policy and its implications are comprehensively discussed.

In the question-and-answer session, two major issues emerged. The first involved how a member state's position on immigration from abroad might influence the other member states' policies towards internal migration in the EU. In a borderless zone such as the Schengen area, one country's approach to immigration from outside the EU can have serious repercussions for the rest of the area, as would-be immigrants will attempt to gain access to the EU as a whole through the borders of member states with the most lax policies. For instance, the way Greece loosely controls its Turkish border, according to Parkin, has been a hotly contested topic in policy debates. In fact, Greece's policies towards external immigration have been used by countries such as Germany and France to justify the reintroduction of internal borders within the Schengen Area.

The second question pointed out that there was little discussion of the current economic crisis in Europe. Pawlak said that he recognized how the crisis in the Eurozone has led to poorly functioning labor markets with very high unemployment in many European countries. This, he pointed out, might have reinforced negative attitudes towards immigrants, as citizens are loath to have more competitors for job opportunities.

The panelists also noted how European efforts to build capacity in the MENA region require a strong role for education policy. Both Parkin and Pawlak were supportive of existing EU initiatives to build education partnerships with North African countries and provide scholarships for students to study in Europe. Likewise, Carerra argued that one of the fundamental weaknesses in most of EU policy debates is the tendency to ignore "wider aspects" such as issues about education policies. More broadly, he advanced the idea that it is imperative for the EU to address issues such as human rights, trade, and education in order to ensure coherence of its domestic and foreign policies.

There was an overall agreement amongst the participants that incoherent immigration policies set forth by EU member states and the EU institutions are suboptimal; however, there is some concern that the situation could deteriorate further if populism rules in upcoming elections. Although the EU institutions have no power over that factor, they do have the power to educate EU citizens regarding the safety and benefits of immigration. This and a strong focus on the development of North Africa, rather than a focus purely on immigration issues, may be the only ways to improve upon the security-driven status quo.

Session 5

Date: Thursday, April 26, 2012
Time: 16:00-17:15
Place: Orchid

Japan's Nuclear Crisis

Organizing Institution:	The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Abe Nobuyasu, The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Panelists:	Funabashi Yoichi, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF)
	Endo Tetsuya, Nuclear Safety Research Association
	Martin Fackler, The New York Times
	Yim Man-Sung, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST)
Young Scholars:	Madeleine Foley, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
	Moira Alice Kelley, Seoul National University
	Suh Jihye, Korea University

Nearly a year following the March 2011 Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan's east coast, much effort has been expended in attempting to identify and remedy the causes of the accident. Moderator Ambassador Abe Nobuyasu, Ambassador Endo Tetsuya, Dr. Funabashi Yoichi, Mr. Martin Fackler, and Dr. Yim Man-Sung weighed in on the leadership dynamics in Japan at the executive and community levels. Following the discussion on leadership, they addressed the specific organizational pathologies plaguing Japan's nuclear village, comprised of government, regulators, industry, and academia. Finally, they discussed what steps can be taken to instill the leadership required to overcome the Fukushima crisis and prevent similar events from happening in the future.

Funabashi, the program director of the Independent Investigation Commission on the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Accident, summarized the lessons learned from post-disaster investigations. The group has produced a thorough and insightful commission report on the causes leading to the accident. In his remarks, Funabashi focused on the governance crisis and the crisis management problem, which the Japanese government faced in the days and months following the disaster.

In response to worsening conditions at the Fukushima plant, Prime Minister Naoto Kan instructed the chairman of Japan's Atomic Energy Commission, Shunsuke Kondo, to draft a worst-case scenario. Such contingency planning is almost unprecedented in Japan in the post-war era. The scenario that Kondo submitted in late March predicted that a hydrogen explosion at Unit 1 of the reactor would make emergency response impossible and force remaining workers to evacuate the Fukushima site. As a result, the

spent fuel ponds in Unit 4 would experience meltdown. Additional releases of radioactive materials would force the evacuation of 35 million people as far away as the Tokyo metropolitan area. In retrospect, we now know that actual events came dangerously close to what Funabashi characterized as Chairman Kondo's nightmare scenario.

Given Japan's meticulous and risk-averse industrial culture, Tokyo Electric Power Company's (TEPCO's) unpreparedness for an accident of this scale was surprising to many. The cause was not managerial or operational, but social in origin. Public support for nuclear power in Japan is tempered by a deeply rooted nuclear allergy, arising from Japan's experience following the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945. Thus, stakeholders in the government and nuclear industry face great incentives to defend the safety of nuclear power plants in Japan at any cost and to downplay possible risks associated with nuclear power generation. If plant operators were to publicly acknowledge and take corrective measures regarding plant safety and regulation in Japan, they feared the public would demand that plants be shut down until absolute safety could be guaranteed. Thus, as Funabashi observed, TEPCO and Japan's nuclear regulatory community found themselves caught in a trap of their own making in which avoidance of worst-case emergency preparation translated to unpreparedness.

Funabashi argued that Japan's nuclear regulator, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency (NISA), shares the blame for this avoidance. NISA is not a formally independent regulator. Rather, it is a branch of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry. Oversights leading up to the Fukushima disaster later revealed the extent of NISA's dependence on Japan's intransigent bureaucracy. The result of this arrangement is a hollow regulation regime in which the regulator pretended to regulate and the regulated pretended to be regulated. For example, when the governor of Niigata Prefecture demanded a nuclear emergency preparedness drill following an earthquake in 2007, NISA executives denied his request, fearing the exercise would provoke "unnecessary anxiety and misunderstanding" from the public. Deep aversion to contingency planning has become a fixed feature in the post-war security culture in Japan. But as the Fukushima accident demonstrates, chronic unpreparedness will continue to undermine Japan's closely guarded image as a "nation of peace" if it does not reform its approach to disaster planning.

Endo focused his comments on the effect of the Fukushima accident on nuclear power globally and in individual nuclear energy-producing states. The Fukushima disaster is classified as a level 7, major accident on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) International Nuclear Event Scale. It is one of only two nuclear events in history to warrant such a classification. The first was the Chernobyl disaster in 1986.

One impact of the Fukushima incident was for nuclear power producers to pay greater collective attention to tightening nuclear power safety regulations. The European Union has instituted stress tests of all nuclear facilities, and the IAEA has strengthened its peer review process. However, nuclear regulation is widely viewed within the purview of individual governments, not subject to requirements imposed by

external authorities. According to Tetsuya, the IAEA is struggling to raise safety and regulatory standards on nuclear power producers seeking to maintain an independent regulatory culture.

An examination of Fukushima's impact by country reveals that responses to the disaster differ considerably depending on political culture, geopolitical circumstances, energy security, and ethics, among other factors. The future of nuclear power in Japan is unclear at present, due in large part to weak leadership in the Japanese government. The current ruling Japanese Democratic Party has adopted a policy of weaning the country off of nuclear power. Still, it is unclear how Japan will meet its energy demand without nuclear power. Japan awaits the outcome of a ministerial conference in August 2012, which will give the final policy deliberation on the future of domestic nuclear power production.

Endo briefly reviewed the status of nuclear power operations in states that deployed or sought to deploy nuclear energy prior to the accident. Since March 2011, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland have announced plans to break from the nuclear power generation. Switzerland and Germany have issued concrete phase-out plans. Italy has made no such formal plans, but has frozen new nuclear construction. Many other European countries, including France, the United Kingdom, and countries in Central and Eastern Europe, have given no signs of abandoning nuclear power. However, the 2012 French presidential election may spell a shift for France's domestic nuclear energy policy.

China and India stand out from the crowd as aspiring suppliers. Following the nuclear accident, China froze domestic nuclear expansion plans pending a comprehensive safety review. Russia and South Korea, as nuclear exporters, have maintained their support for nuclear power. In Southeast Asia, only Vietnam has actively pursued nuclear power. In the Middle East, Turkey, Jordan, and the United Arab Emirates have all displayed continued willingness to pursue and deploy nuclear power. The United States has issued its first construction under operation license in 34 years for a new nuclear plant, though Endo conceded that progress is slow.

Endo concluded that nuclear power is still regarded as a highly reliable, economical, and clean energy

source, despite growing opposition and caution in some quarters. The desire to continue to expand global nuclear energy production remains intact, though tempered by safety and regulatory challenges illustrated by the March 2011 Fukushima incident.

Fackler delivered first-hand accounts of the earthquake and the first of several explosions in the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear plant. Fackler, a close observer of Japan's civil nuclear complex, dubbed the "nuclear village," argued that the political fallout from the disaster proved to be just as devastating as the nuclear accident itself. With six prime ministers over a six-year span, Japan's crisis of leadership, reaching to the highest level of political office, left it ill-equipped to implement a swift and coordinated response to the environmental, humanitarian, and nuclear crises.

In March 2011, Prime Minister Kan found himself falling victim to Japan's trend of cycling quickly through leaders. A self-made man, Kan's "let's get it done" political attitude resonated with Japanese citizens. In the days following the crisis, TEPCO sought to evacuate all personnel from the reactor site despite the threat of further explosions, core meltdown, and the release of radioactive materials. In the early morning of March 15 2011, Kan entered TEPCO headquarters, ordering the operator to keep limited personnel and emergency responders at the reactor site. Ultimately, Kan's actions mitigated the worsening crisis at the plant.

However, Kan failed on two critical points in responding to the Fukushima crisis. According to Fackler, these combined failures highlighted weaknesses in Japan's bureaucratic and regulatory systems. First, Kan's greatest strength became his greatest weakness in a time of crisis. His distrust of Japanese institutions, which made him so attractive to the Japanese electorate, prevented him from leveraging tools and mechanisms developed by the bureaucracy. With the exception of his cadre of trusted political appointees, Kan refused almost every tool at his disposal, most notably the System for Prediction of Environment Emergency Dose Information, designed to predict the spread and direction of nuclear fallout plumes.

Second, Kan's failure to communicate to the Japanese people the corrective actions taken to resolve the crisis left the public and the media with the impression that the government was in atrophy. Kan thought that if he rolled up his sleeves and worked for Japan, the people would follow. The prime minister's apparent silence exacerbated the deeply rooted distrust of the government following the accident. For its part, the bureaucracy was absent. "Evasion of responsibility," as Fackler put it, came to characterize the government's response to the Fukushima disaster for months following the accident.

Yim argued that the Fukushima disaster was and remains a crisis in many respects, including for the technology community, the Japanese nuclear industry, Japan's executive office, and its institutions. Estimates place the cost of damage from the tsunami at $110 billion. Also, the crisis of confidence in the Japanese nuclear industry has spread to the nuclear industry as a whole.

Nevertheless, Yim believes that this crisis presents opportunities for Japan in two areas. First, it has inspired a shift in global nuclear regulatory practices, placing greater emphasis on severe accident management. The accident has reoriented previous standards from design-basis to beyond design-basis regulation. The result is a greater emphasis on the effects of an accident on people. It has inspired greater attention to severe accident management preparation. Second, the Fukushima disaster presents an opportunity to draw a link between nuclear safety and security. The risks of a nuclear accident and the corresponding potential for a terrorist attack on a nuclear plant have seldom been considered together. The manifest economic and social costs of the Fukushima disaster illustrate the potential impact of an attack on a nuclear plant. In the future, these two contingencies will have to be jointly discussed in the context of regional security collaboration.

According to Yim, there is no question that Japan's nuclear industry will survive the Fukushima crisis. Rebuilding the Japanese nuclear sector's credibility and enhancing its transparency is necessary to restore Japan's leadership role in nuclear power. The industry must take the opportunity to learn from the Fukushima disaster and implement necessary changes to make nuclear power safe, secure, and sustainable in the long term.

In the wake of the Fukushima disaster, Japan was hit by another crisis—a crisis of leadership. The ineffective management within the Japanese government and the nuclear community has highlighted the need for more effective accident preparedness, management, and disaster response. To restore public confidence in the nuclear enterprise, Japan must craft an independent regulatory culture that is capable of assessing and carrying out needed reforms. In the years to come, Japan must resolve its deeper leadership crisis by overcoming the mistrust and avoidance culture that afflicts the Japanese government at multiple levels.

Session 5

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 16:00-17:15
Place: Violet/Cosmos

Social Polarization in the United States: Searching for Civility

Organizing Institution:	Hoover Institution
Panel Chair & Moderator:	David Brady, Hoover Institution
Panelists:	William Whalen, Hoover Institution
	Tod Lindberg, Hoover Institution
	Kim Jiyoon, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Young Scholars:	Hana Lee, Ewha Womans University
	Min Kyung Cha, Yonsei University

This panel assessed the impact of social polarization, differences in degree of polarization by class, and the significance of the recent increase in attention to the issues. Moderator Mr. David Brady set the stage by offering his insight on the dichotomy between the political preferences of the general populace and the elite. Mr. Tod Lindberg then began the discussion with a general overview on civil discourse. Mr. William Whalen, an expert on current events and political trends, gave his analysis of the importance of polarization from the perspective of a former journalist. In closing, Dr. Kim Jiyoon offered an outside perspective, suggesting possible reasons for polarization as well as a possible solution.

Brady said that the key question of polarization has to do with the nature of the population: is it predisposed to the center or the extremes? Following an ideological shift in the 1980s, the general American electorate adopted centrist tendencies, with 43 percent of the electorate identifying themselves as independent. Contrary to media portrayals of extreme social polarization, the general electorate is more

centrist, rather than divided along party lines. Polls reveal that the centrist electorate is willing to make a trade-off between increased taxes on the wealthy and greater social benefits for themselves. Thus, at the general electorate level, the issue of US polarization is not paramount. Contrary to the general electorate, the political elite in the United States is polarized. The political elite make up about five to seven percent of the population and consist of people participating in party politics, voting in primaries, and giving money to campaigns. At this level of the American electorate, ideologies are distinctly polarized with very little to no overlap. Party divisions are huge, especially on sensitive issues, such as global warming, fiscal austerity or stimulus, and social security. The party divisions at the elite level may become detrimental to the effective functioning of the US political system, because the US Congress votes along polarized lines established by the political elite. However, the resulting policy gridlock is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the only time when bipartisan voting was significantly present was the period between 1938 and the end of World War II, when the creation of coalitions was possible due to the crisis of world war. Such bipartisan cooperation had all but disappeared by the 1980s.

Brady questioned whether a system built on such huge differences can be stable over time. When polarized politics represent a generally centralized electorate, there is a problem. The rise of independent voters suggests that people are unhappy with the US political system. The dichotomous system may therefore require institutional fixes over time to prevent instability. If institutional fixes over time are unhelpful, decreasing the discord between the general and elite electorate may require serious behavior modifications in terms of voting and politics.

Whalen started off the discussion following the moderator's introduction by tackling the issue of polarization from a journalist's perspective. Regarding the Romney and Obama campaigns, he stated that the American press is convinced that the campaign is going to be ugly. As a result, in the next few months before the election, the most common quote Americans will encounter will read something like this: "2012 will be the ugliest and the most brutal campaign in modern history." However, Whalen argued that this relationship between the mass media and politics is nothing new. For example, going back to 1796, when Thomas Jefferson ran for the presidency, the news openly wrote about his private life, revealing to a surprised public that he had fathered children with one of his slaves. Also, in 1804, when Aaron Burr ran for New York governor, Burr's long-time political rival, Alexander Hamilton, criticized him in newspapers, at dinner salons, and in letters. As such, even though American politics has always had contentious elements to it, it now faces new challenges with the coming of the information age.

Whalen identified three changes that are prevalent today. The first is the 24/7 news cycle—the news never stops. Additionally, it is evident that people do not engage in watching uninteresting news even if it is run all the time. So the news-makers make the news spicier and more provocative, giving rise to controversial debates and arguments that in turn create a more negative political discourse in the country. The second change is the Internet. Because of the Internet, people no longer depend on just newspapers and television for news. People have unlimited access to the news via the Internet, and as long as one has

a computer and is able to connect to the Internet, anyone can become an opinion source. Many things that normally would have been reserved in American politics in past generations now spill out over the Web. The third change is the American electorate system. Political parties have to run distinctive platforms and policies in order to secure votes in elections. It is generally said that each party should secure 40 percent of the vote from their base and then pivot to win as much as possible from the remaining 20 percent. Hence polarization at the beginning of each election is unavoidable.

In his closing remarks, Whalen put forth three issues America has to address: whether the news outlets will be more responsible in delivering the news, whether the voters will step up to be more disciplined in their thoughts and more selective in their gathering of information, and whether the parties will change how they go about choosing their nominees to produce candidates that are more centrist than extremist.

Lindberg introduced the topic of civil discourse by noting that civility is not a natural human condition, but rather something that requires reinforcement to exist. Liberal democratic societies lack the risk of violent reprisal to verbal provocation, reducing reinforcing motivations to refrain from incivility. Additionally, constitutional protection for freedom of speech ensures that insulting speech faces no serious consequences. This is not true for private speech intended for a single person or small groups, however. Private speech in the United States still faces the risk of social sanctions. Although one's liberty or property is not at stake when engaging in uncivil private speech, the potential damage to one's personal life and important relationships is incentive enough to maintain civility. Thus it is only public speech that witnesses a significant degeneration in civility.

Political speech is by nature public. It is intended to be heard, read, and discussed. Whereas, in the past, inflammatory remarks could impose a risk on one's life, public speakers today never perceive political remarks as a matter of life and death. Therefore, disagreements are capable of reaching new extremes. In fact, Lindberg noted that inflammatory speech is incentivized more than discouraged today because such remarks are likely to draw an audience. Though uncivil in some respects, the polarized appearance of political speech is not a big problem as long as the places of public speech and the places of government remain in separate realms. It is important to retain civility within such places. Sanctions such as the House and Senate's rules of behavior exist to keep violent rhetoric out of political discourse. If politics is the management of differences in opinion, then the management of politics can take many forms, ranging from negotiations to war. In modern-day liberal-democratic societies, the use of force no longer belongs within the boundaries of mainstream civility. Thus, as long as uncivil behavior is contained to nonviolent actions, the liberal political order actually encourages and empowers conversations of an uncivil nature. Still, Lindberg claimed, it is important to have polarized rhetoric removed from places where the political and judicial decisions are actually made. As long as this separation is preserved, the increase in incivility will not necessarily reflect a crisis in the liberal political order.

Kim shared a different perspective on the issue of polarization. She argued that while it is evident that

there is some polarization in the American public, and certainly in the political-elite level, there is little reason to perceive that it poses a serious problem or threat to society. A poll from 2008 showed that the number of people who identified themselves as strong partisans had decreased. Surprisingly, the same poll showed a concomitant decrease in independents, who are identified as those not siding with either Democrats or Republicans. In 1988, 33 percent of Republicans and 37 percent of Democrats thought that abortion was always a personal choice. In 2008, the numbers decreased to 29 percent for Republicans and increased to 50 percent for Democrats. This tendency for polarization, she said, could be found in other issues, such as government-provided health care, school prayer, and social spending issues. Adding to the polarization trend is the fact that political elites have to maintain extreme positions in order to capture a majority of their party's votes in elections.

Kim offered two reasons for political polarization. First, polarization happens because it sells. Polarization draws attention and stimulates participation from the public. For example, in the 2004 election, there was an increase in the voter turnout rate because of political polarization and negative ads. As such, it sells in the election in the short run and also for the public in news and mass media. For average Americans, it sells especially well when it comes to moral issues because, unlike policy issues, they can evoke strong emotions and do not require much prior knowledge to understand. It is easy to take positions on these issues, and if there is a political actor, one can follow the cue very easily. Second, polarization cannot be helped in issues on which one cannot compromise. For issues such as abortion or gay marriage, one has to stand for an issue and refuse to change positions. However, Kim claimed that the issue of polarization is not a serious problem because, throughout history, the effect of polarization has been balanced out by the electoral system and will continue to be so in the future. Any party that is taking an extreme position on public policies or even moral issues, she said, has to pivot to the middle in order to draw the necessary votes to win an election. While Kim does not have an unwavering trust in individual voters or political elites, she trusts that, overall, voters seek moderation.

In response to audience members' questions about voters' decision capacity in polarized environments and the impact of negative campaign ads, the panelists discussed what influences voters, whether or not voters are making informed decisions, and whether negative campaign ads contribute to rising incivility

in American politics.

Kim stated that people need to trust the aggregate electorate's decision-making capacity. Political scientists and individual voters alike may demonstrate nonsensical tendencies, but voters at the aggregate level are capable of making wiser decisions. Lindberg added to Kim's position by saying that, throughout history, voters delivered judgments so that no one specific party garnered too much power. Thus, even if the electorate is not especially well informed, it has the capacity to deliver wise judgments. Whalen stressed the importance of understanding the "spirit of the times" for candidates. In the United States, two-thirds of the electorate believes that the country is headed in the wrong direction. It is the job of the candidates to figure out which way is the "right" way, and which issues need to be emphasized. The candidate who is best able to understand this spirit and respond most effectively is usually the one to win. Whalen also said that negative campaign ads are important in the larger process of framing an election through a concept called bracketing, where the candidate influences the public view of the election as a whole. In contrast, Kim believes that negative ads have little effect, as people tend to have a strong bias toward one party or position. One negative advertisement will not change their opinion. In concluding the discussion, Brady made an opposing point and said that the stakes are high when dealing with negative campaign ads because they can hold enormous influence over elections.

The four panelists held different positions on the precise impact of polarization in US politics. Despite the differing opinions, there was a consensus that changes in the media environment, the electorate system, and the people have resulted in growing political polarization.

Session 6

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 17:30-18:45
Place: Grand Ballroom

Leadership Transition in China

Organizing Institution:	The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Bong Youngshik, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Panelists:	Kim Heungkyu, Sungshin Women's University
	Soeya Yoshihide, Keio University
	Wang Yiwei, Tongji University
	Seo Jungmin, Yonsei University
Young Scholars:	Huang Xiao, Ewha Womans University
	Rebecca Graebner, The Heritage Foundation

The moderator, Dr. Bong Youngshik, began the session by raising several issues concerning the leadership transition in China, including speculation about the transition after the political scandal involving the former Communist Party chief in Chongqing, Bo Xilai, and how the current transition in China is essentially different from past leadership transitions. He asked what major challenges the new leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will face in the immediate aftermath of this leadership transition, as well as how the new generation of leaders will cope with these challenges and the current changes within the domestic politics of China.

Dr. Kim Heungkyu began his remarks by briefly explaining the widespread expectations regarding the upcoming leadership change. It is anticipated that seven of the nine current CCP Standing Committee members will retire. Several current members have been slated for positions within this shakeup; however, the recent Bo Xilai incident has added some further complications and has left many to speculate about who will take his place. It is likely that Vice President of the People's Republic of China (PRC) Xi Jinping and Executive Vice-Premier Li Keqiang will remain on the committee. Some predict that Hu Jintao will remain the chairman of the Central Military Commission, while Xi could become the general secretary of the CCP, and Li the premier of the State Council. It is also possible that the current general secretary of the CCP, Hu Jintao, will remain at this post. With Bo Xilai out, it will be difficult to predict who the new members will be, as well as to anticipate the internal dynamics of the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress. "These internal dynamics," Kim argued, "will be a major obstacle for the emerging generation of Chinese leadership."

The diversity among the current leaders and the rising leaders in terms of their sociological and profes-

sional backgrounds will exacerbate challenges that already exist in the party. The Bo Xilai incident already further highlighted factions within groups in the CCP, causing a rift within the princelings and driving apart coalitions between the princeling and the Shanghai groups. The new leadership will have to not only learn to bridge the gaps between the factions, but also adjust to the challenges posed by a multi-generational congress. Kim concluded that balance could be found within the CCP if members are willing to compromise. If not, the 18th Party Congress could be postponed.

Dr. Soeya Yoshihide began by emphasizing the tremendous evolution in China's social, economic, and political spheres from Mao's era to Deng's era. He said that, although China is less institutionalized, the Chinese leadership structure and political changes are quite impressive compared to those of Japan, which is highly institutionalized.

Soeya argued that, at present, Chinese leaders are confronting complex issues and problems since the dichotomy between the old trend, to push for the rise of China, and the new trend, to maintain the actual rising of China, has created a contradiction at this critical time of transition and transformation. Internally, as a natural outcome of the reform and open-door policies prioritizing the development of the coastal areas, various gaps emerged, including the underdevelopment of the inner land, wealth disparity, and the diversification of values among the public. Externally, a rising China has begun to perceive dissatisfaction about some of the existing norms and rules of the liberal international order that China has taken advantage of in realizing its spectacular rise during the last three decades. In addition, in the 12th Five Year Program, the Chinese parliament has given special recognition to the need to build social infrastructure and a more stable and equal society. Therefore, for the next 10 years the government will not focus on purely increasing the gross domestic product (GDP), but on the conflicts that will consequently follow as China progresses towards becoming a middle-income-status country. This will prove to be far trickier and more demanding than simply pumping out good growth rates; hence, the fifth-

generation leaders of China will need to show the same kind of strong vision that their predecessors did about the economy, back in the late 1970s.

Soeya agreed that the new personalities and power dynamics among Chinese leaders highlighted by Kim will exacerbate the existing challenges within the party. He also asserted that finding an appropriate mix of the party leadership and the state leadership will become a main challenge for the fifth generation of Chinese leaders. And a Chinese type of consensus may be necessary to keep things going.

Soeya also provided some insights on the Bo Xilai incident. He argued that Bo's case could be a combination of several factors, such as the lust for wealth and power among established leaders, as well as factional struggles. However, the key issue that Chinese leaders encounter in this incident is how to regain legitimate stability of community leadership. Unless those who are in power handle this problem very wisely, it will weaken not only the power of a particular faction leader, but also the ruling system under the CCP in general. Finally, he concluded that leadership, in general, is fundamentally "messy," where leaders have to "muddle" through the obstacles and issues in order to achieve balance and harmony. This is normal for all new leaders and governing groups; thus, the CCP leadership transition will encounter the same difficulties and will have to adjust.

Dr. Wang Yiwei pointed out that there are not only changes in quantity, but also changes in quality in the new leadership transition. In terms of quantity change, around 70 percent of China's Central Committee members are slated to retire, along with 17 members of the 25-member Politburo, the Congress's governing body, and up to seven members of the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee. In terms of quality, this leadership change is considered a generation transition rather than a power transition, since it is the first time China will choose top leaders without the paramount leader's appointments: intra-party democracy within the CCP. In addition, he said that the dismissal of Bo Xilai is a sort of positive event in China's political development and it should not be over-explained. In the eyes of some Western observers, the Bo Xilai episode has already constituted the most serious political crisis since the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident; however, this time the Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao administration has successfully avoided an even bigger crisis. In stark contrast with the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, China's economy and society have hardly been disrupted, which reflects the maturity of Chinese society and the strength of the country as a whole. To a great extent, this crisis has been a good thing for China, as it not only reveals the side effects of the competition that arises from mandatory retirement at the age of 67 for standing members of the Central Committee, but also provides a real test for the new-generation leaders to see whether they can handle the power transition smoothly.

Wang also spoke of the "five-level framework" with regard to the Chinese power transition and how the levels have changed since modernization. The first layer is the structure of power. China's GDP and foreign reserves limit the Chinese leadership's ability to act as freely as before. The second layer is the base of power. In China, nowadays, the middle class makes up the modern power base, apart from the

traditional power base composed of farmers and workers. The third layer is the distribution of power. Wealth distribution affects power distribution in China, and the past-oriented power distribution model turned out to be a failure. The fourth layer is the institution of power. China's power institution has transitioned from individual leadership to collective leadership, such as with the nine-member Politburo Standing Committee. The final layer is the ideology of power. The power mentality of China's new-generation leaders is more predictive and inclusive than before, since they grew up during the Cultural Revolution and experienced the economic reform. The evolution of the five-level framework of power promotes China's first leadership transition without a supreme leader's appointments towards democracy within the CCP.

Building upon the discussion of the diversity within the rising Chinese leadership, Dr. Seo Jungmin agreed that the sociological and professional differences highlighted by Kim and Soeya will be major obstacles and further expanded upon the upcoming challenges for the new leadership when faced with solving China's domestic and international issues and obligations.

Although China's next generation is more social-science oriented and market-economy trained, Seo cautioned that they will need to be especially creative when solving China's growth issue. After three decades of industrialization, growth in China has now stalled and jobs are harder to find. There is a growing gap between the rich and the poor and those in rural and urban areas in an already stratified society. China plays host to more than 20 million migrant workers, many of whom do not have full "citizen" rights. With a growing, diverse population, China's leaders face the challenge of satisfying more groups with unique needs. Seo said that China's politicians must now utilize "more complex slogans," or promises, in order to satisfy all of China's ethnic and social groups. If the new leaders cannot find a way to meet the growing list of the population's needs, certain groups will be left out and left behind, causing great destabilization.

China's newly attained G2 position has required China to shoulder more responsibilities than it has in previous decades. As a dominant force in the East, many people will now be watching China's foreign policy. Seo argued that China can no longer afford to be introspective and instead should take on a larger

role internationally. He closed his remarks by asserting that, in order to solve China's social and labor issues and to successfully transition to greater global responsibility, the new leadership would have to work through their differences in order to find consensus, achieve harmony, and maintain unity within the country.

Questions after the panelists' remarks focused on the internal workings of Chinese politics and the possibility of evolution. The panelists were asked to explain how established parties keep their momentum in single-party systems, especially when corruption and internal fractures become evident, such as in the Bo Xilai case. Seo conceded that there are problems within the party and that new leadership must serve a very diverse body with separate needs. When asked about the possibility of elections, he said that the majority of the Chinese today would not say they "want the vote." However, he admitted that in 20 to 30 years, the Chinese could view elections as a requirement in Chinese politics. Soeya remarked that observers in mainland China were captivated by the elections that occurred in Taiwan and that China is moving towards the democratization of politics.

No matter what the expert predictions are, China's future political road is still very much in the dark. Although the panelists focused on different struggles facing the new Chinese leadership, an overarching theme was the uncertainty of the future trajectory of Chinese politics—if it will continue to employ elements of democracy, how the diversity of the rising generation and growing populace will affect governance, and how China will cope with its new international status and domestic issues. The panelists agreed that China has the tools to succeed in both the domestic and international arenas, but strongly advocated patience and compromise for the 18th Party Congress. The consolidation of internal differences will be key for the new Congress to achieve its goals for China, domestically and internationally.

Session 6

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 17:30-18:45
Place: Lilac/Tulip

Leadership Transition in Russia: Continuity or Change?

Organizing Institution:	Center for the National Interest (CNI)
Moderator:	Kim Taehwan, Korea Foundation
Panelists:	Nikolas Gvosdev, U.S. Naval War College
	Andranik Migranyan, Moscow State Institute of International Relations
	Andrei Korobkov, Middle Tennessee State University
Young Scholars:	Sarah-Lena Vonderberg, Seoul National University
	Shin Heeyoung, Seoul National University

Moderator Dr. Kim Taehwan opened the panel by observing that Putin's re-election raises the question of what direction his leadership will take in the next few years. The topic brought on opposing viewpoints from three participating panelists. Dr. Nikolas Gvosdev argued that Putin is positioned to continue where he left off. Dr. Andrei Korobkov presented some challenges Putin will face in the upcoming years with the Russian situation having changed since the 1990s. Professor Andranik Migranyan had a different approach, seeing the soon-to-be Russian president as a most competent leader capable of steering Russia in the right direction.

Gvosdev first noted the differences between the Russia of now and of 2000. Gvosdev noted that, during his first term in office, Putin presented a vision of Russia in its former glory: economically developed, capable of securing territory, projecting leadership in the region, and dominant in global politics. Following the disastrous 1990s, he needed to restore Russia to what it had been, and hence a certain degree of acquiescence was predominant. A consensus was built within the Russian community that Putin needs to be given sufficient power to achieve the task. Now the situation is different: the state has stabilized and his support in the polls is weaker. Early declarations showed that he took 62 percent of the votes. This is a strong victory, but compared to the numbers in 2000 when figures in the polls reached over 70 percent, this is a drop of 10 percentage points. The populace is asking for a "renewal" of the government; he has not been given a "blank check."

Gvosdev continued by noting that Putin can no longer rely on the same group of people. People from the post-Soviet generation must be incorporated. News surrounding the appointment of the new cabinet members was tightly guarded, which was quite a change from previous instances where the appointees were predetermined. In a country where political and economic powers coincide, former players in govern-

ment are reluctant to relinquish their power. Putin needs to move his men to retirement, but this means pushing them out from the elite. Putin faces tough choices up ahead.

Internationally, Russia's global standing is not what it was in 2000. China, India, and Brazil have grown enormously in the global arena, and from Gvosdev's point of view, Russia is the weakest power of the BRICs. Superpowers are no more, having been replaced by multi-polarity as the new world order. Russia's relationship with China is uncertain, and its standing with the United States and the European Union needs redefining. Domestically Russia needs to address the problem concerning the continued perpetuation of the Russian regime, and the fact that Russia has not undergone a real transition of power during the past 12 years. In comparison, China has had two transitions. The only comparable case is Japan, where the Liberal Democratic Party has ruled almost consecutively for 54 years. Whether Putin will be successful in replicating Japan's example where a democratic government is re-elected each term without a regime change remains in question.

Korobkov raised five issues. First, Medvedev was chosen as the next president because he could never be an actual successor. As Korobkov said, Medvedev always worked more for Putin than for his own team. He is a puppet of his surroundings, as opposed to Putin, who maintained his political dominance throughout. Russia's population hoped for a more liberal leader when they elected Medvedev, but in reality he was carrying out Putin's wishes.

The second issue was Putin himself. Korobkov raised the following question: who is Putin and why is he so popular in Russia? Putin was the nominated successor of former president Boris Yeltsin. Because Putin was acutely aware of the increasingly anti-Yeltsin spirit of the Russian population at that time, he differentiated himself from the rest and won over the support of the general public.

Third, Korobkov asked what Russia will face after this election. He re-emphasized a fact brought up by Gvosdev, that the Russian government needs new faces, while the members of government do not want to give up their privileges. Korobkov thinks that Putin is relying too much on Yeltsin's heritage. Putin should also include the other parties in the process of finding new faces to have a broader variety of opinions. It is clear that party-building is extremely important for him. Korobkov paraphrased an episode from the campaign of Adlai Stevenson in 1950, which basically states: Even if all intelligent people will vote for you, that is not enough; you need the majority as well. The ruling party needs to understand this and create a majority support base. From Korobkov's point of view this is absolutely possible, but a normal situation between the right- and left-wing parties is necessary.

The fourth point was Putin's isolation from information. The events starting with the sports complex and the re-election came as a surprise to him. By building information and power vertically, Putin has cut off alternative sources of information, which is very dangerous for him.

Last but not least, Korobkov talked about the economic future of Russia. The Russian economy continues to grow, and continuing this trend is critical for Putin's agenda. To accomplish this, Russia needs to move away from its reliance on natural resources, as such dependence will only create more problems further along the road.

Migranyan described Putin as one of the most charismatic leaders in world politics today. He said that Putin's presence is not just based on Russia's standing in the world alone, but on the basis of his personal leadership. Furthermore, the situation in Russia is not as "gloomy" as perceived by some outside sources. The need for "new faces" in Russian politics is exaggerated. The top profile figures in politics have not changed for the past few decades in the United States or Europe, and the Russian situation is no different. During his first term in office, Putin started the task of rebuilding Russia both economically and politically. In his second term, he consolidated the energy and raw materials sector, and accumulated financial resources to pay back the debts inherited from the Yeltsin years. Now he faces his next term with new challenges. Russia has 300 to 400 of the most efficiently and rapidly developing companies around the globe outside the commodities sector. Putin will clear the way for these companies, forming the core and future of Russia's economy.

Migranyan did not agree with Gvosdev and Korobkov on some points. Gvosdev pointed out that Russia is weaker in standing both economically and politically compared to its status in 2000. Migranyan thought otherwise, saying that Russia is stronger than ever. He continued by saying that nothing could be further from the truth than saying that Putin is cut off from information. Referring back to the meetings he had with Putin in 2011, he said that Putin was aware of "everything" that goes on around him.

Putin's criticism of Hillary Clinton's comments on Russian elections being rigged were perceived by some commentators as an indication that Putin believed that the protest movements were organized by the American administration. On this basis, these commentators argued that Putin did not have any idea of what was going on in Russia. In reality, Migranyan argued, this is a distortion of what Putin said about Clinton's comments. What Putin said was that Clinton's comments on Russian elections were made prior to her receiving the official reports from Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe observers, and therefore Putin strongly argued that the US Secretary of State was interfering in Russian internal affairs.

Migranyan agreed that the system was built with Putin firmly at the center, and that Putin came back because he felt his mission was incomplete. Putin aims to relinquish power once well-established institutions are capable of performing their roles.

After hearing the opinions of the panelists, Kim, the moderator, raised two questions for the panel before opening the floor to the audience. His first question concerned the actual topic of the panel. Is the Russian leadership continuous or changing? Does the change refer to Putin's governance in 2008 or 2012? Kim

defined Putin's legacy as something other than a consistent ideology and asked for a comparative reference. He defined the legacy in three points: first, as the rise of a totalitarian, strong state; second, as the rise of state capitalism as a model of economic development; and third, as the improvement in foreign relations.

Migranyan did not agree with this statement, and he said that he considered it "absolutely wrong." In his opinion, nobody considers the Russian regime totalitarian; it is more of a hybrid regime. Second, he stated that the state capitalism is limited to the energy sector and a few other industries, and other sectors are almost completely privatized. To the moderator's statement about the improvement of the foreign policy behavior, he added that of course, because Putin raised the gross domestic product by such a tremendous amount, it was natural for him to represent Russia with more confidence.

Korobkov sees the main problem in the absence of Putinism. Putin is relying on the policy of the ideology and the heritage of World War II. Korobkov generally agreed with the moderator's view but he also feels that those three points were eroded by Yeltsin and other political leaders. To encourage economic development and the development of the middle class, Putin cannot continue with the previous ideological model. Ironically, it is Putin's fault that the people dealing with ideological matters for his leadership are not very well adjusted to the changes that are necessary, as he needs a very different image from his previous administration. They were very effective in creating the image of a sober person that cares about the people, but this will not be enough for his new term. Korobkov made the point that by encouraging the middle class in economic development, Putin is successfully building the image of a "clean" politician.

Gvosdev pointed out that, since Putin wants to create Russia with a pluralist political system, he needs to manage it very wisely or else he risks returning to the chaos of the 1990s. It will be very interesting to see what the future holds and how much management will be needed for the next eight years, as well as how the selected governors will deal with the growth in the economic, telecommunications, and energy sectors. Gvosdev stressed the importance of the energy sector, with Novatech as Russia's largest independent natural gas producer that is positioned against the state-owned enterprises. The questions raised

in the end focused on how the Russian government will continue to manage the system, how much of the economy will get privatized, and how much the state will be in control.

Second, the moderator asked what driving forces and shaping factors made "Putinism" possible. In his opinion, Russia is becoming increasingly dependent on natural resources, with 40 percent of the budget coming from resource revenues. The political economy of resources lies at the center of Putinism's dynamism. The politically dominant class revolves around two phases of rent, the first being rent generation and capture, the second its consumption and distribution.

Gvosdev answered first, pointing to Russia's historical roots. Russia has experienced collapse and restoration during numerous occasions in modern history. Without the financial crisis of 2008, a different discussion might have been possible, but any new attempts were interrupted by the worldwide financial crisis. In the end, Russia needs to decide what to do with the rents that are collected, and one development is the Russian Internet sector. Russia is developing its own Internet companies, as is evident in the fact that Google and Facebook do not have the presence in Russia that they enjoy in other parts of the world. Also, while Russia continues to rely on its energy exports, the world energy market is changing. The leadership needs to be prepared for unstable oil prices and shifting gas contracts.

Korobkov pointed out that Russia is deeply humiliated by the past two decades of economic and political decline. A general support from the population for self-aggrandizement still exists, and because of this, Putin has strong support in terms of foreign policy from the majority of the population. In this regard he is quite democratic. Some changes are taking place in the social structure and the economy, linked together with the rise of the middle class. Another unexpected source of change will be the incoming wave of young students with experiences from abroad.

Russia's future depends much on Putin's leadership in his upcoming term. Nobody disputes that the system was built around Putin. Changes are necessary both economically and politically. Putin stands to continue his own legacy.

Session 6

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 17:30-18:45
Place: Violet/Cosmos

Leadership Transitions in the Two Koreas

Organizing Institution:	Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Scott Snyder, CFR
Panelists:	Victor Cha, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
	Woo Jung-Yeop, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
	Kenneth Gause, CNA
Young Scholars:	Ellen Kim, Center for Strategic and International Studies
	Jens Wardenaer, International Institute for Strategic Studies

Moderator Mr. Scott Snyder began the session by making a few general observations about the leadership changes in South and North Korea. First, he highlighted the fact that, despite the lack of access to information about North Korea, people in South Korea have more certainty about who the next leader will be in the North than they have about the next leader in the South. Second, while there is lots of uncertainty but no anxiety about who the next South Korean leader will be, he pointed out that there is lots of anxiety but less uncertainty associated with the leadership change in Pyongyang. He noted that this reflected a striking difference between the two systems related to their openness, relative institutionalization, and overall stability. Finally, Snyder ended his comments by saying that he hoped that we can project forward in terms of thinking about how these two transition processes will affect the interaction between the two leaders in 2013 as they unfold.

Dr. Woo Jung-Yeop discussed South Korean domestic politics and the parliamentary and presidential elections in 2012. He began by describing the growing importance that South Korean domestic politics holds in the international community. Although in the past South Korea tended to draw international attention only because of the presence of North Korea, South Korea's domestic politics, he noted, has begun to attract international focus since 2002 when Roh Moo-hyun was elected as president.

South Korea has two important elections this year: one is the National Assembly general election recently held on April 11 and the other is the presidential election in December. The unexpected victory of the conservative Saenuri Party (formerly the Grand National Party) in the April general election was a big surprise to most people. Given the unfavorable political climate for the ruling party, many forecasted that the opposition party would have a sweeping victory. Yet, Woo noted the complexities of interpreting the election outcome because the victorious Saenuri Party actually lost seats and the losing party gained

around 40 seats.

The April general election is considered important because of its possible implication for the presidential election in December. Although there are many factors we can consider in analyzing the election outcome, Woo argued that one of the major reasons contributing to Saenuri's victory was down to the failure of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) to exploit its poll lead, as well as Saenuri's swift change of political platform to the center. The DUP moved too far to the left in its coalition with the Unified Progressive Party, and its resulting attacks on former DUP President Roh Moo-hyun's proposed naval base on Jeju Island and the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) created doubts among the South Korean public about whether the DUP was fit to govern.

Mr. Kenneth Gause noted that North Korea's leadership transition has been going on since Kim Jong-Il's stroke in 2008, and picked up speed after Kim Jong-Un was effectively anointed the heir apparent in 2010. Before 2010, analysts generally subscribed to three potential succession scenarios. First, that the designated heir would emerge unchallenged as supreme leader, in a true dynastic succession. Second, that a collective leadership would emerge due to a lack of power and experience on the part of the heir, as well as the fact that the heir would not necessarily command the elites' loyalty in the way his father had. This view came to prominence after Kim Jong-Il's stroke. Third, the lack of a linchpin such as Kim Jong-Il would lead to a fragmented leadership with high potential for internal power struggles due to the fact that he had played competing factions against one another.

The actual succession process was similar to that of Kim Jong-Il's in several respects, and followed the first scenario fairly closely. In the first phase, the successor was secretly chosen within the leadership, something that probably happened in 2007-2008 with Kim Jong-Un. It is believed that this was announced to the general leadership in January 2009. During this period, Kim Jong-Un underwent an education process. The succession process then sped up, and entered its second phase in 2010. Kim Jong-Un was then announced to the world as heir in September, while still in the process of being educated. At this point, reporting lines began to funnel through him, to give him a broader awareness of regime affairs. In the third phase, after his father's death, he began accumulating formal titles such as supreme leader and supreme commander, just as his father did in 1991-1992, and he began taking over more of the day-to-day running of the regime.

When Kim Jong-Il actually died in December 2011, one could get a sense of the internal dynamics by studying attendance and line-ups at the funeral and other public events, as well as promotions. Two major leadership events were held this year: the fourth party conference, and the fifth session of the 12th Supreme People's Assembly, in which Kim Jong-Un assumed the remaining important titles, including the first secretary of the Korean Worker's Party and the first chairman of the National Defense Commission. The former titles—general secretary and chairman, respectively—remained Kim Jong-Il's, but now for eternity. This helped create legitimacy for Kim Jong-Un, who is now the descendant of two "eternal"

leaders. Despite acquiring the trappings of power, it remains to be seen whether Kim Jong-Un has actual power himself, or if he is mainly relying on others. It seems like Kim Jong-Un is currently relying on advisers, including his family, to help make decisions. It is clear that the Kim family, including Jang Song-thaek and Kim Kyong-hui, remains very powerful, and the new leader may indeed have to marginalize them in order to consolidate his own power. Additionally, a large number of people with internal security backgrounds have been promoted.

It is clear that we are faced with a fourth succession scenario, in which Kim Jong-Un has to some degree consolidated his power but still relies on a support network consisting of the extended Kim family. However, a failure to fully consolidate his rule, combined with his inexperience, could lead to concerns over stability both internally in North Korea and on the peninsula as a whole.

Dr. Victor Cha commented on both power transitions, especially highlighting the unpredictability of South Korea's parliamentary elections, in which the conservative Saenuri Party managed to hold on to its majority despite the expected win for the DUP. While the outcome was partly due to scandals, overreaching, and too-high expectations on the part of the DUP, this should not diminish Saenuri's accomplishment. Few had thought that the party would be able to reorganize itself with such success. The major revision of its policies, moving towards the center, contributed greatly to its victory. Cha saw a positive lesson in this—that South Korean politics has become more of a competition of ideas and visions, rather than being decided by regionalism and scandals. The central issue in South Korea is likely to be welfare policies, and South Korean politics is becoming a competition for the middle ground.

The implications of the elections for the alliance with the United States will not be dramatic. With Saenuri's win, talk of renegotiating the KORUS FTA is off the table. The same goes for the presidential elections in December—the personal relationship between presidents Roh Moo-hyun and George W. Bush was a "nightmare," but this did not have long-term implications for the alliance. Certainly, there will be difficult times and a bumpy road ahead for the two countries, but the US-ROK alliance is now so deep and so strong that it will survive and remain stable.

Regarding the change in the North Korean leadership, Cha believes that Kim Jong-Un has acquired control of the country and is not a mere figurehead despite his inexperience. North Korea's political culture, in which only one person makes important decisions, will help him in this regard, and may even prevent internal power struggles. However, it is still unclear how the country is actually run. Over the years, a limited understanding of how Kim Jong-Il operated internationally, including how he responded to threats, was built up. With Pyongyang reneging on the "Leap Day Agreement" and conducting a missile launch, the theory that North Korea does not undertake provocations whilst in dialogue with the United States needs to be reconsidered. From an international perspective, there is therefore increased uncertainty about North Korea, as the nature of the regime and its internal dynamics have changed. This has exacerbated the difficulty of diplomacy with Pyongyang. The question of how resilient the new

regime turns out to be will depend on whether it can deliver policy successes for its different constituents. If we see a succession of mistakes, of which the failed missile launch was the first, we are likely to see fissures beginning to emerge.

The question-and-answer session addressed the upcoming presidential election in South Korea, which, according to Woo, is likely to revolve around the issues of welfare policy and the KORUS FTA. However, personalities may also play a part—Saenuri's Park Geun-hye is popular and has distanced herself from President Lee Myung-bak, but the opposition may attack her character if they fail to come up with popular policies. Another topic was the North Korean succession. Gause said that it had gone smoothly but there had been a few signs of cracks, and provocations may still occur if Pyongyang deems it domestically profitable. Cha commented that the South will respond harder to the next provocation from the North, and that China may no longer be the answer to dealing with Pyongyang, due to its lack of influence there. During this session, the panelists discussed the current leadership changes in South and North Korea, and their consequences for international politics and for the inter-Korean relationship. There was a consensus that the outcomes of both transitions are uncertain: in the North, this uncertainty relates to Kim Jong-Un's degree of control and the potential for instability, while in the South, it relates to the unpredictability of domestic politics and what will be the new focus for debate.

Plenary Session III

Date: April 26, 2012
Time: 20:30-21:45
Place: Grand Ballroom

A New Era of Mass Politics? Leadership, Populism and Information

Organizing Institution:	The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Moderator:	Martin Fackler, The New York Times
Panelists:	Uzi Rabi, Moshe Dayan Center
	Clement Henry, American University in Cairo
	Hahm Chaibong, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
	David Brady, Hoover Institution
	Jon Clifton, Gallup
Young Scholars:	Ardie Ermac, Korea University
	Seukhoon Paul Choi, Council on Foreign Relations

"Are we entering a new era of mass politics?" asked moderator Mr. Martin Fackler. There is a perception and perhaps a consensus that the world is suffering from a leadership deficit. There is a leadership crisis in the United States, the European Union, Japan, South Korea, and even in non-democratic societies such as China and North Korea. Additionally, politics and the way it is practiced is changing. Both a new grassroots politics and a sense of populism are appearing. This is observed in campaigns that range from those of President Barack Obama in the United States to President Roh Moo-hyun in South Korea. There is also an emergence of insurgency campaigns, with grassroots mobilization in almost Bastille-like assaults on the established government and bureaucracy, such as the Tea Party movement. Information and technology—the Internet, cell phones, and social media—all comprise yet another interesting change in the way politics is carried out. This was evident in Twitter's role in the Arab Spring where organizers used social media to overthrow dictators. Building upon these developments, the members of the panel analyzed how these changes reflect an era that offers new hope and new frustrations.

Professor Uzi Rabi argued that the Middle East has experienced a tumultuous change. A byproduct of leadership crises, the region is at the threshold of a new political system and culture. Dictators—stubborn autocrats—have been toppled. In the 20th Century, the "one-man shows" of Mubarak, Hussein, and Gaddafi defined the Arab Middle East. In 2011, however, the barrier of fear collapsed. Though this was not the first instance of Arabs around the region protesting, the difference was that they succeeded. New insights and tools must now be built to better understand the realities of the 21st-Century Middle East.

The Arab awakening should be identified with psychological change. Fear is no longer a paralyzing

challenge, and this new psychological condition will remain. Thus, whether in Egypt, Yemen, Libya, or Tunisia, future leaders will need to advance a different agenda that corresponds to public demands.

In addition, regimes akin to Gaddafi's can no longer exist. The toppling of dictators has opened the public sphere to allow various persons and movements of different orientation to emerge, essentially creating a more diversified political system. Ultimately, public discourse and political systems will be more convoluted.

Regional geopolitics has also changed. Countries need to determine what role the new Egypt will play in their foreign policy toward the region. Furthermore, it is not known what Israel will do. In addition, the non-Arab players—Iran and Turkey—are stronger than ever before. The regional youth are more influential. Twitter and Facebook will continue to be present. Leaders who desire to continue their political careers will have to put emphasis on socio-economic performance, lest they will be faced with protesting crowds in public squares.

Dr. Clement Henry agreed that a fundamental change has been occurring in the Middle East, but said that whether this constitutes a fundamental structural change is still uncertain. Discourse such as in the book *Politics of Social Change* has in the past discussed a new middle class that would uproot old traditional social politics and transform the region. And recalling the question of whether the events in Cairo on January 25 were a revolution or a democratic transition, it seems now that they were the former. It is true that Tunisia experienced a successful democratic transition, and it was this change that began the series of toppling dictators. It is also true that the barrier of fear has been broken. But the questions remain. What was the real impact of these changes? How far do these changes go? Is there really a fundamental structural change in the Middle East? Is there a global phenomenon that is threatening all authoritarian regimes? While the Jasmine Revolution occurred in the Middle East, the word "jasmine" was censored from the Chinese Internet. Even the Middle East's "awakenings" have had mixed results. In fact, one such awakening—that in Bahrain—seriously embarrassed the United States, as the latter has not been willing to provide any support. Even the Al Jazeera network was blackmailed not to report events there out of consideration for neighboring Saudi Arabia, oil, and other strategic interests in the region. Thus, it is difficult to argue that these changes have reverberated and created a universal phenomenon.

One universal and truly new change, however, is the way in which technology altered media from a vertical to a horizontal nature. Whereas old-fashioned media in the 1960s, such as radio and television, was hierarchical, new media platforms like Facebook, blogs, and Twitter are more level. Despite regimes also using social media as a tool to identify challengers to their power and neutralize them, a balance has been tipped that now enables the mass public to disperse information, mobilize, and even create transnational associations.

Moreover, because of new technology, there exist new methods that render greater transparency. And

while some societies apply this critical capacity more than others, the tools that now exist shift the balance of power from leaders to the general public. In Egypt, decision makers today know well that if they act in ways that anger the masses—for example, if they nominate a former leader in the Mubarak government as a presidential candidate—such action will elicit crowds in Tahrir Square. This is because society now has a mobilization capacity, even when it is a divided public. The tools for greater information flow and mass politics allow the Egyptian society to act as a united front to make its point heard despite being composed of two different types of Muslims and a group of liberals.

Dr. Hahm Chaibong recognized that social media has allowed for the masses to be mobilized in the absence of leadership. In South Korea during the anti-US beef protests, people took to the streets without a demagogue, populist leader, strongman, or even a seasoned student activist.

Despite society's ability to mobilize without a leader, people in South Korea still desire one. While the ROK experienced democratic transition and no longer has a strongman, an alternative leadership model is yet to be established. Rather, South Koreans still cling to the old model. They still desire a strongman. They desire a democratic process to elect their leader, but then want that leader to wield significant power. There still exists the pomp and circumstance of the past. This tie to the past is best observed in the leading candidate for the next ROK presidency, Park Geun-hye. The daughter of former strongman Park Chung-hee, she inspires an incredible nostalgia in the South Korean public.

The next difficulty with this new information technology is that, while it is a tool for social mobilization, how it can be used to mobilize and organize people in a desired way is still unknown. In South Korea, for example, a famous Internet radio show host was drafted by the opposition party to be a candidate for a seat in the National Assembly in the hopes that his popularity among younger voters might aid the party in the election. However, a decade-old recording surfaced, in which this host made remarks that were extremely politically incorrect, and criticism of this candidate dominated social media. When the party lost in the election, analysts believed that this candidate played a significant role in its defeat. However, contrary to popular belief, post-election polls revealed that this was not the case. Ultimately, this demonstrated that while people are fascinated by social media and its contents, it does not mobilize people in the way that is assumed.

Ultimately, democratic transition and technology are the answers to several information issues, but they do not resolve the issue of the leadership type that people desire and that is most effective.

Dr. David Brady further substantiated social media's influence in mass politics by highlighting not only its creative potential, but also its many limitations. As illustrated by the protests against the South Korea-US Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) and the recent Arab uprising, social media formats have been influential in overcoming the challenges of organizing and coordinating by efficiently providing people with instant information. Social media connects people who are like-minded, not just in terms of protests but also in terms of interests. In the 2008 US presidential election, the Obama campaign successfully used the pervasiveness of social media to coordinate fundraising events and generate support. Essentially, social media has provided avenues for individuals to participate in politics, as demonstrated by the growing demand for more transparency and accountability from their governments.

Regarding social media's limitations, Brady first questioned the extent of social media's influence in helping protesters, interest groups, or governments in reaching effective solutions to issues that concern them. In the anti-KORUS FTA protests in Seoul, for instance, he argued that bringing people together through the use of social media is relatively easy, but the bigger challenge for these South Korean protesters is finding an alternative to the FTA. Second, while recognizing the remarkable increase of materials easily made available online, he cautioned everyone against dubious information, arguing that editors and the practice of fact checking are not necessarily in place in these media.

Building upon the theme of the conference, Mr. Jon Clifton outlined what his organization recommends that leaders follow in terms of mass politics and information: to focus on their people's well-being.

Clifton began by looking into the Arab Spring, particularly the cases of Egypt and Tunisia. He described how the gross domestic product (GDP) and the Human Development Index in both countries for the past five years had shown consistent improvement until 2010. What transpired recently, however, runs counter to the common assumption that GDP growth brings with it improvement of people's well-being. He

argued that using existing metrics and economic measures to appraise political or societal health would offer little explanation as to what came about in the Arab Spring. Instead, Gallup offers much more comprehensive metrics to assess well-being by looking into how people evaluate their lives and how they experience life. Gallup did this by qualifying people's daily experience by asking them whether they have experienced happiness, sadness, or physical pain throughout the day—five of those questions make up what Gallup calls the "negative experience." Interestingly enough, the number-one country in the world in 2010 in terms of negative experience was Bahrain, a country characterized by high GDP per capita.

According to Clifton, Gallup does not have predictive analytics, but indicators that transcend existing economic measures. Thus, for leaders, Clifton remarked, "one of the things that ... [leaders] really need to be building in is a proper understanding of the real human condition […] because money and GDP do not necessarily buy you that higher well-being."

A large portion of the question-and-answer period remained primarily focused on the issue of leadership. In this era of new technologies and mass populism, is strong leadership possible? What should leadership be like? Maintaining that strong leadership is important, Hahm and Rabi both agreed that the more important question should be about what kind of leadership is needed. From a South Korean perspective, Hahm argued that the South Korean people desire a strong leader who could improve their well-being. He made his case by citing the current government as an example. He described how President Lee wooed the South Korean electorate with a promise of massive engineering projects as a response to their demand for economic growth. On the other hand, Rabi reflected on his experience and argued that there is a growing sentiment in the Arab world for a leader who can bring about economic improvement while maintaining a certain degree of independence from external actors such as the United States and Israel. He articulated that the current leaders should use the momentum of the Arab uprising to commence what he calls a "creative and bold initiative" that promotes regional stability.

In sum, the session fundamentally established the inherent relationship between technology, populism, and leadership, where the discussions centered on three points. One is that we are in a new era of mass politics where technology and the various forms of social media play integral roles in mobilizing the general participation. Second is that this new era has presented both challenges and opportunities for leaders all over the world: on one hand, leaders could utilize these new technologies and the social media to govern effectively and on the other, the same technological forces have rendered governments more transparent. Third, drawing lessons from the Arab Spring and from Gallup's recommendations, there is a consensus that current and future leaders should pay special attention to public demands.

Day 3

April 27, 2012

Session 7

The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and Beyond

Northeast Asian Security Architecture

Trade and Security Linkages

Russia's Leadership Transition and Its Implications in East Asia

Plenary Session IV

"Take Me to Your Leader": Searching for Leadership in a Time of Crisis

Session 7

Date: April 27, 2012
Time: 9:30-10:45
Place: Orchid

The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit and Beyond

Organizing Institution:	Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Jun Bong-Geun, KNDA
Panelists:	Han Yong-Sup, Korea National Defense University
	Kenneth Luongo, Partnership for Global Security
	Corey Hinderstein, Nuclear Threat Initiative
	Hahn Choong-hee, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ROK
Young Scholars:	Sung-Yeon Melissa Kweon, Korea University
	Sunkyo Hong, Korea University

During this session, panelists mainly discussed the achievements of the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit and focused on setting a possible agenda for the further development of the global nuclear security regime.

Dr. Hahn Choong-Hee who played an important role as a Sous-Sherpa for the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, opened the session with congratulatory remarks on the successful results of the summit. Strong momentum carried throughout the 2012 summit, which followed the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC. The South Korean government took a very serious approach to dealing with the nuclear security issue. With more than 50 countries participating, the summit tried to achieve the largest common denominator and aimed to tell the world that it was not just a ceremonial gathering.

The 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit achieved important results, which can be categorized into the three pillars of the Seoul Communiqué. The first pillar is the successful achievement of all national commitments. Around 49 countries reported their achievements in national progress reports. The second pillar is about the individual national basis. During the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, around 100 specific commitments were agreed upon by almost all countries. There was an additional set of achievements, dubbed the “collective gift basket,” on which like-minded countries collaborated to act on specific issues, such as information security and counter-smuggling. The last pillar of the Seoul Communiqué is a set of 11 specific tasks that come with specific action plans, such as the minimization of highly enriched uranium and the conversion of highly enriched uranium-based reactors to low enriched uranium.

Hahn also mentioned the importance of protecting radioactive sources, increasing synergy between security and safety issues, and also securing spent fuel as well as nuclear waste. For the next Nuclear

Security Summit, he emphasized the need to recognize the increasing number of standards and review mechanisms in the international society, pointing out that this is an emerging issue. He stressed that it is necessary to work on these areas continuously to achieve an international standard and review mechanism.

Dr. Han Yong-Sup who recently participated in the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit as an advisory member of the Republic of Korea's Preparation Committee mainly focused on discussing South Korea's role and contributions to the Nuclear Security Summit. He stated that the country played an important role as an honest broker and facilitator for the nuclear security agenda of a globalizing world. As Hahn had mentioned earlier, he also agreed that the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was a success, as it hosted more countries and international organizations, including INTERPOL, than the 2010 Washington Summit.

South Korea was creative in promoting awareness of the Nuclear Security Summit and its importance, and made commitments through multilateral cooperation. Compared to the first Nuclear Security Summit, the second Nuclear Security Summit produced commitments at a multilateral level instead of at the level of individual countries, and more items were added to the agenda, including the interface between nuclear security, safety, and radiological security.

Han argued that the government successfully educated and persuaded the public to focus on the Nuclear Security Summit itself rather than on the North Korean nuclear issue. Han noted the involvement of relevant stakeholders in various events held on the sidelines of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit, such as a Nuclear Security Summit essay contest for middle and high school students, the Model Nuclear Security Summit, and several seminars and conferences.

He also stated that the importance and relevance of the Nuclear Security Summit should not be diluted by other political matters. Moreover, it is time to consider both the demand and supply sides of nuclear security, where demand stems from nuclear weapons-seeking terrorists. This is an area that requires continuous attention and systematic efforts in order to be effective.

Ms. Corey Hinderstein began her speech by making a few comments on the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. She stated that the summit was more successful than it was given credit for there were quite a lot of commitments and much progress made, such as in highly enriched uranium fuels development, transportation security, and promises to remove plutonium from countries including Italy, Belgium, and Sweden. Highly enriched uranium removals were also either promised or announced by countries like Japan, Italy, Belgium, Canada, Israel, and Mexico, among other nations.

Hinderstein pointed out that these were very real and practical threat reduction activities, which would not have happened without the Nuclear Security Summit. However, she also pointed out some of the weaknesses exposed in the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit process, saying, "Bodies do not fail. These processes are only as successful as the political will of their members." Through this statement,

she emphasized the importance and relevance of each member country's will to create a set of agreed principles and priorities on nuclear security issues. She suggested that existing obstacles to common principles and priorities could be overcome by employing creative methods. One example at the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was the introduction of the "gift basket."

Also, she went further to discuss three ways to realistically improve the Nuclear Security Summit between now and 2014. First, she said that it is necessary to revisit the definition of nuclear security and the scope of the process. She argued that by focusing on nuclear facilities, our definition of nuclear security could be broadened to include the diversion of nuclear material, the culture of nuclear security, political and systemic corruption in nuclear security issues, and sabotage. Another way to improve the summit would be to recognize the growing need for interaction among governments, experts, relevant industries, and scientific communities for the successful implementation of the nuclear security agenda. From that perspective, the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was a milestone event. Especially, successful in that regard were the side events, including the Nuclear Industry Summit and the Nuclear Security Symposium. These kinds of summits and symposiums should be continued in the future, while more interaction and attention are required for the sustainable development of nuclear security issues. The third point Hinderstein raised was the need to pay more attention to centers of excellence in figuring out their mission and future plans through better transparency, public education, and building states' own capacities for dealing with nuclear security issues.

Moderator Dr. Jun Bong-Geun asked Hinderstein about the future plan for updating the Nuclear Threat Initiative's Nuclear Materials Security Index report and using the report for furthering the cause of nuclear security. Hinderstein answered that every two years there will be a newly published Nuclear Materials Security Index report, and also the purpose of this is to help achieve global agreement on actual nuclear

security issues and prioritize them regardless of rankings and figures for fostering discussions.

Mr. Kenneth Luongo spoke about global nuclear security governance and gave an assessment of the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. Luongo mentioned that the summit opened up the scope of nuclear security to include the safety-and-security interface and radiological issues, while also giving a new definition to nuclear security. However, he pointed out that the agenda did not include a discussion of what the nuclear security regime is or what it should be. He strongly emphasized the importance of this issue and the need to develop it at the 2014 Netherlands Nuclear Security Summit. the said that the problem with nuclear security governance at the moment is an underdevelopment of the concept itself, adding that the reasons include a national focus, a mechanism that is voluntary, and a lack of transparency.

Luongo quoted the words of the director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the United Nations Secretary General, saying nuclear crises do not respect borders. A cause for concern is that global society does not have an established system for dealing with nuclear security issues across borders.

To solve such problems, he argued that it is important to balance sovereignty and global responsibility by conducting regular peer reviews of security and transnational transparency, and promoting interaction between regulators and security system operators at facilities. A uniform standard would be required as well. Due to the absence of uniformity, individual countries currently operate differently under the recommendations of the IAEA and their regulators. This is also directly linked to the issue of transparency, he said.

He also stated that all the barriers are political rather than technical. A sense of collaboration, not competition, within global society is therefore essential to achieve the goal of a nuclear security regime: building international confidence.

He suggested three pillars for a new architecture of nuclear security. The first pillar would be promoting transparency by adopting what already exists in the nuclear safety regime, encouraging the sharing of information, and also guaranteeing the safety of sensitive information. The second pillar would be an increase in cohesion and standards. He said that this could be achieved by fixing the nuclear security regime in a framework agreement. The last pillar would be building international confidence and global responsibility. For this, it would be necessary to keep working on what nuclear security is doing at present, such as universalizing international conventions, conducting evaluations, and looking at nuclear safety for aspects applicable to the security area, as well as focusing on the centers of excellence to see how they can be unified. However, Luongo pointed out that, from the perspective of the expert community process, the role of the experts in nuclear security has to be bigger and farther reaching on setting out an agenda and identifying recommendations than the nuclear safety regime for governments.

The issue of governance was addressed during the question-and-answer session in which Hahn commented that the concept of governance was one of the core areas that the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit focused on from the beginning. However, some countries define the idea in a very different way, so it was difficult to address it during the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit. However it is obvious that the concept of governance needs to be developed in a more objective and neutral way. The idea does not only mean either structural or management issues; for the further development of governance there is a need to put these separate ideas together.

In conclusion, all panelists agreed that the 2012 Seoul Nuclear Security Summit was a success and achieved a substantial amount of progress. The summit also offered an opportunity to make progress on a large scale, which otherwise would not have been possible due to the sensitivity of security issues and the current nuclear security regime.

Session 7

Date: April 27, 2012
Time: 9:30-10:45
Place: Lilac/Tulip

Northeast Asian Security Architecture

Organizing Institution:	Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Patrick Cronin, CNAS
Panelists:	Randall G. Schriver, Armitage International
	Soeya Yoshihide, Keio University
	Wang Dong, Peking University
	Leif-Eric Easley, The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Young Scholars:	Stephanie Nayoung Kang, Seoul National University
	Daniel Katz, Center for a New American Security

The absence of an institutionalized Northeast Asian security architecture raises important questions as to how Northeast Asian countries can cooperate in areas of security that come with numerous contentious issues that persist in the region. Moderator Dr. Patrick Cronin began the panel by addressing the complex nature of security in Northeast Asia. He stated that the question of architecture forces us to "draw boundaries around a region that is connected globally," and compels us to focus on security matters even though these are related to economic and other international issues. The four panelists offered their varying opinions on the contours of a potential security architecture for the region and the motivations for its development.

Mr. Randall Schriver argued that an enduring and effective framework for a Northeast Asian security architecture has not been fully established. Efforts to create a regional institution to address historical animosities have met with further challenges of competition, territorial disputes, and sovereignty issues. Under the current Six-Party Talks framework, multilateral security approaches are mainly ad hoc and attempt to address difficult problems that are beyond the six countries' capacities to resolve them in the near future—particularly the denuclearization of North Korea. Such regional security efforts have also raised issues for addressing sovereignty debates in a multilateral framework and balancing the goals and interests of the United States and China.

In light of the challenges facing the building of a viable security architecture in Northeast Asia, Schriver outlined some of the potential options that can "strengthen, create [and] empower current multilateral efforts." Ad hoc approaches can be used via trial-and-error in localized contexts and then applied regionally if they prove to be effective. Additionally, the Six-Party Talks and other regional institutions should

approach “low hanging fruit,” such as energy security, that are easier to address, rather than the more contentious issues that the Six-Party Talks have yet to resolve. Lastly, Schriver offered his opinion on the US role in Northeast Asia and the importance of maintaining the current US-led system. He asserted that creating new organizations is both unproductive and burdensome for the United States. The United States cannot afford to sacrifice existing structures—such as its bilateral alliance system—in order to invest in new institutions that may prove risky. The United States can benefit more from supplementing its current bilateral system with “minilateral” efforts among select countries. As Cronin commented, US bilateral alliances may be compatible with rather than mutually exclusive to a multilateral security structure.

Professor Soeya Yoshihide provided a different picture of how the perspectives and strategies of East Asian countries could help structure regional security architecture. First, he indicated that two trends are evolving simultaneously in the Pacific region, both of which involve the rise of China as a driving force. The end of the Cold War era led many to assume that the age of traditional security issues had come to an end and nontraditional security issues would take precedence. The transition towards nontraditional security issues has led to a broader array of multilateral initiatives in the Asia-Pacific region, as seen by the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum. Yet the centrality of traditional security issues still persists. Territorial disputes and conflicts in the South China Sea are prevalent in the region. Internal developments within China are influencing the nature and evolution of traditional and nontraditional security in East Asia.

Second, Soeya raised the question of whether the rise of China was inevitable or not. Although it is a debatable point, he asserted that, from the perspective of Japan and most East Asian countries, China’s rise is merely a return to normalcy. Current public debates that focus on the Japan-China strategic competition are unrealistic and reveal gaps between what Japanese officials claim they want and what they can realistically pursue. China as a central power in Northeast Asia is both an expected phenomenon and a factor of concern. Even if a Chinese-centered security community is the predicted norm in East Asia, an alternative view may suggest that a regional order conceptualized and initiated by other East Asian countries (not China) is also a real possibility. A multilaterally structured regional order should not exclude or antagonize China; rather, it should incorporate it. In order to move towards this regional order of incorporation, Soeya advised Japan to state its acceptance of China’s role in the region clearly and explicitly and to hold joint talks with key players, such as the United States, on their roles as major powers and US-China strategic relations.

Despite the emphasis placed on a China-centered architecture, Japan’s alliance with the United States and its relations with middle powers will have broad implications for traditional and nontraditional security issues. Japan still views the United States as a necessary security anchor in the area of traditional security concerns. Japan’s strategic focus should therefore be equally distributed between its alliance with the United States and its commitment to a regional structure that coexists with China. Although Soeya stated that middle powers—Japan, South Korea, and Australia—are outside the domain of great-

power politics, he indicated that cooperation among middle powers is important for addressing nontraditional security challenges. Traditionally, Japan's security policies were divided into three levels of security: international (UN peacekeeping operations), bilateral (alliance with the United States), and domestic (self-defense). Yet a fourth layer has been added that emphasizes the importance of regional security cooperation with Japan's neighboring countries. Soeya concluded by stating that a move towards a postmodern world may usher in more opportunities for regional cooperation as historical and territorial issues become meaningless in the long-term and countries learn to embrace China.

Professor Wang Dong offered analysis on the absence of a regional security architecture and the important role that US-China relations have in the construction of such a multilateral order. He stated that four factors have contributed to the lack of architecture: North Korea, territorial disputes, rising nationalism, and the United States' return to Asia. First, the DPRK acts as a "spoiler" to security cooperation because it creates regional tension and instability. In particular, strategic differences between the United States and China vis-à-vis the DPRK have increased strategic distrust and intensified security dilemmas. A dangerous zero-sum game may emerge with China supporting North Korea on the one hand and the United States and its allies opposed to DPRK actions on the other. Policy makers had initially hoped for the institutionalization of the Six-Party Talks in a multilateral framework, but the DPRK's recent provocations have increased pessimism.

Wang's second factor for the lack of regional architecture is territorial disputes related to domestic politics. The third factor, rising nationalism, is also a major impediment to security cooperation. Wang mentioned the diplomatic crisis between China and Japan over the capture of a Chinese fisherman as an example of how rising nationalism—where the public desires assertive foreign policy—can impede peaceful coordination. Lastly, the United States' return to Asia increases strategic distrust between the United States and China because Chinese policymakers perceive US reengagement as a policy of containment. The US-led alliance system is incompatible with a multilateral security architecture. The bilateral and hierarchical nature of the US alliance system must be replaced by a multilateral security framework. Wang suggested that this can be done through consultative efforts between the United States, China, Japan, and South Korea that focus on removing mutual suspicion and building trust. The DPRK must

also change from a revisionist state into a normal state that seeks legitimacy rather than nuclear weapons in order to ensure stability within a regional architecture.

Professor Leif-Eric Easley further emphasized the important role of trust-building in creating a security architecture in a region fraught with uncertainty and historical animosities. The main source of distrust is North Korea. The lack of a shared strategic vision towards North Korea hinders the development of a regional security structure and increases distrust amongst neighbors in Northeast Asia. The United States and South Korea blame China for not being a responsible player in dealing with North Korean provocations and the nuclear issue. China, on the other hand, is concerned about the possibility of a unified Korean Peninsula under the influence of the United States on its border. Additionally, South Korea does not trust Japan to support Korean unification. In light of these issues of distrust, Easley raised the following question: is the resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue a necessary or sufficient condition for achieving security architecture in Northeast Asia? His answer is that it may not be sufficient to overcome institutional and domestic challenges, but resolving the North Korea issue may be necessary to allow a security architecture to move forward.

Easley pointed out that North Korea is not the only impediment to trust-building in Northeast Asia. Trust and security architecture function within a chicken-and-egg paradox of needing one before the other. Moreover, merely talking about trust falls short of actually building trust. Discussing trust is often an excuse to avoid specific details and to pursue national interests without considering their regional implications. A “critical juncture” or regional crisis on the order of the collapse of North Korea will likely be necessary to bring countries in Northeast Asia together despite their differences and mistrust of one another. If some foundation of trust can be achieved before the crisis, it can lower the costs and dangers of the crisis and increase the odds of building a new and effective security architecture with converging interests.

Finally, Easley suggested practical solutions to encourage the construction of a Northeast Asian security architecture. In terms of leadership, shared regional decision-making will have an important function in shaping national strategies into regional visions. Progress made in non-security areas, through the trilateral “plus 3” mechanism, can have positive spillover effects for security cooperation. Additionally, institutions should increase their capacity to address transnational issues while also retaining the ability to restrain provocation and the use of force. Burden sharing and resource allocation will be increasingly important due to recent financial crises and budget cuts. Easley concluded that issues of trust and mutual understanding should be at the forefront of both foreign and domestic policies.

During the question-and-answer period, attendees challenged the arguments of the presenters. One audience member suggested that countries involved in the region should instead engage in serious discussion about the hardest issues first. Tackling these issues would compel bureaucracies to articulate explicitly their national anxieties, directions, and goals. Easley responded that transparency of national goals and

intentions will be required to forge trust. Although progress has been made, he stressed that additional work remains for regional actors in taking ownership of and following up on promised initiatives. Wang agreed with Easley that ownership of an idea on regional architecture is important, but pointed out that a zero-sum conception of power will infuse proposals with a power-politics motive in the eyes of other countries in the region. Another attendee questioned what kind of crisis would be able to spur real cooperation given North Korean nuclear tests and the March 2011 Fukushima disaster. Soeya concurred with the belief that North Korean collapse would constitute a critical juncture and incentive to cooperate. Building on previous comments on ownership, Soeya said that ownership should evolve into joint ownership and an inclusion forum that would ultimately lead to regional stability.

There was a general consensus among the participants about the desirability of doubled efforts to build a regional security architecture, but panelists differed in their recommendations on the ways and means of achieving that objective. Given the array of security challenges in Northeast Asia, governments will need to make progress on different bases for cooperation despite areas of disagreement.

Session 7

Date: April 27, 2012
Time: 9:30-10:45
Place: Grand Ballroom

Trade and Security Linkages

Organizing Institution:	American Enterprise Institute (AEI)
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Claude Barfield, AEI
Panelists:	Ahn Dukgeun, Seoul National University
	Xiong Lili, University of International Business & Economics
	John Park, United States Institute of Peace (USIP)
	Lee Jung-Hoon, Yonsei University
Young Scholars:	Matthew Jensen, American Enterprise Institute
	Kim Kyungtae, Seoul National University

Trade policy is an economic issue just as trade itself is an economic phenomenon. But in the modern era, trade policy and security are inextricably linked, for trade policy interacts with political and security goals. Dr. Claude Barfield, a trade economist and moderator of this panel, began by stressing the fact that, today, trade is as much a strategic decision as an economic one. The United States' first bilateral trade agreement of the modern era, for example, was with Israel, a country of limited economic importance at the time, but of significant strategic importance.

Examples of more recent security-motivated trade policies abound. The Bush administration explicitly listed strategic goals in trade agreements. The Obama administration, has moved to foster transpacific arrangements largely as a result of strategic considerations. It is now playing a leading role in negotiations over the Trans-Pacific Strategic Economic Partnership (TPP), realizing that trade agreements may be the best way to recover US political influence in the Asia-Pacific region.

Barfield concluded his introductory remarks by stressing that the link between trade and security is unavoidable. It is becoming more so as the focus of the economic integration moves from multilateral engagements like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) or the World Trade Organization (WTO) system to regional and bilateral trade agreements. While some trade economists might see security motivations as "polluting" the economic discourse and hindering the implementation of optimal trade policy, Barfield argued that economists must accept the reality and attempt to understand trade through a strategic lens as well as an economic one.

Dr. Ahn Dukgeun, a professor of trade law and policy, provided a discussion of the legal aspects of the

trade-security nexus. When the GATT was designed, member countries' rights to take restrictive trade measures to protect their essential security interests were incorporated into Article 21. This reflected the fact that trade measures have traditionally been important and influential tools in dealing with security concerns. However, Ahn stressed that it is difficult to coordinate between member countries' rights to take action for security interests and multilateral trade agreements.

During the GATT period, there were several cases of conflicts where a country unilaterally imposed trade sanctions to address security problems. However, after the establishment of the WTO in 1995, it became much more difficult to utilize trade measures for security objectives. Even as the WTO dealt with complaints relating to security-related sanctions in the 1990s, it did not provide a specific guideline to address the issue based on Article 21.

While Article 21 of the GATT still applies under the WTO regime, the conditions to invoke the article are ambiguous and it is unclear which entity has jurisdiction. Member nations can utilize the clause if the nation itself claims an essential security issue, but the WTO has not provided guidance as to how Article 21 will be interpreted. It is still controversial whether the dispute settlement body of the WTO has jurisdiction in the case of a dispute.

Ahn advanced the position that the UN Security Council should coordinate with the WTO when nations attempt to enact sanctions. In any particular situation, if the UN Security Council makes a definitive judgment regarding Article 21, the WTO will follow. When the Security Council fails to do so, uncertainty and controversy ensue.

Beyond the uncertain legal position to which sanctions expose a sanctioning nation, wielding trade policy for security purposes can cause unintended consequences. Dr. John Park noted that when one country creates sanctions, other countries may fill the vacuum. In this way, coalitions can coalesce around sanctioned countries. Although Park did not elaborate on this point, he offered Iran as a current example.

Dr. Xiong Lili shifted away from the discussion of sanctions and presented an optimist's perspective on the TPP, discussing the security and economic benefits that might stem from its wider adoption. Xiong focused on three of these benefits, the first of which is that more economic openness would enhance development in Southeast Asia. Openness and development could, in turn, strengthen connections between Southeast Asia and China as well as between Southeast Asia and the United States, thereby creating an economic bridge. Secondly, the TPP would provide a model for consolidating current free trade agreements (FTAs) in the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, far too many overlap, forming an entangled "noodle bowl" that is costly for firms to navigate. Finally, the TPP would level the playing field for US exports to Asian markets and might contribute to fixing its trade imbalances with Asian countries, specifically with China.

Despite the many projected benefits, one area in which the TPP will likely have little effect is trade relations between China and ASEAN countries. Most ASEAN countries, including those that have territorial disputes with China, are already highly reliant on China's economy. In this area, FTAs between China and ASEAN nations will be more influential than the TPP. However, parallel improvement of the TPP and China's FTAs with many other Asian countries would grant mutual benefit to both sides of the Pacific. If the TPP can even evolve into an FTA for the whole Asia-Pacific region, then major economies, including China, the United States, South Korea, and Japan, can all benefit. These benefits might not accrue for 10, 25, or an even greater number of years, but Xiong stressed that the possibility of delayed results should not discourage action.

In his main remarks, Park focused on the Obama administration's rebalancing strategy towards Asia, for which trade and security can be regarded as two interrelated pillars. The primary reason for the rebalancing, Park contended, is concern in the United States that military confrontation with the People's Liberation Army is growing while the US defense budget is facing cuts. Given that context, many US leaders think a greater share of resources should be focused on Asia. Moreover, the rebalancing to Asia is seen by some as an opportunity to rally the American public after exhausting engagements in the Middle East.

Regional dynamics, according to Park, are also being considered as the United States decides how to rebalance—particularly the tendency for countries to coalesce around economic as well as military might. In Southeast Asia, for example, it is difficult to reconcile the high-level economic interdependence between the countries in the region and the headline-grabbing joint military exercises and territorial/maritime boundary disputes, especially in the South China Sea. The US "pivot" can be thought of as including not only a military shift, but also the development of trading relationships in the region.

There are also enormous challenges ahead, no matter how the United States rebalances. The Asia-Pacific region is evolving extremely rapidly, and the United States will need to constantly recalibrate and update its strategy. Park recognized that this will be a complicated process at every step with the United States

needing to decide whether to be reactive or proactive militarily, and what sorts of mechanisms—bilateral or multilateral—should be pursued on the trade front.

Dr. Lee Jong-Hoon, an expert in international security, first introduced the conventional logic that there is a positive correlation between trade relations and the security situation. Moreover, he explained that causation flows in both directions: more peaceable relations lead to more trade, and likewise, trade discourages discord. However, Lee went on to describe how, in some regards, this logic does not apply to the Asia-Pacific region. Currently, the security relationship between China and the United States seems to be deteriorating. The Obama administration sold multi-billion-dollar arms to Taiwan and is pursuing the rebalancing strategy along with military buildup in Australia. China is increasing its military might rapidly, particularly in the ever-important South China Sea. The administration is also making an effort to strengthen its military ties with Pakistan. All of these signal that Sino-US security relations are souring. Nevertheless, there is also growing economic interdependence between China and the United States and vibrancy in the region.

Lee attributed the uncertain relationship between trade and security in the Asia-Pacific region to the fact that there is no automatic loyalty from satellite states as there was for the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. Today, neither China nor the United States can expect such loyalty from their regional partners, which means that today's so-called G2 have to endeavor to win favors from countries that might support them. One tool for that objective is trade policy. As the security situation deteriorates, it is likely that China and the United States will continue to compete for economic alliances in the Asia-Pacific region.

Besides the Sino-US relations, Lee elaborated on the internal circumstances in Asia, especially among the Northeast Asian countries. There are many political and diplomatic tensions within the region relating to historical events and current conflicts over issues such as fishing rights and policy towards North Korea. Many of the efforts to overcome these conflicts and insecurities are founded on economic cooperation, including the discussion of a China-Japan-Korea FTA and the creation of the Boao Forum for Asia, a regional version of the Davos Forum.

Lee only presented a contrary view regarding one direction of causality in the traditional logic: he argued that a poorer security environment might enhance rather than detract from trade. It is worth noting that he did not present any evidence to counter the logic that more trade might enhance security, or at least fend off war. Indeed, Barfield later noted that international trade played an enormous role in European economies immediately preceding World War I.

Other scholars, however, such as the authors of the recent RAND Corporation paper "Conflict with China," have argued that today's economic interdependence is a powerful deterrent. At no point in history has freedom of movement or international communication been as easy as they are today, and at no other

time in history were economies, particularly the financial sectors, so interconnected. According to the RAND study, “this mutual dependency can be an immensely powerful deterrent, in effect a form of mutually assured economic destruction.”

As the US “pivot” to the Asia-Pacific region brings it in closer contact with China, it is likely that trade and security issues will grow in importance. Policy makers who think about trade and security as two interwoven policy areas will need to weigh the economic benefits and security benefits of broad-based free trade against the benefits of being able to use trade policy as a stick or carrot in specific situations.

Yet the security benefits of trade are not yet agreed upon, as is evidenced by the differing positions on this topic held by Barfield and the RAND researchers. Likewise, the tactical use of trade sometimes has drawbacks, such as the coalitions that can form around sanctioned countries, as Park described. It is hard to know when the formation of these coalitions is more detrimental than the use of sanctions is beneficial. Disagreements and unknowns should motivate researchers to follow the advice that Barfield gave in his introductory remarks: trade and security are inextricably linked, so rather than rue reality, researchers should focus their energy on understanding the connections between the two fields. Those connections can then be better harnessed by nations to advance their economic and security goals.

Session 7

Date: April 27, 2012
Time: 9:30-10:45
Place: Violet/Cosmos

Russia's Leadership Transition and Its Implications in East Asia

Organizing Institution:	The Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Panel Chair & Moderator:	Alexander Lukin, The Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation
Panelists:	Iwashita Akihiro, Hokkaido University Andrey Ivanov, Moscow State Institute of International Relations George Kunadze, Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights in the Russian Federation Han Byung-Jin, Keimyung University
Young Scholars:	Rebecca Graebner, The Heritage Foundation Kim Jiseon, Ewha Womans University

Moderator Dr. Alexander Lukin, a specialist in Sino-Russian affairs, assembled a panel of experts on international politics in East Asia in order to explore future foreign policy between Russia and countries in Northeast Asia. Ambassador George Kunadze described current bilateral relations between Russia and its neighbors and presented his views on the future trajectory of these relationships. Dr. Iwashita Akihiro built upon Kunadze's remarks, speaking on Sino-Russian relations and Russo-Japanese relations. Dr. Han Byung-Jin supplied additional expertise on South Korean politics, as well as exploring the relationships among the DPRK, China, and the ROK. Dr. Andrey Ivanov concluded the panel by providing the Japanese foreign policy position.

Lukin set the stage for the panel by describing the past and upcoming leadership transitions in Asia. In May, Vladimir Putin will become president of Russia for his third term. The current president, Dmitry Medvedev, will take over Putin's current position as prime minister. The reinstallation of Putin will inevitably affect policy decisions and relationships within a region that is already undergoing sweeping changes in leadership. Within the last eight months, Japan appointed a new prime minister, Yoshihiko Noda, and North Korea transitioned into the rule of Kim Jong-Un. Lukin pointed out that, with China and Russia set to change leadership within the next few months, many eyes are now focused on Asia.

Kunadze posited that Russia's foreign policy will be shaped by domestic issues rather than the events outside the country. He stated that Putin's party is focused on staying in power as long as possible and

will do what is necessary to make sure they win elections, but they will not abandon popular election procedures. He said that rumors of fraud and corruption during the election have caused much criticism from outside countries, and sparked domestic political opposition. The government will be focused on rallying public support and suppressing dissidents, while portraying Russia as being unfairly criticized by countries that voice concerns about its political system.

Kunadze further argued that not only will Russia be preoccupied with domestic issues, causing foreign policy to take a back seat, but also other countries within the region will not be interested in Russia's transit to democracy. The Russo-Japanese relationship is polite and businesslike, and neither country sees the other as a potential threat. Thus, relations are stable and without need for much attention. Russia's relationship with South Korea follows similar nuances as its relationship with Japan and is expected to remain positive. Relations with North Korea are almost nonexistent. North Korea and Russia have neither economic ties nor developed relations. Kunadze pointed out that North Korea's nuclear threats have become part of the fabric of international politics for almost a decade; therefore, Russia does not see these threats as immediate issues to resolve. Due to North Korea's inability to afford a partnership, relations with Russia are expected to remain stagnant. In contrast to the relations between Russia and its other neighbors, Sino-Russian relations are more vital. Kunadze stated that Russia cannot afford to provoke China due to its overall size, geographical proximity, and strength. However, that does not mean that Russia is actively seeking out partnerships with its southern neighbor. On the contrary, ties with China are not specifically based on regional or foreign policy, but focus on global issues that inevitably bring the two countries together for collaboration. Mutual concern for issues beyond the boundaries of Northeast Asia is likely to further engage the two countries, but Russia is not likely to be proactive with its foreign policy.

Iwashita discussed relations between Russia and the Northeast Asian countries after Putin's victory. Iwashita said that after hearing Putin's remarks during the presidential election, the Japanese media and politicians expressed optimism about solving territorial issues. Putin mentioned that, in accordance with the 1956 Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration, Russia would hand over the Habomai and Shikotan Islands to Japan. Nevertheless, Iwashita argued that the impact of Putin's re-election would be limited because Putin declared the same policy as he did six years ago.

Iwashita went on to discuss Sino-Russian relations. Some US and Japanese researchers expect that Sino-Russian ties could become strained because Russia regards China as a threat. He argued that those researchers use this idea for their own interests. He pointed out that even though Russia does not consider China a threat, their relations are somewhat sensitive; however, he argued that Sino-Russian relations will be stable. In 2004, China and Russia agreed to divide Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island (Heixiazi Island). After finalizing the border issue, China rushed to—although Russians have not carried out any plans for their side—build facilities on the Chinese side of the island, such as buildings, bridges, railways, airports, and large ports. Iwashita pointed out that the situation on the island shows Russia's isolationist dynamic within the Northeast Asian region.

In addition, Iwashita reflected upon his experience in the Shanghai Valdai Club, particularly in the Russian-Chinese section last December. In the section, Russia harshly criticized the United States and Japan. Contrasting with the Russian remarks, Chinese participants kept their composure while airing their grievances against the United States. Unlike the Russians, the Chinese seemed confident that they could handle the challenges they are facing with the United States and that they do not need other countries, such as Japan or Russia, in the bilateral relationship. In that sense, the Russians feel frustrated and isolated in the Asia-Pacific region.

Iwashita concluded by summarizing relations among four countries: Japan, the United States, China, and Russia. As for Japan-US relations, there are many serious problems and challenges, but the alliance is strong. US-China relations are also facing many difficulties, but the two countries also have confidence that they can work together as the G2. On the other hand, even though China is no threat to Russia, Sino-Russian relations are somewhat sensitive. Russia and Japan have been discussing territorial issues for a long time, but the two countries continue to build business-oriented relations and may attempt to resolve several issues, such as energy and maritime security.

Contrary to Kunadze's position, Han explored the Russian political win as a stabilizing factor towards a more proactive foreign policy. Han began by emphasizing the significance of Putin's success in being re-election. He said that it showed Putin's strong presence in the Russian government and political circles. Since the early 1920s, the Russian elite have coordinated themselves to maintain the central government, which has been proven to work well.

Han also conceded that there has been some domestic unrest regarding unfair electoral procedures in the two previous elections. But overall, he said, the domestic landscape is stable and thus will allow the government to focus on other regions, such as Central and Northeast Asia. According to Han, Putin already focused on these regions during his two previous terms. The new administration will also try to expand its influence against that of the United States. Even though Russia's role in East Asia is not extensive, Putin's success in the election is good news for North Korea. The Yeltsin administration could not afford to concentrate on East Asian issues, especially North Korea, due to its own problems. However, Russia's strong presidential administration means that Russia can maintain the status quo within the region. Specifically, Russia's stable political situation will let North Korea employ its traditional survival tactics: to extort aid by threatening neighboring countries and to postpone economic reform as long as possible. Chinese-style reforms, a shift to a mixture of state-owned companies and an open-market economy, will not work in North Korea because the reforms will cause changes not only in the economy, but also in politics. However the regime is reluctant to loosen its control. This is why it relies on the "special economic zone" in the Rajin-Sonbong region without substantial reform. China also has interests in developing this border area, which is one of the most underdeveloped regions in China. Russia will consider involvement if China and North Korea begin to develop the Siberian region.

Han expects a positive alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia, particularly on issues of low politics, such as developing the border area shared by the three countries. With Putin's strong presidential power, Russia will be able to invest in and implement long-term strategies in the region. Moreover, the economic potential of the Rajin-Sonbong "special economic zone" is particularly important for North Korea, as it would address its need for an economic exit strategy.

Building upon Han's statements, Ivanov's remarks focused on Russia's foreign policy as the means of finding its place within Northeast Asia and balancing the growing competition for leadership instigated by China and the United States. China has established itself as a dominant power in the region and a rising international power to counter the United States economically. Current conditions have spawned several initiatives to solve the problem, some revisiting an idea promoted by Gorbachev: the creation of a union within the Asia-Pacific region akin to that of the European Union. However, this idea of a "new model" has been criticized. Ivanov highlighted the view of Yukio Hatoyama, former prime minister of Japan, that vast political, economic, and regional differences between the Asia-Pacific countries would make a new model impossible. Continuing with Hatoyama's view, Ivanov asserted that many Russian

experts believe the answer for Russia and the Asia-Pacific region is to strengthen current structures, not to make new ones. Increased investment within the region is just one possibility to facilitate deeper ties, one that Russia is already planning to market at a 2012 symposium in Vladivostok. Russia has great potential for investment, especially in its Siberian and Far Eastern regions. Ivanov closed his remarks by asserting that if Russia offers opportunities to its neighbors honestly and is willing to compromise, it will be able to find its footing within the Asia-Pacific region once more.

There was consensus among the panelists that Russia and East Asian countries will strengthen ties, although Kunadze concluded that the Russian government will focus more on domestic stability rather than international issues. It is unlikely that North Korea and Russia will improve their ties, but the Sino-Russian relationship will be crucial for collaboration on global issues. However, Iwashita argued that Sino-Russian relations are sensitive due to Russia's isolation in the dynamics of the once-disputed island. Han asserted that the Putin administration is strong in domestic political circles and predicted a strong alliance among China, North Korea, and Russia in developing the border area between the three countries. Ivanov agreed with Han about the economic importance of the Siberian and far eastern regions of Russia and emphasized that the current structure among Russia and Asia-Pacific countries should be strengthened, not replaced with a new model. Overall, the panelists agreed with the idea that the countries will try to maintain the status quo with increased economic cooperation. Whether the predictions of the panelists will be realized depends on how much emphasis the new government in Russia is willing to put on its relations with East Asia.

Plenary Session IV

Date: April 27, 2012
Time: 11:00-12:15
Place: Grand Ballroom

"Take Me to Your Leader": Searching for Leadership in a Time of Crisis

Organizing Institution:	The Asan Institute for Policy Studies
Moderator:	Hugo Restall, The Wall Street Journal
Panelists:	James Steinberg, Syracuse University
	Funabashi Yoichi, Rebuild Japan Initiative Foundation (RJIF)
	Bark Taeho, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, ROK
Young Scholars:	Erik French, Syracuse University
	Hana Lee, Ewha Womans University

The closing plenary session convened a panel of experts from the United States and East Asia for discussion on the importance of leadership in governance and international relations. South Korea's Dr. Bark Taeho brought the perspective of an economist and ROK official to the debate, Japan's Dr. Funabashi Yoichi provided insight into leadership in Japan during its recent crisis, and Mr. James Steinberg contributed his expertise as an academic and US government official to the discussion. The primary debates in the panel focused on how leaders could overcome major challenges both at home and abroad to accomplish critical goals in the 21st Century, and on the importance of reform, innovation, and vision.

Moderator Mr. Hugo Restall began the discussion by introducing the speakers and framing the discussion around the theme of frustration with leadership in the democratic world. Leaders in democratic states have either struggled to accomplish their objectives or have proved incapable of acting, and in places like Hong Kong discontent with the current state of affairs continues to grow. In democracies, it seems as if every component of society or special interest groups can veto policies they disagree with, yet none of these groups can pass policies they want. Restall believes that the world is undergoing a shift in the balance between concerns over constraining government officials and enabling energetic executive offices. The current systems are skewed toward the first concern, leading commentators like Tom Friedman to envy unconstrained leaders in places like China. According to Restall, the democratic world must find a way to rebalance its systems to encourage more energy in elected officials, while also preventing the abuse or overreach of governmental authority.

Bark drew on his experience in economics and focused on the importance of South Korean leadership in negotiating bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs). The topic of international trade in South Korea has

always been a source of significant political tension. In 1994, the ROK began to consider its first bilateral trade agreement as a tool to encourage economic growth, and eventually selected Chile as its first potential partner. By 2006, the ROK under President Roh announced it would pursue FTA negotiations with a much more significant partner, the United States. Bark stated that this negotiation was a challenging task for President Roh, which prompted a great deal of criticism from his own political base. Negotiations peaked in 2007, and farmers and labor unions demanded that the negotiations be terminated. By 2008, newly elected President Lee had to face these domestic interest groups as well as a strong opposition party in order to continue moving towards the agreement. Both Presidents Roh and Lee believed that an FTA would provide the means for the ROK to remain competitive and strong in the global economy. Despite differing political views, both leaders agreed that free trade was the proper path for the ROK, and both remained committed to FTAs despite continued opposition.

Bark also briefly reviewed the importance of international economic leadership. Since the stalling of the Doha dialogue, attitudes surrounding the state of the world economy have been pessimistic. According to Bark, what is needed to address this situation is leadership in the World Trade Organization (WTO), particularly from the leading stakeholders in the global economy. Leaders must work to build a more credible and stable WTO based firmly on the rule of law, which can act as a public good and provide greater predictability in the world economy. Bark also advised that the world needs to guard against rising demands for protectionism, which might set back free trade and its accompanying benefits.

Funabashi examined the crucial role of political leaders in dealing with crisis situations, drawing from Japan's experience of the March 2011 earthquake and Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster. He emphasized the need for Japanese politics to shift from routine to a mode of contingency in order to adopt stronger leadership, endure potential crises, and redefine national goals. The shift toward a politics of contingency may either occur through bipartisan consensus building or through strong leadership. Which type of leadership Japan will adopt is a question that should be examined, but there is no doubt that strong leadership is necessary.

In the past five years, six prime ministers have held office in Japan, revealing a lack of strong political leadership. Funabashi described Japanese politics as characteristically lacking strong leadership, which is due in part to the bureaucracy's deep entrenchment into the cultural and value systems of Japan. Japanese political culture emphasizes fairness and compliance with laws, and prefers a bottom-up decision-making process. This culture does not encourage the breeding of strong leaders, Funabashi stated. Therefore, the routine political traditions are insufficient to meet leadership needs during times of crisis. In order to overcome the traditional preferences of Japanese political culture in hindering successful crisis management, a political shift to a mode of contingency is necessary. This shift is only possible with strong leadership. Crisis management demands that a strong leader must demonstrate flexibility, a willingness to break the rules, redundancy, and top-down decision-making. Additionally, strong leaders will not merely delegate authority to the bureaucracy but will also be able to make decisions independently. Bureaucracy slows the decision-making process by slowing the retrieval and analysis of information. Funabashi stated his belief that the slow bureaucratic process can be detrimental during the critical, time-crunched moments following a crisis. In a case such as the March 2011 Fukushima disaster strong leadership needs to be able to maneuver through the situation alone.

Funabashi cited former prime minister Naoto Kan's handling of the Fukushima incident as a successful case of strong leadership displayed in Japan. Contrary to popular criticism of Kan's micromanagement, his decision to command Tokyo Electric Power Company workers to close down the nuclear reactors prevented larger fallout from occurring. Beyond this one successful case, however, is the reality that the legislation, mechanisms, procedures, and legal framework of Japanese politics are insufficient to deal with large-scale crises. Finally, post-crisis analysis of the Fukushima incident revealed that Japan's leaders need a new approach and vision regarding Japan's national security. Japan must redefine its national goals and direction, and Funabashi identified strong leadership as crucial to this process of redefinition.

Steinberg contrasted leadership crises in the United States and the international community based on his expertise in the history of US foreign policy. Looking to the past, Steinberg noted, it is clear that US politics is historically polarized. Difficulty in bipartisan consensus is not a novel crisis of this era, but is rather structurally inherent in American political institutions. Great moments of history are determined by great leaders and their ability to mobilize public opinion and spark action to overcome such polarization. A successful leader will reveal the wider consensus in American public opinion hiding behind extreme bipartisan political debates, said Steinberg. To move forward in times of crisis, a great leader serves the dual role of providing a diagnosis of current problems while developing a consensus behind a particular solution to those problems. For a US president, this sometimes requires using informal tools of persuasion.

In terms of how to equip countries with tools to address international challenges, Steinberg revealed his belief that a proper model of international leadership should be adopted. An ideal model would involve

clusters of committed nations driving one particular issue forward. These clusters of nations are to serve as catalysts to build international consensus around sensitive issues. Energy, climate change, non-proliferation, terrorism, and global economic growth issues stand to benefit from mobilization of the international community. This model, however, may run against the traditional functions of formal international institutions wherein the protection of parochial interests of stronger nations is sustained. Looking to the past, Steinberg noted that traditional international cooperation emphasized equal voices of participant nations, insisting that each country get an equal vote. This method is unlikely to move sensitive issues forward, as there will always be a group of nations with very little incentive to cooperate. Therefore, there is a need for flexibility in formal models of legitimate international cooperation. Although negotiations may use informal tools of persuasion, Steinberg maintained that forward movement on sensitive issues is a priority over adherence to customary proceedings.

Citing the Copenhagen climate conference as a successful example of international community mobilization, Steinberg advocated the mobilization tactic used during the conference. A small number of leaders from diverse backgrounds came together to move the negotiation process forward using an innovative approach of forming small groups that work to build consensus around the issue. In that light, the current global challenges are to think of such new tools to generate effective progress, to define the aspects of new forms of civil society, and to discover the process of creating new norms in an international setting.

During the question-and-answer session, Bark agreed with Steinberg's previous remarks on the proper model for international leadership. Multilateral economic decision-making based on consensus and least-common-denominator agreements is difficult and may not be the most preferable form of international cooperation. Sharp division in the Doha round between the BRICs and developed countries, for instance, has constrained forward progress in international trade. On this issue, Funabashi agreed that globalization results in a new geopolitical reality where international participation is unavoidable. International participation has the potential to be a plus-sum game, but this depends on the ability of a country's leadership to get itself deeply committed to a particular issue. Domestic leadership must quickly and decisively excel in deliverability of policies through consensus building among parties. In addition, geopolitical stability is necessary for key countries to cooperate. Steinberg commented on the rise of the BRICs, saying that the core nations of international cooperation may change, but the core function of these nations as international leaders cannot.

In response to a question about modern media's influence on the political landscape, Steinberg claimed that the method of media communication matters less than the continuity of the fundamental challenge of political leadership. The ability to articulate a specific vision, speak clearly to the public, and explain why the country should get there—these roles are and have been elementary necessities to strong leadership regardless of the medium used to achieve them.

Bark suggested identifying countries that are systematically important to a particular problem and then figuring out how to get them to play the leading roles in generating consensus. This could improve the current trade-off between regional FTAs and multilateral trade negotiation, for example. Bark cited Bhagwati's "Spaghetti Bowl Effect" to describe the negative consequences of drifting away from a multilateral trading system. Funabashi disagreed, taking the stance that FTAs are building blocks to successful multilateral trade negotiations, but did agree that the current framework is weak and difficult to manage. Warning against nationalist rhetoric, Funabashi instead suggested a strengthening of regional cooperation institutions as well as a modification of the composition and structure of the UN Security Council.

In conclusion, Steinberg paid tribute to South Korea's rapid ascendance to global leadership. South Korea's success implies the possibility of successful transformations in other countries as well. In order for international leadership to thrive, recognition of a global diversity of interests and an aggregation of differing opinions is the fundamental way forward.

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(in alphabetical order)

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Christopher R. Hill

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Ambassador Hill is the Dean of the Josef Korbel School of International Studies at The University of Denver, a position he has held since September 2010. Christopher Robert Hill is a former career diplomat, a four-time ambassador, nominated by three presidents, whose last post was as Ambassador to Iraq, April 2009 until August 2010. Prior to Iraq, Hill served as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 2005 until 2009 during which he was also the head of the US delegation to the Six-Party Talks on the North Korean nuclear issue. Earlier, he was the US Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Previously he served as US Ambassador to Poland (2000-2004), Ambassador to the Republic of Macedonia (1996-1999), and Special Envoy to Kosovo (1998-1999). He also served as a Special Assistant to the President and a Senior Director on the staff of the National Security Council, 1999-2000.

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Mr. Klingner is the Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia at The Heritage Foundation. Klingner joined Heritage in 2007 after twenty years of government service with the CIA and Defense Intelligence Agency. He was Chief of CIA's Korea Branch, which provided analytic reports on military developments during the 1993-94 nuclear crisis with North Korea. Klingner was subsequently Deputy Division Chief for Korea in the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence where he was responsible for analyzing Korean political, military, economic, and leadership issues for the president and other senior policymakers. Klingner is a distinguished graduate of the National War College where he earned a master's degree in national security strategy in 2002. He also earned a master's in strategic intelligence from the National Intelligence University, Defense Intelligence Agency.

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Mr. Nawaz, a native of Pakistan, was made the first Director of the South Asia Center at The Atlantic Council in January 2009. He has worked with many leading think tanks on projects dealing with Pakistan and the Middle East, and has advised or briefed senior government and military officials and parliamentarians in the US, Europe, and Pakistan. He was a newscaster and news and current affairs producer for Pakistan Television from 1967-72 and covered the 1971 war with India on the Western Front. He has worked for *The New York Times*, the World Health Organization, and has headed three separate divisions

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Mr. Romberg has been at the Stimson Center since September 2000, where he is Distinguished Fellow and Director of the East Asia Program. Previously, he served as Principal Deputy Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff (1994-98), Senior Adviser and Director of the Washington Office of the US Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Navy. He was Director of Research and Studies at the United States Institute of Peace following almost ten years as C.V. Starr Senior Fellow for Asian Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. A Foreign Service Officer for over twenty years, he served in various capacities dealing with East Asia at the State Department and NSC. Mr. Romberg was Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State and Deputy Spokesman of the Department (1981-85). He has written extensively on US policy toward the People's Republic of China, Taiwan, Korea and Japan.

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Dr. Sagan is the Caroline S.G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University, and a Senior Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Freeman Spogli Institute. He

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Dr. SaKong is the Founder and Chairman of the Institute for Global Economics. During 2010, Dr. SaKong chaired the Presidential Committee for the G-20 Summit, responsible for the preparation of the 2010 Seoul G-20 summit under Korea's presidency. He previously served in the government of the Republic of Korea as Senior Economist of the Council on Economic & Scientific Affairs for the President from 1979 to 1980, Senior Counselor to the Minister of Economic Planning Board in 1982, Senior Secretary to the President for Economic Affairs from 1983 to 1987, and Minister of Finance from 1987 to 1988. He was Ambassador for International Economy and Trade from 2000 to 2002 and Member and Senior Member of the Council of National Economic Affairs for the President from 2001 to 2004. He served the Office of the President as Special Economic Advisor from 2008 to 2009. He served the Presidential Council on National Competitiveness from March 2008 to January 2009. SaKong is a graduate of Seoul National University and earned his MBA and Ph.D. from the University of California at Los Angeles.

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Mr. Sanger is Chief Washington Correspondent for *The New York Times* and is one of the newspaper's senior writers. In a 30-year career at the paper, he has reported from New York, Tokyo and Washington, specializing in foreign policy, national security and the politics of globalization. He is the author of *The New York Times* best-seller *The Inheritance: The World Obama Confronts and the Challenges to American Power* (2009) based on his seven years as the Times' White House correspondent, covering two wars, the confrontations with Iran, North Korea and other rogue states, and America's efforts to deal with the rise of China. Mr. Sanger was also a member of two teams that won the Pulitzer Prize and has been awarded numerous honors for national security and foreign policy coverage. A graduate of Harvard College, he is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Aspen Strategy Group.

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Mr. Sheffer is the Counselor to the president of The Heritage Foundation. He has been affiliated with The Heritage Foundation since 1982. Prior to that, he served as Special Assistant to the Lt. Governor of New York in 1979. In 1980, he served on the campaign of then-candidate Ronald Regan and then on the presidential transition team until the inauguration of the President in 1981. Mr. Sheffer went on to serve in the Reagan White House on the National Security Council staff from 1981 to 1982.

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Mr. Whalen is a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, where he studies, writes and comments on current events and political trends, with an emphasis on California and America's political landscapes.

A native of Washington, DC, Mr. Whalen has worked in the US capital as a political aide and public-relations strategist. From 1985 to 1991, he was a political correspondent for *Insight Magazine*, the national newsweekly and sister publication of *The Washington Times*, where he was honored for his profiles and analysis of candidates, campaigns, Congress, and the White House. He has been a guest political analyst on the Fox News Channel, MSNBC, and CNN. Before joining Hoover, Mr. Whalen was the chief speech-writer for former California Governor Pete Wilson. Mr. Whalen writes frequently for leading California and national opinion-makers, including the editorial pages of *The Wall Street Journal* and *Los Angeles Times.*

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Ms. Williamson has worked for BBC News for over a decade, covering stories in the Middle East, Asia, and Europe. She is currently the BBC's Seoul Correspondent, covering events in both North and South Korea, and before that spent three years as the BBC's Jakarta Correspondent, covering Indonesia's recovery from the tsunami and multiple bomb attacks, and East Timor's unsteady path to stability. During shorter postings in India and the Middle East, she reported on Israel's withdrawal from Gaza, the Israeli-Lebanon conflict, and the death of Yasser Arafat; and produced a series of radio reports from Baghdad in the aftermath of the Iraq War. As well as covering breaking news, Lucy has made documentaries on the political conflict in Thailand, East Timor's 'lost children,' and North Korea's people-smugglers.

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Dr. Woo is a Research Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies. Prior to joining the Asan Institute, he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Korean Studies Institute in the University of Southern California. He was also an associate analyst for Gallup Korea and the Korea Research Company. His areas of specialty include foreign military intervention in civil wars and the relationship between foreign policy-making and public opinion. He earned his B.A. in business administration from Seoul National University in 1995, an M.P.P. from Georgetown University in 2001, and a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee in 2009.

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Asan Plenum Young Scholars

The Asan Institute's *Young Scholars Program* was created to invite graduate students from Korea's most prestigious universities and young professionals from think tanks around the world to participate in the *Asan Plenum 2012*, in which they had the unique opportunity to engage in discussions with senior experts and form lasting networks of future leaders and policy analysts. The Young Scholars also had the opportunity to serve as conference rapporteurs by co-authoring panel sketches shortly after each session of the *Plenum*, then longer panel summaries for publication in the *Asan Plenum 2012 Proceedings*.

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The following think tanks and institutions organized panels for the *Asan Plenum 2012*.

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- **Bertelsmann-Stiftung**
- **The Brookings Institution**
- **Carnegie Endowment for International Peace**
- **Center for a New American Security (CNAS)**
- **Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)**
- **Center for the National Interest (CNI)**
- **Centre for European Policy Studies**
- **Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)**
- **China Reform Forum**
- **Council on Foreign Relations (CFR)**
- **The Diplomatic Academy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation**
- **FOI-Swedish Defence Research Agency**
- **The German Marshall Fund of the United States**
- **The Heritage Foundation**
- **Hoover Institution**
- **Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO)**
- **The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)**
- **Korea Economic Institute (KEI)**
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Research Fellow, Ph.D.
Director, Center for International Law and Conflict Resolution;
Director, Nuclear Policy and Technology Center

Woo Jung-Yeop
Research Fellow, Ph.D.
Public Opinion Studies Center;
Director, Center for Security Policy

Program Officers

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Nuclear Policy and Technology Center

Lisa Collins
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Karl L. Friedhoff
Public Opinion Studies Center

Ham Younghoon
Modern Society Studies Project

Kang Chungku
Public Opinion Studies Center

Kim Jungjin
Chief Secretary to the President

Kim Min Jung
Center for China Studies

Lee Eui Cheol
Public Opinion Studies Center

Lee Hye Sun
North Korea-China Relations Studies Project

Lee Ji Hyung
Center for Foreign Policy

Peter Lee
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Center

Lee Seunghyuk
Center for Security Policy

Lee Sung Hee
Center for Global Governance Studies

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Administrative Director

Lee Hyunmin
Administrative Staff

Han Yu Jin
Administrative Staff

Park In-Young
Executive Assistant to the Chairperson and the Board

Shin Chaemin
Executive Assistant to the President

Human Resources Department

Lee Seunghee
Director, Human Resources Department;
Director, Asan Academy

Choi MiRin
Program Officer

External Relations Department

Eileen Block
Program Officer

Huh Hae-nyoung
Program Officer

Shawn Seiler
Program Officer

Yun Yelim
Program Officer

Kim Keuntae
Program Officer, Academic Affairs

Kim Yong-Kag
Program Officer, Student Affairs

Sin Eun Hae
Program Officer, Asan-Washington Fellowship Program

Publications Department

Choi Booil
Chief Editor

Park Joo-young
Program Officer

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Program Officer

Public Relations Department

Kim Sungyeon
Program Officer

Asan Academy

AhnEunsoon
Program Officer, Asan-Beijing Fellowship Program

ChoiJong-Sung
Program Officer, Asan-Washington Fellowship Program

Kim Ju Yeon
Program Officer, Admission Affairs

Comments

"I've attended many conferences in the past but this was by far one of the most exciting gatherings I've participated in. The organization and structure of the forum allows both practitioners and academics to come together in an environment conducive for open discussion and mutual understanding. The *Plenum* breaks new ground with its standard-setting organization and execution."

-J. James Kim, California State Polytechnic University (Pomona)

"An outstanding gathering of first-rate speakers from all over the world, addressing some of the most pressing issues of our time."

-Jorge Heine, Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)

"Asan did a superb job of organizing and carrying out this complex event. My compliments to the leadership and staff for their great work, particularly for their vision in selecting this year's topic."

- Evans J.R. Revere, The Brookings Institution

"I am very grateful to the Asan Institute for preparing a world-class international conference. This is something that we can be proud of."

- Ahn Dukgeun, Seoul National University

"I came to the *Asan Plenum 2012* with high expectations and, to my great happiness, it succeeded beyond them. The panels I attended were illuminating—thank you so much for giving me the opportunity to take part in this thought provoking assembly."

- Rami Ginat, Bar-Ilan University

"This was overall a truly "global" conference in terms of themes and regional representation for the individual panels. The combination of this, as well as the high quality of participants, and the impressive logistical organization, certainly makes the *Asan Plenum* rank as one of the premier ones in its league, despite its very young age."

- Diederik Vandewalle, Dartmouth College

"*Asan Plenum* is a truly unique gathering, bringing together practitioners, experts, and interested [members of the] public in a friendly and open environment. [The *Plenum* was] very useful to get a sense of the latest debate and analysis across a wide spectrum of issue areas, and to meet or re-connect with a diverse pool of experts."

- Allan Song, Smith Richardson Foundation

"The *Asan Plenum* was a well-planned, meticulously implemented, and highly valuable opportunity for a wide range of scholars, officials, consultants, experts, and students to gather together to discuss major issues of international concern. The mix of ages, levels, areas of expertise, nationality and, viewpoints made for a robust and stimulating conference. Logistics and arrangements were outstanding, as was the welcome provided by the Asan Institute and staff. The Asan Institute and staff are to be highly commended for putting on a first-rate conference."

- Christopher Clarke, Independent Analyst

"The *Asan Plenum* was a wonderful chance for me to discuss the pressing challenges facing the world with the world's leading think tanks. The participants could benefit a lot from the diversity of opinions and perspectives. The *Asan Plenum* facilitated communication and understanding among think tanks and scholars from various countries, such as South Korea, China, the United States, Russia and, Japan, thus it was helpful for international peace and cooperation not only in East Asia but also in the world."

- Xiong Lili, University of International Business & Economics

"Overall I was extremely impressed with the *Asan Plenum* on Leadership. The speakers were very impressive and the quality of the discussions which followed their comments was very high. The session topics and themes were timely and relevant. The organization of the conference was flawless, and the staff was polite, helpful, and professional. The hospitality was excellent. One of the best conferences I have attended."

- Ian Storey, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore

"Asan staff did a remarkable job making this important event happen. Quality and variety of speakers invited, volume of interaction coordinated, venues chosen, attention afforded to participants, evident dedication of Asan's leadership, as well as behind-the-scenes and online support, were all impeccable."

- Vladimir Hlasny, Ewha Womans University

"The *Asan Plenum 2012* represented a unique opportunity for the exchange of views and information between scholars and policy practitioners from all continents."

- Andres Serbin, Regional Coordination for Economic and Social Research (CRIES), Buenos Aires

"I look forward to next year."

- Edwin Feulner, The Heritage Foundation

"Just wanted to congratulate everyone involved in the plenum for another magnificent conference. I was impressed last year, and I can tell this *Plenum* will continue to gain steam and prestige in the international relations field. I've attended many conferences within the last few years, but none has the diversity of the *Asan Plenum*. It is obvious a lot of man-hours were invested to ensure the outcome the Asan Institute achieved."

- Paul Chun, Group W, USFK

"The *Plenum* was an experience; a chance to meet people, to hear their views and contribute to a broad discussion of important issues."

- Paul Rivlin, Moshe Daya Center

Statistics

Asan Plenum 2012 Participation

Total Participation	496
Speakers	128
Overseas Observers	27
Young Scholars	32
Domestic Observers*	309

* Domestic Observers include RSVP, walk-in and separate press registration.



Overseas Participation (total 137): By Country	
USA	59
China	19
Europe	17
Japan	14
Russia	7
Taiwan	6
Middle East	6
South East Asia	5
Latin America	3
Australia	1



Domestic Participation	309
Embassy	71
Academics	46
Research Institutes	43
Press	41
Students	33
Government	21
Other	17
National Assembly	11
Business	10
Asan	8
NGO	5
Law Offices	3



www.asanplenum.org