The idea of an “Asian NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization)” is not new. For decades, there have been intermittent discussions exploring the feasibility of transforming the U.S.-led “hub-and-spokes” bilateral alliance system into a NATO-like multilateral collective defense organization. Before Shigeru Ishiba was elected president of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and appointed Prime Minister of Japan in October 2024, he proposed the idea in a commentary published by the Hudson Institute, a Washington, D.C.-based think tank. He wrote: “Ukraine today is Asia tomorrow,” adding that “the absence of a collective self-defense system like NATO in Asia means that wars are likely to break out because there is no obligation for mutual defense. Under these circumstances, the creation of an Asian version of NATO is essential to deter China by its Western allies.” Although Ishiba’s proposal did not take off, it attracted attention among security establishments in several Indo-Pacific countries. For instance, in August 2025, Ju Hyung Kim, president of the Security Management Institute, a think tank affiliated with South Korea’s National Assembly, wrote in the Canberra-based East Asia Forum: “With China’s military assertiveness, North Korea’s expanding nuclear arsenal, and defense collaboration among Russia, China, and North Korea, there are growing questions about whether Asia needs its own version of NATO.”

The proposal for an Asian NATO has gained fresh momentum with the advent of Donald Trump’s second presidency (hereafter Trump 2.0) and subsequent geopolitical developments in Europe and Asia. In the face of growing multifaceted threats and increasing Trumpian unpredictability amid intensifying U.S.-China rivalry, nearly all U.S. allies across the Indo-Pacific and Europe have been reassessing their reliance on Washington’s security guarantee, rethinking their own defense and deterrence capabilities, and recalibrating their alignment positions vis-à-vis one another. Against this backdrop, some have advocated the need for like-minded U.S. allies to forge a NATO-like pact in Asia through which they could collectively deter aggression, deny their adversaries’ hostile moves, and defend their shared interests and values.

This Issue Brief assesses the relative desirability of an “Asian NATO” by contrasting it with a distinct approach, termed “pragmatic multi-alignment,” and presenting them as two competing pathways for middle-power realignment in the Trump 2.0 era. Middle-power realignment is likely to persist through Trump 2.0 and beyond. As the United States under Trump 2.0 becomes more unpredictable, transactional, and coercive, while China under Xi Jinping displays visible assertiveness—particularly in the maritime and cyber domains, often with unclear intentions—many countries caught between Washington and Beijing are becoming increasingly concerned about both superpowers. These countries, particularly next-tier powers and secondary states that are viewed as, or perceive themselves as, “middle powers,” have realigned and stepped up efforts to explore collective or convergent self-help mechanisms, with an eye toward pooling resources, multiplying capabilities, and managing shared challenges amid an increasingly volatile global environment. The momentum for such middle-power realignment was further amplified by Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney’s rousing speech at the January 2026 World Economic Forum, in which he called on middle powers to assert themselves and act together amid a ruptured world order.

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