Last September, the Lee Jae Myung administration announced 123 policy tasks to pursue during its term, including the “transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) based on the ROK-U.S. alliance’s comprehensive deterrence capabilities,” an issue that was also discussed at the ROK-U.S. summit on October 29, 2025. The administration’s approach may be interpreted as an effort to meet the conditions of the “conditions-based OPCON transition”—agreed at the 46th ROK-U.S. Security Consultative Meeting (SCM) in October 2014—as early as possible, and enabling the transition to occur during President Lee’s term. It can be reasonable to seek an early transition of OPCON if doing so can stably deter and defend against North Korea’s current and future threats and align with the broader development of the alliance. However, careful judgement is required in assessing whether this approach can truly generate such effects.

Much of the debate over the early return of OPCON frames the issue in terms of an infringement or limitation of “sovereignty.” Yet, OPCON is “a relatively limited and temporary authority exercised by a commander for executing specific missions or tasks.” The fact that the Commander of United States Forces Korea (USFK) concurrently serves as Commander of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC) does not allow him to exercise authority contrary to South Korea’s “sovereignty.” It is important to consider that wartime OPCON is closely linked to U.S. wartime reinforcement, as in the case of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Above all, this authority is activated only under the extreme security circumstances of “war.” Moreover, OPCON transition must be pursued within the broader framework of future ROK-U.S. command relations. As the United States seeks to expand alliance roles and missions through its “modernization,” a more extensive operational cooperation framework encompassing contingencies both on and beyond the Korean Peninsula must be established. Most importantly, the government’s fixation on completing the OPCON transition “within its term” must not undermine the fundamental principle of the “conditions-based OPCON transition.”

Compared to when the agreement was reached in 2014, North Korea’s nuclear threat has rapidly intensified, and the security environment on and around the Korean Peninsula has become more adversarial. Therefore, evaluating the ROK military’s capabilities to lead the defense of the peninsula through an assessment centered on conventional warfare is no longer meaningful. Any major military conflict or war on the peninsula will involve nuclear weapons, and the concept of “nuclear deterrence” must be integrated into the ROK-U.S. combined defense and reflected in the operation plans.

This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2025-36).

(‘전시작전통제권 전환: 변화된 위협과 안보 여건을 먼저 고려해야’)