At the ROK–China summit held in Beijing on January 5, the leaders of both countries agreed to continue seeking “creative approaches” to building peace on the Korean Peninsula. Following his return, President Lee Jae Myung expressed hope for the restoration of inter-Korean dialogue, exchanges, and cooperation. However, achieving stability and peace on the Korean Peninsula requires a clear and accurate understanding of North Korea’s own vision for inter-Korean relations and the international order. When the U.S.–North Korea summit was held in Singapore in June 2018, one of the central points of the discussion was the possibility of North Korea’s transformation into a “normal state.” Embedded in this notion were expectations such as denuclearization, adherence to international norms, a shift from the parallel pursuit of nuclear weapons and economic development toward growth-centered economic policies, a relaxation of internal controls, and the pursuit of inter-Korean coexistence, co-prosperity, and ultimately peaceful reunification.

Yet an analysis of North Korea’s domestic and foreign policies throughout 2025 suggests that such expectations were either overly optimistic or fundamentally misdirected. North Korea repeatedly declared that it had no intention of engaging in any U.S.–North Korea dialogue with denuclearization on the agenda and instead intensified efforts to entrench its nuclear status as a fait accompli. It has intervened in regional conflicts through troop deployments to the Ukraine war and is likely to continue fomenting regional instability whenever it serves its interests. The continuation of one-man rule and hereditary succession, both fundamentally abnormal practices, is expected to be internationally legitimized through closer alignment with China, Russia, and other socialist states, alongside intensified ideological indoctrination of the population. Rather than pursuing conventional economic growth, North Korea is also likely to promote survival under low-growth conditions based on “self-reliance” as its own model of development. Finally, the so-called “hostile two-state relations” should not be understood as a temporary phenomenon, but as a structural condition that will persist so long as South Korea refuses to recognize North Korea’s strategic dominance and nuclear status and abandons efforts to induce change in the North Korean system.

This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2026-05).

(‘2025년 북한의 대내외 정책 평가: 북한식 ‘정상국가’의 위험성’)