As North Korea’s nuclear threat has advanced, the Washington Declaration in 2023 marked an effort by South Korea and the United States to strengthen extended deterrence through measures such as the regular deployment of strategic assets and the establishment of the Nuclear Consultative Group (NCG). However, North Korea has shown little regard for these efforts, continuing to test various nuclear delivery systems and casting a “nuclear shadow” over the Korean Peninsula. As a result, over 70% of South Koreans now support the indigenous acquisition of nuclear weapons. However, it could lead to international sanctions, economic damage, and a loss of global credibility due to a withdrawal from the NPT.

Alternatives like the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or the nuclear sharing have entered the conversation, but the idea remains a minority position in Washington D.C. In this context, securing nuclear latency is being discussed as a second-best option. This refers to maintaining the capability to rapidly transition to nuclear armament in a contingency, without actually possessing nuclear weapons in peacetime. With North Korea’s nuclear threat becoming a constant and public trust in U.S. extended deterrence weakening, securing nuclear latency is emerging as an inevitable strategic alternative. Now is the time to think the unthinkable.

This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2025-22).

(‘'핵 잠재력(nuclear latency)’의 확보도 우리의 대안이다’)