Last first half of the year. During this period, Kim made a total of 51 public appearances, with military (24 instances) and economic (13 instances) sectors accounting for the majority—reflecting a trend similar to previous years. The most notable aspect of Kim Jong Un’s public appearances in the first half of the year is the continued dominance of military-related activities, despite expectations that he would emphasize “pro-people policies” in the lead-up to the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party. His posture toward the United States appears to have been calibrated up until the time of Trump’s inauguration, after which he turned toward maximizing practical gains through deeper cooperation with Russia. In contrast, Kim’s economic activities this year have been strikingly limited unlike in previous years. On the domestic political front, the June plenary session of the Workers’ Party proclaimed a highly positive evaluation of the first half. However, this appears to be more of a propagandistic effort than a reflection of actual progress, especially given that most of the session’s contents were reportedly circulated only within the party in confidential form.

Looking ahead, North Korea's domestic agenda for the second half of 2025 is expected to center around preparations for the 80th anniversary of the founding of the Workers’ Party and the upcoming 9th Party Congress. For South Korea, it is critical to recognize that Kim remains far more invested in modernizing conventional military capabilities and promoting warfighting readiness than in improving the livelihoods of his people. While Seoul has pursued a flexible, preemptive approach—evidenced by the suspension of loudspeaker broadcasts—the combination of North Korea’s internal political demands and its deepening alignment with Russia suggests that the likelihood of direct provocations toward the South may temporarily decline.

This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2025-20).

(‘김정은 공개 활동으로 본 북한 상반기 정세 평가’)