Although largely overshadowed by Japan–China tensions sparked by concerns over visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and remarks hinting at possible intervention in a Taiwan contingency, Japan’s foreign and security policy has been undergoing rapid reconfiguration since the launch of the Takaichi Sanae cabinet. For the first time since the Liberal Democratic Party’s founding in 1955, it lost its independent majority in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors, and it had to rely on the Japan Innovation Party’s loose form of “external cooperation” following the departure of Komeito, its coalition partner of 26 years. Despite this fragile start, the Takaichi cabinet has maintained high approval ratings from the outset. Moreover, in just over a month since its inauguration, the cabinet has already driven changes across a wide range of areas, including politics, the economy, diplomacy, and security, with the pace of policy shifts in the foreign and security domain particularly striking. This raises a key question: under the Takaichi cabinet, in what direction, and in what ways, are Japan’s foreign and security policies changing?

From a policy perspective, the core changes can be summarized as follows:

① pushing to achieve the target of defense spending equivalent to 2% of GDP ahead of schedule, by fiscal year 2025; ② initiating preparations to re-revise, by the end of 2026, the “Three Security Documents” that were revised in 2022; ③ establishing a “National Intelligence Agency” aimed at integrating intelligence systems, alongside renewed discussion of an anti-espionage law; ④ easing restrictions on defense exports and arms transfers by removing the “five-type” limitation under the Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment and Technology; ⑤ ordering revisions to the Economic Security Promotion Act and concentrating investment in 17 strategic sectors; ⑥ formally articulating statements linking a Taiwan contingency to a “survival-threatening situation” for Japan; and ⑦ signaling the possibility of revising Article 9 of the Constitution and reconsidering the Three Non-Nuclear Principles.

For South Korea, these changes carry a dual implication: enhanced deterrence on the one hand, and a deepening security dilemma on the other. Japan’s more proactive foreign and security posture could contribute to deterrence against North Korea and China. At the same time, however, it heightens the risk of crisis linkage among Taiwan, the East China Sea, and the Korean Peninsula; fuels regional arms competition; stimulates military activity; and increases pressure on South Korea regarding its role and burden-sharing responsibilities.

This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2025-39).

(‘‘적극적 행위자’로의 전환: 다카이치(高市) 내각 출범 이후 일본 외교·안보 정책의 변화와 한국에의 함의’)