The 13th Plenary Meeting of the 8th Party Central Committee, convened in December 2025, was the final plenary session of the 8th term ahead of the 9th Party Congress. While North Korea addressed largely practical issues at this meeting and disclosed its outcomes only in a summarized manner, this paper uses the meeting as an opportunity to conduct a comprehensive analysis of the operational system of the 8th-term Party plenary meetings, given its significance as a session concluding a five-year cycle.

First, using the 13th plenary meeting as a case study, this paper examines how the procedures of Party plenary meetings have become standardized. The findings suggest that the North Korean Party leadership has managed policy issues relatively smoothly through a system of regular policy evaluation and oversight. However, beneath this outwardly coordinated framework, a persistent tendency remains to avoid responsibility for policy outcomes and defer final accountability to the supreme leader.

An integrated analysis of the agendas discussed across the 13 plenary meetings convened since the 8th Party Congress shows that agenda items can be categorized into regular agenda items, routine administrative items, and ad hoc agenda items addressing emerging issues. An examination of the proportion and evolution of ad hoc agenda items reveals that political and social issues—rather than economic ones—more frequently emerged as urgent concerns, indicating that the Party authorities perceived greater policy risks in the political and social domains.

In conclusion, despite multiple sources of internal tension, North Korea’s operational system for 8th-term Party meetings succeeded in containing emerging problems and managing policies without major disruption. In the short term, following the 9th Party Congress, the Workers’ Party’s regime management functions are expected to continue operating effectively, supported by backing from China and Russia and by strengthened internal mobilization mechanisms. Over the medium to long term, however, the regressive nature of policies absent reform and opening, the limitations of internal mobilization and external support, and the potential for fractures within the Party leadership are likely to significantly weaken the Party’s capacity for policy management and regime cohesion. Accordingly, policies that prepare for substantive changes in North Korea’s policy trajectory will be increasingly necessary.

This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2026-04)

(‘북한의 8기 당 전원회의 운영체계 종합 평가’)