Paradoxically, Iran’s indiscriminate offensive against the Gulf was the result of the decapitation of much of its leadership and the collapse of its command-and-control system under the overwhelming military power of the United States and Israel. Backed into a corner, hardliners within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps lost their internal coordination mechanisms and became preoccupied with organizational survival. As a result, they resorted to fragmented, localized attacks and asymmetric tactics based on low-cost drones. At the same time, Iran combined these actions with demands for Strait of Hormuz transit fees settled in Chinese yuan, as well as maritime asymmetric threats involving small fast boats and naval mines.

However, the integrated air defense network built by the United States and Gulf states recorded an interception rate of over 90 percent during the war, demonstrating the strategic value of multilayered defense systems, real-time intelligence sharing, and interoperability. Iran’s attempt to blockade the Strait of Hormuz also backfired, triggering a U.S. counter-blockade that placed pressure on Iran’s own economy. Nevertheless, the war left the Gulf security architecture with urgent tasks: securing low- to mid-cost interception systems and expanding missile stockpiles. In response, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) is accelerating efforts to establish a collective security framework while emphasizing the indivisibility of member states’ security.

Going forward, Gulf states are likely to further institutionalize a collective security framework centered on U.S. Central Command, or CENTCOM, into which Israel has been incorporated. There is no viable alternative to the United States’ unrivaled surveillance and reconnaissance assets or its integrated command structure. Moreover, the existential threat posed by Iran far outweighs regional fatigue over U.S. intervention. The UAE has already reportedly participated in strikes on Iranian territory in coordination with the United States and Israel, while Saudi Arabia is also known to have undertaken limited military action. In addition, the UAE and Bahrain have joined U.S.-led efforts to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, and the rapid deployment of Israel’s Iron Dome and Iron Beam systems to the UAE has further tightened security cooperation among them.

Although Saudi Arabia continues to pursue diplomatic hedging in light of the Palestinian issue, it is likely to converge militarily with a U.S.-centered defense architecture. Ultimately, the Gulf security landscape is expected to evolve into an integrated system built around U.S. CENTCOM, with the UAE taking a leading role and Bahrain serving as a strategic bridgehead. The United States, for its part, will likely seek to distribute its regional strategic burden through a locally sourced collective security framework that combines Israel’s advanced technological capabilities, Gulf capital, and U.S. command-and-intelligence assets.

This article is an English Summary of Asan Issue Brief (2026-16).

(Read More in Korean : ‘2026 미-이란 전쟁과 걸프 안보 체계의 전환 가능성: 위기에서 집단안보로’)