Key Findings

Introduction

December began with extensive coverage of China’s expanded air defense identification zone(ADIZ) and what it meant for South Korea. The coverage was measured, with most calling for a cautious South Korean response. But this budding debate was derailed by news from North Korea.

The North’s announcement of the purge and execution of Jang Seong-Taek surprised everyone. While the rumor had already surfaced via a South Korean lawmaker who was told of the purge by the National Intelligence Service(NIS), it was highly unusual for North Korea to publicly confirm it. This announcement only served to ramp up the rumor and speculation that always accompanies news emanating from North Korea.

On the domestic front, President Park Geun-Hye marked the one year anniversary of her election victory. The Blue House was far from celebratory. Approval ratings decreased sharply in the last half of December, driven primarily by losses among those 40 and younger. The ongoing NIS scandal continues to create problems for the administration, the handling of the country’s longest-ever rail workers strike brought strong criticism, and students around the country took part in a poster protest that asked the question, “How are you all doing?” With no domestic achievement of note in the year since her election, and seemingly nothing in the pipeline, the youth and the progressives were increasingly critical of President Park.

Jang Seong-Taek and the North Korean Regime

While the prime focus was on what the purge meant for the stability of the regime, there was also speculation about a North Korean provocation. Defense Minister Kim Kwan-Jin predicted that such a provocation could come between late January and early March. A majority (67.9%) of the South Korean public also sees a provocation as likely. It is worth noting, however, that there was no change in perceptions of current and future national security throughout December. This suggests that opinions on provocation likely reflect media reporting.

With regard to President Park’s overall North Korea policy, the public appears to approve with 58.2% stating as such. This number deserves further investigation. Among those aged 50 and older 73.4% approved of her North Korea policy, but for those under age 40 approval of the administration’s policy was 47.8%. This suggests that approval of current policy toward North Korea is being filtered through presidential approval. In the last half of December President Park’s approval among those under 40 declined sharply. This is precisely what regression analysis shows. Rather than being a judgment of the actual policy, it was instead a reflection of whether or not a respondent approved of President Park’s overall performance.

With regard to the stability of North Korea, there were two clear camps. The first claimed that the purge of Jang was a sign of Kim Jong Un taking firm control of the country. The second camp posited that it was a sign of significant instability. As for the Korean public, they largely agreed with the latter—63.4% stated that the purge and execution of Jang was a sign of instability in the regime.

Of course, the purge and execution of Jang Seong-Taek once again highlighted the ongoing human rights abuses in North Korea. There has been increasing focus on this issue as progress on the denuclearization of the North remains at a standstill. However, the issue remains under the radar for the South Korean public. Following the purge of Jang, 41.8% stated they had some level of interest in human rights in North Korea. When this same question was asked in a survey conducted April 26-28, it was 37.8%. In fact, in the April survey, the South Korean public showed higher concern for other domestic minority groups, with 43.5% stating concern for the human rights of these groups.

Youth Dissatisfaction

As illustrated, if Dr. Ahn were to announce the official formation of his own political party, significant support would be drawn from the 20s, 30s, and 40s. Thus, the support is not nearly as one-dimensional as is often presented in the media. While party support is not the same as candidate support, this data does provide a useful proxy as the establishment of Ahn’s party would be viewed as a measure of his ability to mount a presidential campaign in 2017.

Also of note is the regional support for an Ahn-led party. In the Honam region, Kim Dae- Jung’s political base, there is great interest in Ahn. Between the Democratic Party (DP) and Ahn’s potential party, that which carries Honam in the upcoming local election in June will be rendered the legitimacy of being the major opposition party. This region, in addition to the Seoul mayoral race, will be of high interest.

If Ahn’s party is formed, and all indicators point to that taking place eventually, it would be a disaster for the DP. In multiple polls, support for the DP falls to approximately 10%. Without Ahn’s party, the DP polls at 20%. This will likely ignite a serious political battle between the two camps.

Impact of Korail Strike Limited

When the strike began on December 9 approval was 57.2%. When the strike concluded approval was at 53.7% (Figure 3). True, the approval rate certainly does seem to have reached a lower plateau, but assigning the cause to the handling of the Korail strike is difficult. Even if that was the cause, the Blue House likely feels that it emerged relatively unscathed from what could have been a bruising battle. What once looked like a potential inflection point on which presidential approval would begin an irreversible decline, now appears to have been
nothing of the sort.

Conclusion

Clearly, President Park’s to-do list is long. Regional relations have deteriorated, and a North Korean provocation may be in the offing. Domestically she is faced with a country that has significant wealth, regional, and generational gaps. At the moment, her administration prepares unready to seriously address any of these divides. Her approval ratings already show signs of having lost those 30 and younger, and those in their 40s may soon be lost as well. While these groups are not her political base and did not get her elected, to accomplish her goals while in office it would be beneficial to at least have them involved. Instead, she now faces an uphill battle for the remainder of her term. That battle may increasingly play out as the old versus the young, and could lead to a worsening generational divide rather than an easing one.