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ㆍNearly 77% of surveyed respondents expressed interest in unification. 53.5% stated that the speed with which to move forward on unification should be adjusted and more than 1 in 4 (25.5%) stated that there is no need to rush unification.
ㆍViews about unification were tempered by expectations about its cost as 63% of those surveyed stated that they anticipated South Korea’s post-unification economy to be worse off. The respondents stating that they are not willing to pay for unification increased from 20.6% in 2011 to 45.5% in 2020.
ㆍWhen asked how the respondents perceived North Korea, 27.9% said “neighbor,” 25.7% stated “enemy,” 11.5% said “stranger,” and 21.1% said “one of us.”
ㆍNearly 79% (78.7%) of those surveyed stated that South Korea should provide economic aid to North Korea if Pyongyang changes its behavior. 21% stated that aid should continue unconditionally.
ㆍ94.9% of those surveyed agreed that the human rights situation in North Korea was serious and 78.3% stated that this issue should be addressed immediately.
ㆍOver 57% of the respondents stated that they assessed the likelihood of war with North Korea to be low. Over 72% of those surveyed stated that South Korean military cannot deter North Korea in the event of a contingency on the Korean Peninsula.
ㆍNearly 95% of South Koreans believe that North Korea possesses a working nuclear capability and over 93% believes that North Korea will not abandon this capability.
ㆍNearly 70% (69.3%) of the respondents supported developing indigenous nuclear capability and over 61% (61.3%) supported reintroducing tactical nuclear weapons.
ㆍWith respect to the ROK-US alliance, over 78% supported either maintaining or strengthening the bilateral relationship. Over 86% supported keeping the alliance even after unification.
ㆍWith regards to US Forces Korea, over 70% supported either maintaining or increasing the troop level.
ㆍOn burden sharing, over 41% supported maintaining the current level of South Korean contribution to the Special Measures Agreement.
ㆍOn wartime operational control (OPCON) transfer, 42.5% favored condition-based transfer while 27.2% favored schedule-based transfer.
ㆍ25.9% of the respondents saw China as a significant security threat after North Korea (55.8%). 66.7% named China as the greatest threat to South Korea after unification.
ㆍ71.5% of survey respondents assessed Japan’s influence in the region to be negative.
ㆍOnly 11.3% of the respondents stated that Japan is a national security threat. 23.1% saw Japan as a potential security threat after unification.